THE DIDO EPISODE AND THE AENEID

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RICHARD C. MONTI

THE DIDO EPISODE AND THE AENEID

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THE DIDO EPISODE AND THE AENEID

Roman Social and Political Values in the Epic

BY

RICHARD C. MONTI

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For My Mother and Father

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PREFACE

This book has its origin in my doctoral dissertation presented at Harvard University in 1973. Some of the material in Chapters One, Three and Four comes from the dissertation, but everything from the dissertation has been reworked. I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge my gratitude to the following: the Istituto di Filologia Classica of the Università degli Studi di Torino, for permission to use the library facilities in the summer of 1977; to my colleagues Prof. Carrie E. Cowherd and Prof. Roy A. Swanson who read the typescript and made many helpful criticisms; and to my wife Dr. Nancy G. Monti for her useful suggestions and, not least of all, her patience and understanding.

WORKS CITED AND ABBREVIATIONS USED

Reference is made to the works of ancient Latin and Greek writers by the abbreviations of the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* and Liddell, Scott, and Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon.* The Oxford Classical Texts have been used for the citations of the works of Vergil (R. A. B. Mynors, 1969), Catullus (R. A. B. Mynors, 1958), Apollonius Rhodius (Hermann Fränkel, 1961), and Euripides (Gilbert Murray, vol. I, 1902). *CAH* = *Cambridge Ancient History*; *FGrH* = Felix Jacoby, *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*; *ThLL* = *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae.* In the following list of the works cited, abbreviations of periodicals are those of *L'Année Philologique.* Works are regularly cited in the body of the book and the notes by the authors' names only. Since in certain cases such a manner of citation would be confusing, abbreviations for some works have been provided in parentheses.

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CHAPTER ONE

FIDES AND THE RIGHT HAND

The Dido episode of the *Aeneid* has been studied for the most part in its relation to the tradition of amatory narrative. Because Vergil's poetry relies heavily on literary reminiscence to create its effect, it must be a task of the scholarship to trace the influence of earlier literature. But even after literary imitations are securely identified and the determination is made whether they are allusive merely or structural,[1] one must further consider how Vergil integrates the imitations into the ensemble of his own poem. If such considerations are not entertained, the simple recognition of imitations can lead to the obfuscation and misunderstanding of what the poet is saying. This unfortunately had been the case in the criticism on the Dido episode. Emphasis has been placed on Dido as a sentimental heroine at the expense of a fact obvious to every reader of the poem, namely that Vergil also presents her as a political woman, the ruler of a city destined to be the rival of Rome. It is the hope of this study to offer a somewhat more balanced view of the Dido episode. Its purpose is first to take up the question of how the literary reminiscences in the narrative of the rupture of relations between Dido and Aeneas are integrated into the larger context of the Dido episode. From the perspective which this examination provides, it will further consider the relationship between the episode at Carthage and the *Aeneid* as a whole.

It is a commonplace of the scholarship on the Dido episode that the lament and complaints of Dido over the departure of Aeneas reverberate with the echoes of the Medeas of Euripides and Apollonius and the Ariadne of Catullus.[2] Richard Heinze's remarks give the classic formulation of the judgment of the scholarship on Vergil's treatment of the matter.

> Virgil hat weder das Bedürfniss gehabt noch die Verpflichtung gefühlt, im Ausdruck, den Dido ihren Empfindungen gibt, original zu sein. Trotz der grossen Lücken der erhaltenen älteren Literatur gibt es kaum einen wesentlichen Zug in diesem Bild, den wir nicht aus Virgils Vorgängern belegen könnten. (p. 113)

We learn that Vergil reproduces the work of his predecessors, and this knowledge in turn explains the form and content of what Dido says. To the conclusions of the scholarship it should also be added that Vergil's imitation is structural as well as allusive. The narrative is modeled on the pattern of the Medea and Ariadne stories. The epic hero, in a set of circumstances that thwart his progress, finds the way out of his difficulties by the help of a woman who falls in love with him. They become lovers, but he eventually leaves her. The story-pattern is a common one, but the repetition in the same order of the same themes which form the lament of the abandoned woman in Apollonius and Catullus demonstrates Vergil's immediate sources.[3] These themes moreover can be traced back from Apollonius and Catullus to Euripides' *Medea.* The Dido of *Aeneid* 4 then is conceived as a sentimental heroine in the Greek manner, and the primary influence on Vergil is to be found in the Hellenistic tradition of love narrative.[4]

There are, however, certain instances in which a comparison with the earlier literature fails to provide an explanation for Dido's words. These are crucial passages which affect our understanding of the nature of the relationship between Dido and Aeneas and which seem to go to the heart of Vergil's conception of the episode. A case in point is Dido's complaint about the faithlessness of Aeneas.

> ...iam iam nec maxima Iuno
> nec Saturnius haec oculis pater aspicit aequis.
> nusquam tuta fides. eiectum litore, egentem
> excepi et regni demens in parte locavi.
> amissam classem, socios a morte reduxi
> (heu furiis incensa feror!): nunc augur Apollo,
> nunc Lyciae sortes, nunc et Iove missus ab ipso
> interpres divum fert horrida iussa per auras.
> (*A.* 4.371-378)

Heinze (p. 135, n. 2) notes the parallel of *nusquam tuta fides* (v. 373) with Medea's ὅρκων δὲ φρούδη πίστις (*Med.* 492) and remarks that "Die Klage über den mangelnden Beistand der Götter, ursprünglich durch die Straflosigkeit der Eidesverletzung begründet... ist hier anders gewendet, weil an keinen Schwur appelliert werden konnte."[5] With the words ὅρκων δὲ φρούδη πίστις Medea refers to the oath of marriage which Jason had made to her,

and for this Vergil's narrative offers no parallel either implicit or explicit. Heinze leaves unanswered the question which his remark on the similarity of *A.* 4.373 to *Med.* 492 raises. If an appeal cannot be made to an oath, on what does Dido base her claim? In other words, what kind of relationship is this which Dido puts under the protection of the gods?

Dido's appeal to the right hand of Aeneas in *A.* 4.307-308 (*...nec te data dextera quondam/...tenet...?*) and in *A.* 4.314-319 (*per ego... dextramque tuam te/... oro... exue mentem*) involves similar difficulties. Heinze (p. 134, n. 1) cites *Med.* 21-22, ...ἀνακαλεῖ δὲ δεξιάς, / πίστιν μεγίστην..., and adds that "Die Berufung auf die *data dextera quondam* 307 ist durch die frühere Erzählung nicht ausreichend motiviert, wenigstens nicht so wie bei Medea..."[6] The observation that the invocation of the right hand is not adequately prepared by the earlier narrative proceeds from the assumption that Vergil is simply reproducing the tradition. If Dido speaks of right hands, then she must be referring to a promise of marriage because *Med.* 21-22 refers to the promise of marriage that Jason guaranteed with his right hand. Since it is true that there is nothing in the text before this point which tells of the clasping of right hands in a pledge of marriage, the conclusion to which Heinze's reader is drawn is that Vergil in an excess of zeal incorporates this borrowing from Euripides without making the necessary adjustments in the narrative.[7]

Unless this conclusion is satisfactory, it will be necessary to look elsewhere for an explanation of *dextera.* Some have taken *dextera* as a reference not to a promise of marriage, but to marriage itself. Mackail at *A.* 4.307 cites the ritual joining of the right hands of the bride and groom at a Roman wedding, and Austin and R. D. Williams (with some diffidence) *ad loc.* follow him. Although it is not explicitly stated, this view is undoubtedly founded on the peculiar interpretation which Mackail gives at *A.* 4.166 to the incident in the cave (*A.* 4.165-168). The various entities and natural phenomena in the passage are said to represent particulars of a Roman marriage ceremony: earth the *panis farreus,* Juno the *pronuba,* the lightening the torchbearers of the wedding procession, and *aether* the witnesses who signed the marriage certificate. It seems, however, somewhat perverse to make an allegory of this symbolic description of Aeneas' and Dido's lovemaking, especially since we are told that Dido felt the necessity to camouflage the incident with

the name of marriage, *coniugium vocat, hoc praetexit nomine culpam* (*A.* 4.172). Dido does say that she and Aeneas are wife and husband, but there is no reason to assume that she does so because she takes the incident in the cave as a wedding ceremony.[8]

The problem of understanding posed by *dextera* in *A.* 4.307 and 314 is one and the same with the problem of understanding posed by *fides* in *A.* 4.373. Dido herself puts them together at a later stage of the narrative when she watches Aeneas' ships sail away, *en dextra fidesque* (*A.* 4.597). Vergil here is only making explicit that the right hand is the symbol of *fides*. This is an association which the Romans regularly made.[9] It is for this reason that Buscaroli's interpretation, which like Mackail's understands *dextera* as a reference to marriage, stands on firmer ground. This view takes into account the symbolic import of the right hand. "La destra... è qui, come si è detto, simbolo di fedeltà," by which he means conjugal fidelity.[10] But there are certain objections that can be brought against this interpretation. First, although in Republican usage the right hand was regularly employed to symbolize *fides* in a number of personal relationships, as, for example, *amicitia, clientela,* and *hospitium,* it was not used as a symbol of *fides* in marriage.[11] If *dextera* in *A.* 4.307 and 314 means conjugal fidelity, it would be an anomalous usage. Second, Buscaroli's view is open to the criticism that can be made of any of the interpretations which take *dextera* as an allusion to marriage. Such an assumption creates difficulties in understanding Dido's complaint about *fides* in *A.* 4.371-378. If marriage is on her mind, why does she not say so? Her preoccupation rather is with her benefactions to Aeneas: she saved him and his fleet, she gave him a share in royal power, and now he must depart by divine command. Dido in fact mentions marriage nowhere in this speech. She had raised the issue in her first speech to Aeneas (*per conubia nostra, per inceptos hymenaeos, A.* 4.316), he disputed the point (*...nec coniugis umquam/ praetendi taedas aut haec in foedera veni, A.* 4.338-339), and now she abandons it. She nevertheless advances a claim against Aeneas. If not as wife to husband, on what basis? We return to the question raised at the beginning of this discussion about *fides* and *dextera, i.e.,* the nature of the relationship between Dido and Aeneas.

If we disregard all of the views which understand *dextera* as a reference to marriage, the only alternative is to suppose that *dextera* has a different significance. Pease suggests a solution to the pro-

blem which has the merit of being unencumbered by preconceived notions and unwarranted assumptions. He proposes at *A.* 4.307 (*data dextera*), as Servius implies with his comment *ad loc.*, *foedus amicitiarum,* that we understand the phrase as a reference to Dido's claim to the gratitude which she earned by showing hospitality to Aeneas and his people. His argument is based on a consideration of the term *dextera* elsewhere in the *Aeneid.* "Other cases in Virgil seem to suggest a pledge of hospitality or friendship rather than one of troth...."[12] This remark suggests a valuable methodological procedure which deserves to be followed up. What is the semantic range of the term?

Dextera in the meaning of right hand occurs with extremely high frequency in the *Aeneid.*[13] In the majority of the cases the word merely designates the right hand in its functional aspect (*e.g.*, engaged in battle, greetings, celebrating rites). In contrast to these altogether expected uses, the term appears a number of times as the palpable expression of an individual's trustworthiness within the context of various types of personal and political relationships. But marriage is not among these. In the Polyphemus episode of Book 3, Anchises' offer of his right hand becomes for the frightened Greek Achaemenides the visible sign of his protection.

> ipse pater dextram Anchises haud multa moratus
> dat iuveni atque animum praesenti pignore firmat.
> (*A.* 3.610-611)

The term occurs earlier in Book 3 when the Trojans come to Delos. The king of the place, Anius, meets them and *...veterem Anchisen agnovit amicum. / iungimus hospitio dextras et tecta subimus* (*A.* 3.82-83). Anchises and Anius are old guest-friends, *amici,* and so they join right hands to renew their *hospitium.* The distinction between personal and political relationships becomes obliterated when we realize that the first part of *A.* 3.83 is echoed in *A.* 11.165, *iunximus hospitio dextras,* the words with which Evander refers to his military alliance with Aeneas (*cf. A.* 8.150, *accipe daque fidem,* a reminiscence of Ennius' *accipe daque fidem foedusque feri bene firmum,* Vahlen, *Ann.* 1.32, and *A.* 8.169, *ergo et quam petitis iuncta est mihi foedere dextra*). Aeneas himself, when he learns of the death of Pallas, recalls the *dextrae datae* (*A.* 10.517) which sealed his alliance with Evander, and later he cries out in despair over the dead body of Pallas, *haec mea magna fides?* (*A.* 11.55).

Vergil regularly makes this association of the right hand with *fides* and *foedus* as the symbol of the assumption of obligations in political relationships. Amata appeals to Latinus' right hand when she attempts to dissuade him from the dynastic marriage of Lavinia to Aeneas and to recall him to his responsibilities to Turnus.

> quid tua sancta fides? quid cura antiqua tuorum
> et consanguineo totiens data dextera Turno?
> (*A*. 7.365-366)

Diomedes uses the term in his exhortation to the Latins to ally themselves with Aeneas, ...*coeant in foedera dextrae/ qua datur*... (*A*. 11.292-293). Latinus stretches his right hand to the sky, ... *tenditque ad sidera dextram* (*A*. 12.196), as he swears fidelity to the agreement for the single combat of Aeneas and Turnus, *nulla dies pacem hanc Italis nec foedera rumpet.* (*A*. 12.202). Aeneas does the same when he insists on the observation of the agreement, ... *dextram tendebat inermem* (*A*. 12.311).../ *quo ruitis?* (313).../...*ictum iam foedus* (314).../... *ego foedera faxo/ firma manu*... (316-317), and when he disclaims responsibility for its violation, ... *dextram sub moenia tendit* (579)/ ...*testaturque deos* (581).../... *bis iam Italos hostis, haec altera foedera rumpi* (582).

Vergil's practice corresponds to the use of the word in Republican literature in contexts of personal relationships. As in Vergil, *dextera* is not used in Republican literature to allude to marriage or to symbolize marriage vows. Rather the sphere of reference of *dextera* is regularly that of political relationships.[14] A brief survey of the term establishes the point. Livy in Book 1.1.8-9 tells of the first encounter of Latinus with Aeneas and the Trojans. *Dextra data fidem futurae amicitiae sanxisse* [*i.e.*, *Latinum*], *inde foedus ictum inter duces, inter exercitus salutationem factam, Aeneam apud Latinum fuisse in hospitio; ibi Latinum apud penates deos domesticum publico adiunxisse foedus filia Aeneae in matrimonium data.* Livy is simply applying in this legendary account the terms that would be used to define an actual political relationship. One need only compare the relations of Syphax the Numidian and Scipio in Book 29.24.3. Syphax sends emissaries to Scipio in Sicily to warn him that in the event of a Roman invasion of Africa Scipio would find him joining the Carthaginians. Scipio replies in a letter that invokes Syphax' obligations to Scipio and to Rome, ... *litteras dat ad regem quibus etiam atque etiam monet eum ne iura hospitii secum ne cum populo Romano initae*

societatis neu fas, fidem, dextras, deos testes atque arbitros conventorum fallat. The connection with Scipio is again mentioned in Book 30.13.8 when the captured Syphax is brought before Scipio. *Movit et Scipionem cum fortuna pristina viri praesenti fortunae conlata tum recordatio hospitii dextraeque datae et foederis publice ac privatim iuncti.* The relationship of the client king Syphax to Scipio and the Romans is designated, like that of Aeneas to Latinus, *hospitium*; the term *amicitia* in Book 1.1.8 and *societas* in Book 29.24.3 are obviously synonyms. The agreement to enter relations is a *foedus,* the obligations of which are protected ultimately by the gods, but immediately by the *fides* of the participants which is symbolized by the right hand. The repeated phrase *dextera data* has the appearance of a set formula. The application of these terms is not limited to international relationships. Cicero, for example, joins *dextera* with *fides* and *foedus* in *Phil.* 13.2.4 where he speaks of the impossibility of coming to any kind of terms with M. Antonius. Here *fides* is replaced with the corresponding adjective *fidus*: *O fidam dextram Antoni qua ille plurimos cives trucidavit, o ratum religiosumque foedus quod cum Antoniis fecerimus. Dextera, fides,* and *foedus* as the stipulation of a formal political relationship form a natural constellation with each element implying the others.

The utter conventionality of the right hand as the concrete sign of trustworthiness and reliability in political relationships is proven by the frequency with which the collocation of the two terms is made: Cicero, *Flac.* 41.103, where Cicero addresses his legal client Flaccus, *O mea dextera illa, mea fides, mea promissa, cum te, si rempublicam conservaremus, omnium bonorum praesidio quoad viveres, non modo munitum, sed etiam ornatum fore pollicebar*; *Red. Sen.* 9.24, where Lentulus in his effort to secure Cicero's return from exile is characterized as one *qui mihi primus adflicto et iacenti consularem fidem dextramque porrexit*; *Phil.* 11.2.5, where Cicero refers to the murder of Trebonius by Dolabella, *secutae conlocutiones familiarissimae cum Trebonio; complexus summae benevolentiae falsi exstiterunt in amore simulato; dextraeque quae fidei testes esse solebant sunt perfidia et scelere violatae*; *Ver.* 5.58.153, where Pompey takes under his protection former followers of Sertorius, *ad Cn. Pompeium clarissimum virum et fortissimum permulti occiso Peperna ex illo Sertoriano numero militum confugerunt. quem non ille summo cum studio salvum incolumemque servavit? cui civi supplicanti non illa dextera invicta fidem porrexit et spem salutis ostendit?*; Sallust, *Iug.* 10.3, where Micipsa on his death bed commends Adherbal and Hiempsal to Jugurtha,

nunc quoniam natura finem vitae facit, per hanc dexteram, per regni fidem moneo obtestorque te uti hos, qui tibi genere propinqui, beneficio meo fratres sunt, caros habeas neu malis alienos adiungere quam sanguine coniunctos retinere. Further examples could be brought forth, but they would illustrate the point confirmed by the passages already cited, namely that *dextera* is used to designate symbolically reliability in a variety of international and domestic, public and private political relationships.[15]

Internal as well as external evidence then suggests that we understand Dido's appeal to the right hand of Aeneas in *A.* 4.307 as a claim on *fides,* that is, on the reliability and loyalty that one must exhibit in a personal political relationship. Taking *dextera* in this way would therefore clarify Dido's complaint about *fides* in *A.* 4.371-378. She is not criticizing Aeneas for breaking a promise or foreswearing an oath; rather she is blaming him for shirking his responsibilities towards her. She took him in and even gave him a place in her kingdom; he thereby contracted certain obligations towards her which he now refuses to accept and which he moreover has the temerity to say the gods—who protect the observation of such obligations—order him to neglect. Is there any justification for maintaining that Dido views her relationship with Aeneas as a political relationship rather than simply as that of the wronged wife or deceived lover of the Greek tradition represented by Euripides, Apollonius, and Catullus? Dido's complaint and the enumeration of her benefactions in *A.* 4.371-378 bring us back first to the initial stages of the relationship which are set out in Book 1 and next to the period of intimacy narrated in the earlier part of Book 4. In order to answer the question, it is necessary to consider on what basis the relationship is established, and, in answering it, it will become evident that the view to which the evidence on the term *dextera* leads is confirmed.

CHAPTER TWO

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL VALUES IN THE DIDO NARRATIVE OF *AENEID* 1

One of the results of the study of Roman history in approximately the last seventy years has been the clarification of the structures of Roman politics and along with that the clarification of Roman political terminology. The conclusions are well known, and, were it not necessary to establish an orientation for the present discussion, there would be no reason to repeat them here even briefly.[1] Roman politics was organized not into parties adhering to a more or less closely defined ideology, but into personal alliances maintained for the purpose of mutual and/or common advancement. Success in politics was a function of the politician's personal connections and the strength of the ties that bound political friends together. A political relationship was regularly defined as *amicitia,* a term which has little to do with the sentimental notion of friendship. Although the term implied a parity in the social status of the participants, it could be applied to the association of patron with client and even to relationships of *hospitium* with foreigners. Because of the personal nature of Roman politics, the code of behavior which regulated political relationships was essentially a code of inter-personal relationships. At the core of the system was the notion of reciprocity. Politics operated by the exchange of services (*officia*) and favors (*beneficia*): these were the concrete manifestations of the individuals' reliability and sincerity. From this exchange resulted *gratia,* the attitude which disposed the individuals involved to continued reciprocation. The indispensable quality in a political *amicus* was *fides* because the sense of responsibility and trustworthiness provided the only element of stability in a relationship. While *fides* in the strict sense was the bond which related patron and client, it was applicable as well to the relations of social equals. Matthias Gelzer outlined the sense and importance of this term and the related *officium* in the political vocabulary.

> Treuverhältniss entspricht dem lateinischen "fides". Seine Natur ergibt sich aus Stellen wo fides mit andern Begriffen kombiniert wird, mit patrocinium, clientela, praesidium,

> amicitia, hospitium. Demgemäss finden sich häufig nebeneinander amici, clientes, hospites, patroni. Mit "fides" deckt sich vielfach die Bedeutung von "officium", die man mit "gegenseitigen Nahverhältniss" wiedergeben kann. Das Wort begegnet ungemein häufig, besonders im Sinn der dem Nahverhältniss entspringenden sittlichen Pflicht. Die Nuance der Gegenseitigkeit ist dabei immer vorhanden. (pp. 52-54)

The sacredness of the obligations of *fides* was underscored by the use of the term *pietas* to indicate the observation of such obligations—although *pietas* was properly exercised in the sphere of family relations and relations with gods. This same tendency to place these political relationships under the protection of the gods is seen in their designation as *foedera*.

The norms of behavior which regulated Roman political relationships are the same ones which inform the association which Dido enters with Aeneas and the Trojans. Vergil narrates the establishment of the initial stages of their relationship in the series of scenes that begins with Ilioneus' petition to the queen in *A*. 1.520-558. In this speech Ilioneus bears a double burden. He must persuade Dido whom he considers to be the ruler of a barbarous people to show common decency to the shipwrecked Trojans, and he must convince her moreover that they are worthy of such consideration. Modes of behavior are very much the topic of this speech.

The speech develops around the antithesis between barbarity and humane and civilized conduct.

> quod genus hoc hominum? quaeve hunc tam barbara morem
> permittit patria? hospitio prohibemur harenae;
> bella cient primaque vetant consistere terra.
> si genus humanum et mortalia temnitis arma,
> at sperate deos memores fandi atque infandi.
> (*A*. 1.539-543)

It is barbarous to disregard the claims of humanity by forbidding the shipwrecked the safety of the shore and to think that one may with impunity provoke unjust armed hostilities. But what, on the other hand, are the norms of civilized behavior?

> rex erat Aeneas nobis, quo iustior alter
> nec pietate fuit, nec bello maior et armis.
> quem si fata virum servant, si vescitur aura

aetheria neque adhuc crudelibus occubat umbris,
non metus, officio nec te certasse priorem
paeniteat. sunt et Siculis regionibus urbes
armaque Troianoque a sanguine clarus Acestes.
(*A.* 1.544-550)

Iustitia, pietas, officium, and military valor are the qualities of Aeneas. In his absence Acestes and the Trojans in Sicily can be expected to act in the same way: they are civilized (they live in *urbes*), and they are men of military prowess. Barbarity and civilized conduct then are judged according to a specific standard of behavior.

As a parallel to the connection of *iustitia* and *pietas* in vv. 544-545, Austin *ad loc.* cites Cicero, *N. D.* 1.116, *est enim pietas iustitia adversum deos.* This definition is irrelevant and misleading. It suggests that Ilioneus is praising Aeneas as the man of *pietas* in the sense of the opening lines of the book, that is, as the *fato profugus* who submits even against his will to the commands of the gods. Although this understanding is open to the reader, it cannot be the one which Ilioneus gives to these words. He assumes throughout the speech that Aeneas and the Trojans are unknown to Dido (and she in fact is quick to correct him on the point, *A.* 1.565-566). As a consequence it is reasonable to expect that the meaning of *pietas* will emerge from the context, not from our preconceived notions of Aeneas' character. *Iustitia* is the virtue which consists in giving each person his due.[2] To be *pietate iustus* in Ilioneus' phrase would be to act like one who, by fulfilling the obligations he has incurred towards another, gives him his due. In other words Aeneas can be trusted to requite a favor with a favor. *Pietas* is closely related to *fides* (according to Cicero, *Off.* 1.7.23, *fundamentum est autem iustitiae fides*), and *pietas* in the passage in Ilioneus' speech seems to be used as a synonym for *fides.* The two concepts approach each other in meaning, *fides* the trustworthiness or reliability in a personal relationship, and *pietas* the steadfast observation of obligations. The conjunction of the terms is attested in our sources,[3] and Vergil himself treats them as virtually synonymous. In the parallel passage of Book 7, where Ilioneus appears again as an ambassador, now to Latinus, he characterizes Aeneas in words strongly reminiscent of *A.* 1.544-545. He is attempting to persuade Latinus to accept the Trojans as settlers in his country.

non erimus regno indecores, nec vestra feretur
fama levis tantique abolescit gratia facti,
nec Troiam Ausonios gremio excepisse pigebit;
fata per Aeneae iuro dextramque potentem
sive fide seu quis bello est expertus et armis.
(*A.* 7.231-235)[4]

The *fides* and military valor of Aeneas recommend the Trojans here as his *pietas* and military valor did in *A.* 1.544-545.

Like *fides, pietas* manifests itself in actions. Hellegouarc'h (p. 276) observes, "*Pius,* dont le sens premier est vraisemblablement '(au cœur) pur'... caractérise l'état de celui qui s'est purifié par l'accomplissement des devoirs qui lui incombaient. Ainsi la *pietas* appartient au domaine de l'*officium*; le *pius* est l'homme qui s'est acquitté de la dette qu'il a contractée en raison de bienfaits reçus." Vergil explicitly draws the connection between *pietas* and *officium.* Aeneas' *pietas* is the guarantee that he will reciprocate any favors shown to him: ... *officio nec te certasse priorem/ paeniteat* (*A.* 1.548-549). This phrase is remarkable for two reasons. First, the notion of a competition in rendering services has an exact parallel in a letter of Cicero. In *Fam.* 7.31.1 Cicero writes to his client M. Curius (see *Fam.* 7.29.2, where Curius addresses Cicero as his *patronus*) of the close relationship they enjoy: *facile perspexi ex tuis litteris quod semper studui, et me a te plurimi fieri et te intellegere quam mihi carus esses. quod quoniam uterque nostrum consecutus est, reliquum est ut officiis certemus inter nos, quibus aequo animo vel vincam te vel vincar abs te.* There is of course no reason for imagining Vergil's words to be a direct imitation of Cicero, but it is reasonable to assume that the metaphor would suggest itself to a member of the culture thinking in the terms of a personal political relationship. Second, the word *officium* appears nowhere else in the Vergilian corpus. It hardly seems possible that Vergil did not use the word here deliberately in its political significance, and that as a result he was not suggesting an analogy between Roman social institutions and the relationship with the Carthaginians for which Ilioneus pleads.

Aeneas' *iustitia* and *pietas* are only half of Ilioneus' characterization. He is also *bello maior et armis* (*A.* 1.545); Acestes and the Trojans in Sicily, the substitutes for Aeneas in the event of his being dead, are also humane and civilized since they live in cities, and they too are warriors (see *A.* 1.550). Why the focus on military

valor? Ilioneus is surely not threatening Dido. He is in no position to do so, and he has already left to the gods the punishment for unjust provocation of war. The mention of military prowess finds a place in Ilioneus' recommendation of Aeneas because Aeneas is represented as the quintessential Roman. Both military prowess and the social virtues like *fides* and *pietas* characterize the ideal *imperator,* the man of complete Roman virtue. In *Man.* 13.36 Cicero outlines the virtues of the ideal general. *Non enim bellandi virtus solum in summo ac perfecto imperatore quaerenda est, sed multae sunt artes eximiae huius administrae comitesque virtutis. ac primum quanta innocentia debent esse imperatores, quanta deinde in omnibus rebus temperantia, quanta fide, quanta facilitate, quanto ingenio, quanta humanitate.* Pompey alone, of course, has the appropriate credentials. Cicero concludes this passage, in which he applies the above-mentioned virtues to Pompey's conduct, with a consideration of the great man's *humanitas*: *humanitas iam tanta est ut difficile dictu sit utrum hostes magis virtutem eius pugnantes timuerint an mansuetudinem victi delexerint.* (*Man.* 14.42) *Humanitas* is the crown, as it were, of all the virtues. It encompasses the practice both of the martial arts and the arts of peaceful intercourse. Although Cicero's propaganda on behalf of Pompey and Vergil's portrait of Aeneas are not entirely analogous, they nevertheless are similar to each other in that they both proclaim an ideal, and in this respect they bear a remarkable resemblance. Each portrait is an independent manifestation of the same Roman social ideal. The complex of virtues to which Cicero applies the term *humanitas* has its analogue in the qualities that characterize Aeneas. These qualities, as we have seen, are meant to be contrasted with the conduct of the Carthaginians which Ilioneus describes as barbarous. They are the indications of Aeneas' civility or civilized behavior. The comparison of Cicero with Vergil suggests that *humanitas* and civilized behavior, as defined by specific social norms, are one and the same thing. The suggestion does not seem to be misleading since the adjective *barbarus* was used antonymously to *humanitas* and as a synonym for *inhumanus.*[5]

The Romans employed the term *humanitas* in two basic senses, benevolence or philanthropy, and culture or what we would call education in the humanities. A large number of semantically related concepts were drawn into one or the other of the spheres of meaning, and so we find in the usage of the first century B.C. that the word can bear, on the one hand, the sense of kindness, com-

passion, indulgence, tolerance, obligingness, tact, courtesy, and consideration, and, on the other, the sense of good taste and discrimination in cultural matters, wit, cleverness, humor, and charm.[6] The major problem to which the scholarship on *humanitas* has addressed itself is that of the origins and development of the concept from Greek philosophical and ethical thought. Another strain in the scholarship has attempted to distinguish a genuinely Roman element in the concept.[7] Among the investigators in this category is Hellegouarc'h. While not denying the Greek influence, he (p. 269) brings *humanitas* into the orbit of the social virtues of the Roman political man: "... ni 'humanisme', ni 'humanitarisme', l'*humanitas* consiste simplement à remplir les devoirs de l'*officium.*" His remarks are suggestive, and they served as the catalyst for the development of the view of *humanitas* elaborated below.[8]

A case can be made for defining *humanitas* in its primary meaning as that quality in any action or mode of behavior that makes possible or sustains civilized life. Civilized life is the life in which men's behavior is regulated by the laws and customs of the *civitas.* This most general sense of *humanitas* is evident in two passages from the speeches of Cicero, *Sest.* 42.91-92 and *Deiot.* 11.30-32. In *pro Sestio* Cicero describes human development as a progress *ex feritate illa ad iustitiam atque ad mansuetudinem* (91). The transition takes place when men are induced to abandon their nomadic ways and to live together in *res publicas, civitates, urbes* (91). But this communal life develops only with the discovery of law (*invento et divino iure et humano,* 92). *Ius* and *vis* are the criteria for distinguishing the savage from the civilized life. *atque inter hanc vitam perpolitam humanitate et illam immanem nihil tam interest quam ius atqua vis* (92). Urban and political life is refined by *humanitas.* What else can *humanitas* be but the behavior inculcated by *ius, iustitia* and *mansuetudo?* In *pro Rege Deiotaro* Cicero berates Castor for indicting his grandfather Deiotarus on a charge of conspiracy to murder Caesar. Castor's action is reprehensible not only because he behaves *ingrate* and *impie,* that is in disregard of *necessitudinis nomen,* but also because he violates *omnia vitae salutisque communis atque etiam humanitatis iura* (30). Castor had bribed one of his grandfather's slaves to testify against him. *Ubi enim id quod intus est atque nostrum, impune evolare potest contraque nos pugnare, fit in dominatu servitus, in servitute dominatio* (30). Castor's action then is an attack aimed not merely against his grandfather, but against the established order of society. *O tempora,*

o mores! (31). Such conduct is branded as *inhumanitas* and is contrasted with the conduct that adheres to the standards of civilized life, namely law and custom. *Quae est ista tam impotens, tam crudelis, tam immoderata inhumanitas? Idcirco in hanc urbem venisti ut huius urbis iura et exempla corrumperes, domesticaque immanitate nostrae civitatis humanitatem inquinares?* (32). Since civilized life is urban life, *humanitas* implies not only the social structure of the city, but also its social values.

If the basic meaning of *humanitas* is understood in this way, it becomes possible to see how in the usage of the first century B.C. the term could designate the diversity of qualities that fall under the rubrics of culture and philanthropy. Culture or the study of the humanities is *humanitas* because such studies contribute to civilized and benign social intercourse. The idea is well illustrated by an anecdote which Scipio relates in Cicero, *Rep.* 1.17.29. Plato, shipwrecked and washed onto a deserted shore, allayed the fears of his companions about their safety when he discovered geometrical figures traced in the sand. This and not the evidence of the practice of agriculture, which he could see, was proof that they were in a land inhabited by men. The point of the anecdote is that *appellari ceteros homines, esse solos eos qui essent politi propriis humanitatis artibus* (*Rep.* 1.17.28). *Humanitas* is civilized behavior; geometry and the other branches of speculative knowledge are proper to *humanitas* because they are a manifestation of one's civilized behavior.[9] The statement in the anecdote that Plato in drawing his conclusions disregarded the fact that agriculture was practised is not an idle detail. The notion that agriculture provided the economic base on which the civilized life of the city was founded is a commonplace of Greek thought; one needs only to think of the tradition of Demeter and Triptolemus at Eleusis.[10] Agriculture and the concomitant development of urban life became one of the criteria for distinguishing the barbarian from the civilized person.[11] In contrasting the evidence of interest in geometry with the evidence of the practice of agriculture, the anecdote makes it clear that the cultural interest is a more accurate indication of civilized behavior or *humanitas.* The cultural evidence takes precedence because *a priori* it implies a particular form of social organization and its attendant social values. Once the connection between culture and civilized behavior is established, then other concepts like wit, humor, and charm, which are associated with culture, can as well be designated by the term *humanitas.*[12]

This view of the primary significance of the term further explains not only why kindness, compassion, tact, tolerance, *etc.*, all those qualities which we would call good manners, can be designated by *humanitas*—they all facilitate the processes of social and communal life—, but also, and more importantly, the association of *humanitas* with *fides, pietas, gratia,* and *officium* in the literature to describe the behavior of Romans both within the context of domestic personal and political relations and in their relations with their conquered enemies and their subjects.[13] These characteristic Roman virtues provide the element of stability in Roman society, that is, in what in their eyes was civilization, and so they are properly called *humanitas.* In the same way the trust between ruler and ruled is a requisite for the orderly and efficient administration of an empire. Vergil's own words on the mission of Rome provide the best commentary on this aspect of Roman *humanitas.*

tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento
(hae tibi erunt artes), pacique imponere morem,
parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.
(*A.* 6.851-853)

The mission of Rome is that of civilizing. The practice of the arts of war is a means to an end, the establishing of the ways of civilized life (*pacique imponere morem*).[14] It is a task for which Aeneas is uniquely suited.

rex erat Aeneas nobis, quo iustior alter
nec pietate fuit, nec bello maior et armis.
(*A.* 1.544-545)

The *humanitas* of Aeneas is implicit in Ilioneus' characterization.

In drawing his portrait of Aeneas Ilioneus proves himself to be a consummate diplomat. His statement is at once a declaration of the ideal standard of behavior and a description of the type of people with whom Dido is dealing. The declaration places the onus on Dido to act in accordance with the norms it proclaims. The description effectively counteracts the charge of barbarity which Ilioneus knows can be made against the Trojans.

parce pio generi et propius res aspice nostras.
non nos aut ferro Libycos populare penatis
venimus, aut raptas ad litora vertere praedas;
non ea vis animo nec tanta superbia victis.
(*A.* 1.526-529)

Ilioneus raises the issue of the Trojans' being pirates precisely because they would seem to be so. In fact the accusation that Aeneas is a *praedo* recurs in the poem. Iarbas makes this complaint in his prayer to Jupiter.

> et nunc ille Paris cum semiviro comitatu,
> Maeonia mentem mitra crinemque madentem
> subnexus, rapto potitur.
> (*A.* 4.215-217)

Aeneas is no more than an interloper who by making himself master at Carthage (*cf. A.* 4.214, ... *dominum Aenean in regna recepit*) has taken what does not belong to him and threatened Iarbas' political position. Amata vilifies him in the same way when she attempts to dissuade Latinus from marrying Lavinia to him.

> o genitor, nec te miseret nataeque tuique?
> nec matris miseret, quam primo Aquilone relinquet
> perfidus alta petens abducta virgine praedo?
> (*A.* 7.360-362)

In Book 11.476 ff. Amata leads the Latin matrons to the temple of Minerva where they pray, *frange manu telum Phrygii praedonis*...(*A.* 11.484). Mezentius vows to make a *tropaeum* from ...*praedonis corpore raptis*/...*spoliis*.../ *Aeneae*...(*A.* 10.774-776). In the propaganda of his enemies Aeneas then is the *praedo,* the destroyer of the established order: he threatens the rightful authority of the ruler, and he faithlessly disrupts the family.

The pirate stands beyond the pale of civilized living. Cicero's use of the term as a slur against his political enemies in *pro Sestio* shows how commonplace the association of concepts was in the Roman mind. In reviewing the events of 59 B.C. Cicero says that Pompey bound Clodius by *foedere, exsecratione* (7.15) that during his tribunate he would not attack Cicero. Clodius not only violates this "treaty", but he attempts to assassinate Pompey (7.15). *hanc taetram immanemque beluam vinctam auspiciis, alligatam more maiorum, constrictam legum sacratarum catenis solvit subito lege curiata consul* (7.16). When in his tribunate in 58 B.C. Clodius threatens with armed violence any public display of support for Cicero, he is *omnium rerum divinarum humanarumque praedo* (12.27). The consuls of 58 B.C., Gabinius and Piso, who are in collusion with him and who allow Clodius virtually to run the government (10.24) are similarly characterized. When

the knights and all the *boni* come to the senate to plead for Cicero, their entreaties are rejected by Gabinius, "that highway robber" (*vestris precibus ab illo latrone repudiatis,* 11.26), and this although they have thrown themselves at the feet of "that most polluted of pimps" (*vos... ad pedes lenonis impurissimi proiecistis,* 11.26). The pimp falls into the same category as the *praedo.* Both have characteristics which mark them as representatives of antisocial behavior.[15] It is noteworthy that images not merely of violence, but also of animal savagery cling to the *praedo.* The antithesis implied is that between the bestial or uncivilized person and the one who has integrated himself into the social context of the *civitas,* that is, the person who is *humanus.* The image of bestiality recurs in Cicero's invective. Gabinius together with his colleague Piso is called *immanis* (13.29) for relegating L. Lamia for his support of Cicero. Significantly this act also earns him the title of *impurus* (13.29) as if he were a pimp.

In Ilioneus' words to Dido *vis* (*A.* 1.529) is the distinguishing characteristic of the *praedo.* As we have seen, this mode of behavior was used by Cicero in *pro Sestio* as one of the criteria which separate the savage and bestial stage of human development, when men live as nomads, from the civilized stage, when they live in cities. *Vis* moreover finds its antithesis in *iustitia* and *mansuetudo,* the modes of behavior that characterize urban life. This same polarity of nomadic and urban life, of violence and justice is implicit in Ilioneus' assertion of the Trojans' *pietas.*

> o regina, novam cui condere Iuppiter urbem
> iustitiaque dedit gentis frenare superbas
>
> parce pio generi.
>
> (*A.* 1.522-526)

The assertion of *pietas* becomes the basis of the appeal to justice, the disposition to give each person his due. The *superbi* merit harsh treatment, not the *pii.* If Jupiter has granted Dido the privilege to found a city, then she must rule with justice. Justice is evidently the concomitant of urban life. The attribution of *iustitia* is for Ilioneus not the statement of a fact, but rather a prescription, cloaked in the words of a diplomat, for the modes of civilized conduct.[16]

That Ilioneus should expound to Dido the ways of humane and civilized behavior is not without a certain irony. Her character is defined for him by his experience of the Carthaginians: she is the

ruler of a barbarous people. But the perspective of the reader is different. What Vergil has already told of Dido indicates that she is disposed to respond to Ilioneus' diplomacy with *humanitas*. In Venus' speech to Aeneas in Book 1.335-370 we learn that Dido has been herself the victim of barbarous treatment at the hands of her brother Pygmalion, and in the description of the pictures of Juno's temple in Carthage in Book 1.450-493 we are led to believe that Dido is a woman of compassion. There is discernible in both these passages a pattern of action that conforms to Roman standards of civilized behavior.

First the temple pictures. While Aeneas waits, enveloped in the protective cloud of invisibility, for the arrival of Dido, he sees a series of tableaux depicting events of the Trojan War. As R. D. Williams has shown, the description of these pictures is subjective rather than objective.[17] We see them through Aeneas' eyes, and how they are described is conditioned by his emotional reaction to the events which they represent. From his interpretation of the pictures Aeneas infers that they were made by a compassionate people and that this compassion is the guarantee of safety for him and his men.

> constitit et lacrimans 'quis iam locus,' inquit, 'Achate,
> quae regio in terris nostri non plena laboris?
> en Priamus. sunt hic etiam sua praemia laudi,
> sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt.
> solve metus; feret haec aliquam tibi fama salutem.
> (*A.* 1.459-463)

The compassion which Aeneas discerns in the pictures implies an attitude and behavior that conform to the Roman concept of *humanitas*. It is important to observe carefully Aeneas' words. It is not compassion alone which he sees, but a compassion whose expression is conditioned by a sense of justice. *Sunt sua praemia laudi,* glorious deeds here receive their due. *Feret haec aliquam tibi fama salutem,* the reputation which the Trojans enjoy will be the guarantee of their safety. The recognition of virtue, an act which in itself implies values held in common, provides the impetus for the artistic representation, and so the art becomes itself a manifestation of civility. Klingner in his essay on *humanitas* has remarked on the similarity of this incident in the *Aeneid* to the anecdote about Plato which appears in *de Republica*. He maintains that each of these nar-

ratives is in its own way illustrative of the meaning of *humanitas*. But he perceives a significant difference between them. On the one hand, the evidence of the interest in geometry on Plato's deserted shore was indicative of the exercise of the intellectual faculties that are proper to man as man; this proof of intellectual activity was indirectly a guarantee of the safety of the shipwrecked Plato and his companions. On the other hand, in the *Aeneid* it is not the fact of the art which calms Aeneas' fears for safety, but rather the compassion which the art manifests.[18] Klingner's perception of the difference between the Plato anecdote and the passage in the *Aeneid* procedes from his understanding of *humanitas* as a metaphysical definition of man in his essence rather than as a sociological definition. But, as we have seen, the significance of the geometry in the anecdote lay not in its being an intellectual activity, but rather in its implication that its practitioners had *a priori* to be people who act in a civil and civilized manner. In this respect the passage of the *Aeneid* is entirely analogous. The artistic representations on the temple walls strike a responsive chord in Aeneas because they manifest an adherence to certain social values that dictate a benign and civilized treatment of him and his people. Despite the subjective quality of the ecphrasis, it is clear that Vergil wants Aeneas' opinion to remain as the reader's impression of Dido as she arrives and has the interview with Ilioneus. Aeneas' consolation of Achates, *solve metus; feret haec aliquam tibi fama salutem,* anticipates the first words of Dido's reply to Ilioneus.

> solvite corde metum, Teucri, secludite curas.
>
> quis genus Aeneadum, quis Troiae nesciat urbem,
> virtutesque virosque aut tanti incendia belli?
> (*A.* 1.562-566)

The thought follows the same sequence, and there is the same implication of a community of values. Since the promise of salvation made in the first passage finds its fulfilment in the second, the first impression is proven to be the valid one.

That Dido is a woman of *humanitas* is implied as well in the biography which Venus presents in *A.* 1.335-370. In constructing this history of Dido Vergil follows the traditional foundation legend of the city of Carthage. Pygmalion, Dido's brother and king of Tyre, murders her husband; Dido together with some companions

flees and founds a new city. Vergil's narrative preserves the basic outline of the legend as it is found in the only extant source that predates the *Aeneid,* namely, the fragment of Timaeus preserved in excerpt form in Polyaenus, *Strategemata,* Book 8 (*FGrH* iii 566 F 82). But the account in the *Aeneid* provides details, not found in Polyaenus' excerpt, which clearly suggest that Dido is to be seen as the victim of barbarous and inhumane treatment. Pygmalion is an archetype of criminal savagery, *scelere ante alios immanior omnis* (*A.* 1.347), a title which he richly deserves since *impius ante aras* (349) he murders Sychaeus his brother-in-law and uncle. In his deception of Dido about the death of Sychaeus, he is *malus* (352). Despite the high frequency of the word in the Vergilian corpus, it is rarely used as a predicate of people. In the majority of instances it appears as a neuter substantive meaning misfortune, disaster, or misdeed, or as an adjective qualifying things or animals and meaning destructive, guilty (once in *A.* 6.278-279, *mala mentis Gaudia*), malicious (once in *Ecl.* 7.28, *mala lingua*), or of poor quality (once in *G.* 2.243, *malus ager*). It appears only five times to describe a person: in *Ecl.* 8.83, of Daphnis, the beloved of the love-sick woman, in *G.* 3.282, of a stepmother, in *A.* 3.398 of the Greeks who fought in the Trojan War, now living in Italy, whom Aeneas must avoid, in *A.* 6.542, of the wicked who are punished in *impia Tartara,* and of Pygmalion in *A.* 1.352. Hellegouarc'h (p. 527) remarks that in the domain of social relations, "...le *malus* est surtout celui qui ne possède pas le *fides,*" and he cites a passage from *Phil.* 14.3.7 where Cicero gives a definition of the word. *Testamentum, credo, subiciunt aut eiciunt vicinos aut adulescentes circumscribunt; his enim vitiis adfectos et talibus malos aut audaces appellare consuetudo solet.* The *malus* then is the person with whom the possibility of benign social intercourse is excluded. It is difficult to determine how much, if any, of this negative characterization of Pygmalion Vergil found in his sources. As Jacoby notes, to judge from the wealth of detail in the sources that date from the imperial period, the account in Polyaenus is much abbreviated.[19] As a result the possibility exists that Vergil did not himself invent this characterization. But whether or not Vergil found the details concerning Pygmalion in the literature available to him, there can be no doubt that Pygmalion's murder of Sychaeus would suggest itself to a Roman as an exemplum not simply of impiety, but also of inhumanity. Justinus in the epitome of Pompeius Trogus describes the murder in this way, ... *Pygmalion oblitus iuris*

humani avunculum suum eundemque generum sine respectu pietatis occidit (18.4.8.).

In one other respect the traditional story of Dido would appeal to a Roman's sense of *humanitas*. Vergil tells us that under the impetus of troubling visions of her dead husband, Dido organizes and makes her escape.

> his commota fugam Dido sociosque parabat.
> conveniunt quibus aut odium crudele tyranni
> aut metus acer erat; navis, quae forte paratae,
> corripiunt onerantque auro, portantur avari
> Pygmalionis opes pelago; dux femina facti.
> (*A.* 1.360-364)

The political aspect of the enterprize is emphasized. Dido gathers a group of political dissidents, and she serves as their *dux*. *Dux* is a word of high frequency in the Vergilian corpus. In the majority of cases it means either guide or military leader. In contrast it occurs only three times unequivocally as the designation of a political leader: in *Ecl.* 4.13 of the consul Pollio under whose leadership the golden age will have its inception with the birth of the child; in *G.* 4.4 metaphorically of the leaders of the bees whose community is the type of the society ruled by law (see *G.* 4.154); and in *A.* 1.364 of Dido. Hellegouarc'h (pp. 325-326) defines *dux* in its political use, "...*dux* et *auctor*... peuvent tous les deux, soit à tour de rôle, soit associés, désigner un homme politique de premier plan... le *dux* la [*i.e.*, a political enterpise] dirige, lui donne son impulsion." Again it is impossible to say how much, if any, of this characterization of Dido as a political leader Vergil found in his sources. The Timaeus fragment says simply that Dido ἐνθεμένη τὰ χρήματα μετά τινων πολιτῶν ἔφευγε. Justinus is more expansive and parallels Vergil, *fugam... molitur adsumptis quibusdam principibus in societatem, quibus par odium in regem esse eandemque fugiendi cupiditatem arbitraretur* (18.4.9). Whatever the sources available to him may have contained, it is clear that Vergil was willing to emphasize Dido's character as a political leader.

The flight from barbarism to a civilized world must have been a thought, however idle and fanciful, that entered the minds of some Romans during the horrible period of the civil wars. Horace makes the idea the basis of *Epode* 16, a poem remarkable in that it represents the poet addressing a proposal to a political assembly of

the Roman people. But poets must tread lightly. As Fraenkel, *Horace,* pp. 43-46 has shown, in order to divest the poem of its aura of actuality Horace uses language that at some points suggests a *contio* and at others a meeting of the senate. The group to whom Horace speaks corresponds to no assembly of the Roman state. The proposal is equally fantastic as the setting. A second time civil war vexes Rome, a city which

> impia perdemus devoti sanguinis aetas,
> ferisque rursus occupabitur solum.
> barbarus heu cineres insistet victor et Vrbem
> eques sonante verberabit ungula,
> quaeque carent ventis et solibus ossa Quirini,
> nefas videre! dissipabit insolens.
> (*Epod.* 16.9-14)

The implication of these lines is the same as that of Cicero's invidious comparison of Clodius to a wild animal in *Sest.* 7.16. The act of rending the social fabric of the state is tantamount to a reversion to a state of bestiality. The overrunning of the land set aside for human habitation and use is symbolic of the barbarity to which acts of *impietas* lead. The more honorable among the citizens (*pars melior,* v. 37; *vos quibus est virtus,* v. 39) should abandon the city forever and sail away to the isles of the blessed. *Iuppiter illa piae secrevit litora genti* (v. 63). In *Phil.* 13.21.49 Cicero presents a proposal similar to Horace's in content as well as fantasy. Cicero's preoccupation in this speech is to characterize M. Antonius as the enemy of the state and therefore of civilized life. For that reason he is to be excluded from the human race. The theme is struck in the first paragraph of the speech. *Nam nec privatos focos nec publicas leges videtur nec libertatis iura cara habere, quem discordiae, quem caedes civium, quem bellum civile delectat, eumque ex numero hominum eiciendum, ex finibus humanae naturae exterminandum puto.* Throughout the speech Antonius is vilified in images of barbarity and bestiality. He and his allies are *immanis beluas* that have to be kept in cages (3.5); they are all a *grex latrocinii* (5.10); he is an *archipirata* (8.18), a *furiosus gladiator cum taeterrimorum latronum manu* (6.16), *barbarus, immanis, ferus* (9.21), an *importunissima belua* (10.22), a *praedo* (13.29). As a result it is impossible to come to any terms with such a person. *Prius undis flamma, ut ait poeta nescio quis, prius denique omnia quam cum Antoniis res publica aut cum re publica Antonii redeant in gratiam. Monstra quidem ista et portenta sunt rei*

publicae. Moveri sedibus huic urbi melius est atque in alias, si fieri possit, terras demigrare, unde Antoniorum 'nec facta nec nomen audiat,' quam illos, Caesaris virtute eiectos, Bruti retentos, intra haec moenia videre (21.49). The term *redire in gratiam* is no more than a synonym for reestablishing relations of political *amicitia.*[20] This is an impossibility because a person characterized in the way that Antonius has been is bereft of the requisite social virtues. If Horace's and Cicero's proposals are not practical, they at least show where the imagination was led in the face of the savagery of the civil wars. Legend and poetry are not always bound by the requirements of practicality. Dido's experience has an affinity with that of the Romans, but she is able to accomplish what they cannot. Aeneas first learns of Dido as the leader of a flight from barbarity, and when he first sees her, she is presiding over a new city, *iura dabat legesque viris...*(*A.* 1.507).

The scene between Ilioneus and Dido is the culmination of Vergil's exposition of Dido's character. It serves to confirm the view of her that is suggested by the earlier narrative. She is the woman of *humanitas* in the Roman sense of the term, that is, she subscribes to and acts in accordance with a specific standard for civilized behavior. In reply to Ilioneus Dido in her embarrassment[21] makes excuses for the harsh treatment which the Trojans have received—the difficulties of a new kingdom require particular vigilance (*A.* 1.563-564)—and she refutes only indirectly the charge of barbarity—the Carthaginians are not so sequestered from the inhabited world as to be ignorant of Troy and its men and to be unaware of the virtues of its people (*A.* 1.565-568). The explicit acceptance of the ideology that Ilioneus had expounded yields place to action which is based on that ideology. Dido offers her material support in returning to Sicily, or if they wish, an invitation to join as equal partners in the new city. Whatever the Trojans choose, Dido has taken them into *hospitium.* The formal designation of the relationship is not made until the last scene of the book, at the banquet when Dido, before making a libation, prays *Iuppiter, hospitibus nam te dare iura loquuntur* (*A.* 1.731), but it is implied in her reply to Ilioneus.[22] It is significant that only when Dido has proved her *humanitas* in this way that the magical cloud enshrouding Aeneas evaporates to allow him to speak with her.

Hospitium, the proper designation for the association of individuals of different political states, is like other Roman political relationships based on the *fides* of the participants and so implies the

whole range of social norms which we have been discussing, *i.e.*, in addition to *fides* itself, *pietas, officium* and *gratia.*[23] At the inception of the Trojans' relations with Dido, Ilioneus, as we saw, appealed to these standards either explicitly or implicitly both to assure Dido of the civility of the Trojans and to set forth as well a pattern of behavior for her to follow. The assumption which underlies Aeneas' words of thanks to Dido is that in entering the relationship of *hospitium* he too sees his conduct as regulated by these norms. It conditions the form and content of his reply.

> o sola infandos Troiae miserata labores,
> quae nos, reliquias Danaum, terraeque marisque
> omnibus exhaustos iam casibus, omnium egenos
> urbe, domo socias, grates persolvere dignas
> non opis est nostrae, Dido....
>
> di tibi, si qua pios respectant numina, si quid
> usquam iustitiae est et mens sibi conscia recti,
> praemia digna ferant.
>
> semper honos nomenque tuum laudesque manebunt,
> quae me cumque vocant terrae.
> (*A.* 1.597-610)

According to Claude Moussy in his study of the word *gratia* (pp. 49-71), *grates*, which comes from the religious vocabulary, originally meant sacrifice of thanksgiving to the gods, but also acquired the meaning of *gratia,* and was on a regular basis used only in the expressions *grates agere* and *grates habere.* Apart from Tacitus and one instance in Velleius Paterculus, it is the poets alone, starting with Vergil, who use the word in different phrases, and that by way of a metrical convenience as a substitute for various forms of the word *gratia.* In dactylic verse the accusative plural *gratias* and the accusative singular *gratiam,* when the final syllable is not elided, would be impossible. Vergil's practice illustrates the necessity of recourse to *grates.* Although *gratia* does occur in the Vergilian corpus, it does so only in the nominative singular where it forms a dactyl.[24] In those instances when the concept has to be expressed in the accusative, the spondaic *grates* appears. The word is used three times either in the phrase *grates persolvere* or *grates referre,* and both these expressions indicate the notion of paying back a favor by performing a favor in return. Thus they preserve the original sense of

gratia as gratitude which manifests itself by action.[25] This meaning of *gratia* is the one most prominent in the political vocabulary and is well illustrated by Cicero's definition in *Inv.* 2.21.66, [*eam*] *gratiam* [*appellant*] *quae in memoria et remuneratione officiorum et honoris et amicitiarum observantiam teneat.*[26] Aeneas in admitting his and the Trojans' inability to give Dido sufficient thanks is at the same time acknowledging that the *hospitium* into which he has entered imposes on him the obligation to manifest *gratia,* that is, to perform *officia* or *beneficia.* Hence the appeal to the gods to requite Dido properly. The choice of the divine powers is significant. They are the *numina* that *pios respectant— iustitia* and *mens sibi conscia recti.* The *pii,* those who observe the claim of justice, as Dido has by recognizing the virtue of Aeneas and taking him into *hospitium,* have the right to compensation. Although Aeneas speaks of *iustitia* and *mens sibi conscia recti* as abstract cosmic principles in the style of a Platonist or a Stoic, his mode of thought is purely Roman. It takes as its basic premise the notion of reciprocity within the context of a personal political relationship.

The only recompense which Aeneas himself can offer for Dido's benefactions is the verbal manifestation of his gratitude. *Semper honos nomenque tuum laudesque manebunt.* Both *honos* and *laus* are in the Roman political system obligations to which the recipient of benefactions is subject.[27] *Honos* has religion as its proper sphere of application since it means the homage paid to the gods and usually indicates a sacrifice or ritual offering. It thus belongs to the *fides* and *pietas* of the worshipper to perform *honores* to the gods for the benefactions they confer. Transferred to the political sphere, *honos* is used to designate the payment of the debt that results from receiving an *officium* or a *beneficium,* and again belongs to the domain of *fides* and *pietas. Honos,* the activity by which one manifests his homage, can assume a number of different forms, among which is *laus.*[28] In its primary meaning *laus* is the eulogy delivered at a funeral. It is an activity proper to the ruling class and is originally of political provenance. By extension it is the praise addressed to the politician for his activities in the military and in civic life.[29] It is in fact the verbal form of *honos.*[30] Although *honos* and *laus* do not occur in Vergil's works exclusively in the meaning of the political vocabulary, the context of Aeneas' speech clearly marks them as having this meaning. *Fides* and *gratia* require, if not some more concrete action, at least the everlasting verbal expression of gratitude for the *hospitium* offered and accepted.

Elsewhere in the *Aeneid* as well, when Aeneas enters into *hospitium,* the essential terms of the Roman vocabulary of political alliance are used to define the relationships. In his embassy to King Latinus, Ilioneus, as we have already seen, promises the eternal *gratia* of the Trojans if Latinus will allow them to settle in Latium, and he offers as guarantee the right hand of Aeneas... *potentem/ sive fide seu quis bello est expertus et armis* (*A.* 7.234-235). Latinus construes Ilioneus' request as a petition for *hospitium* (*A.* 7.264) and consents on the condition that Aeneas appear in person to formalize the relationship by joining right hands (*A.* 7.265-266). The significance of the handshake lies in its symbolizing in a type of ritual action the mutual exchange of *fides.* Later in Book 7, when Allecto has finished disrupting the new alliance, she reports ironically to Juno,

> en, perfecta tibi bello discordia tristi;
> dic in amicitiam coeant et foedera iungant.
> (*A.* 7.545-546)

The peculiar expression *foedera iungere* can only mean to join right hands in a *foedus.* Diomedes' phrase in *A.* 11.292, ...*coeant in foedera dextrae,* when he encourages the Latins to ally themselves with the Trojans shows that this understanding is correct.[31] In *Aen.* 7.546 *foedus* seems almost to be a synonym for the relationship itself; it is no more than the agreement, externalized by the clasping of right hands, the symbol of *fides,* to enter formal relations, here called *amicitia.* The application of this term to the alliance of Aeneas and Latinus is one more demonstration that Vergil adopts the terminology of Roman political relationships to define this *hospitium.* *Amicitia* has as its primary meaning the notion of political friendship, and it is a general designation for any of the various types of *fides*-based political relationships.[32] The only other time Vergil uses the word, in *A.* 11.320-322, he again applies it to the alliance of Trojans and Latins. In each case the term is employed in its technical political sense. Although Latinus insists on shaking Aeneas' right hand, the ceremony itself is not necessary for establishing the relationship of *hospitium.* Allecto's ironical *dic in amicitiam coeant et foedera iungant* implies that the relationship has already been established — this despite the fact that we are never told that Aeneas and Latinus met face to face. When Aeneas complains of Latinus' behavior to the Latin ambassadors in *A.* 11.113-114, he views it as a violation of their *hospitium,* ... *rex nostra*

reliquit/ hospitia, and in Book 12 he calls the Latins' resumption of general combat a breach of *haec altera foedera* (12.582).[33] A comparison of the alliance with Evander demonstrates the same point. Aeneas makes his request for a military alliance with the words *accipe daque fidem* (*A.* 8.150). Evander agrees by saying, ... *quam petitis iuncta est mihi foedere dextra* (*A.* 8.169). The simple allusion to the right hand is sufficient to engage one's *fides* in a *foedus.* Again here *foedus* seems to be merely an alternate name for the relationship. When Evander later refers to the alliance in the phrase *iunximus hospitio dextras* (*A.* 11.165), he uses the word *hospitium* in exactly the same way that he uses the word *foedus* here. The similarity of Livy's treatment of the alliance of Aeneas and Latinus to Vergil's narrative of the alliances with Latinus and Evander deserves to be noticed. As we saw above, Livy adopted for his presentation of the legend the everyday terminology of Roman political relationships. The alliance is called *hospitium,* or *amicitia*; it results from the exchange of *fides* by the clasping of right hands, and it is solemnized as a *foedus.* Vergil's use of the same terminology is evident.

Despite the different aims of Aeneas' associations with Dido, Latinus, and Evander, they are all called *hospitium.* The point of resemblance among them, apart from their international character, is that they are regulated by the same behavioral norms and social values. Although the application of the political terminology is not uniform in the three episodes, Vergil's conception of the nature of the relationships is clear. Each is founded on the *fides* of the participants. The term *fides* appears in the episodes with Latinus and Evander, but not in the narrative of the establishment of relations with Dido. It is, however, implied by Ilioneus' invocation of the *pietas* of Aeneas as the guarantee of his *officium.* The proximity in meaning of *pietas* and *fides* shows this as does Ilioneus' parallel appeal to the right hand of Aeneas, strong in *fides,* as a means of assuring Latinus of the Trojans' *gratia.* Neither *officium* nor *gratia* is used in the Evander narrative, but it is clear that these notions are operative in the relationship. To cite one example, Evander's words to the Trojans on the return of the corpse of Pallas,

> vadite et haec memores regi mandata referte:
> quod vitam moror invisam Pallante perempto
> dextera causa tua est, Turnum gnatoque patrique
> quam debere vides.
>
> (*A.* 11.176-179)

Evander claims the death of Turnus as a debt owed to him for his *foedus* with Aeneas. The rendering of one service demands repayment by the performance of another service in return. This is the essence of *gratia*. In contrast to the other two relationships of Aeneas, the term *foedus* is not applied to the association with Dido, but, as we have seen, *foedus* in the Latinus and Evander episodes is synonymous with *hospitium*. The *hospitium* with Dido has the same implications as the other *foedera* of Aeneas, that is, of a formal relationship founded on a mutual exchange of *fides*. Given the numerous points of resemblance of the three relationships, it would not be misleading to call them all examples of *amicitia*, although the term is used only for the alliance with Latinus. The standards of conduct which the participants in these *hospitia* proclaim as their own are not those of some remote and hypothetical legendary past, but come from the world of politics contemporary with the poet. Aeneas' association with Dido, no less than his associations with either Latinus or Evander, is defined in the terminology of Roman personal political relationships.

CHAPTER THREE

THE DYNASTIC MARRIAGE

The marriage with Aeneas which Dido projects in the opening scenes of Book 4 is at the same time a love match and a national alliance. The political character of this union is emphasized in several ways. The scheming and frustrated Juno puts the worst possible face on it in her exchange with Venus, ... *liceat Phrygio servire marito/ dotalisque tuae Tyrios permittere dextrae* (*A.* 4.103-104). Aeneas will be not only the husband of Dido, but also the lord and master of both her and her people. Since Venus has the upper hand, she can afford to be more objective.

> sed fatis incerta feror, si Iuppiter unam
> esse velit Tyriis urbem Troiaque profectis,
> miscerive probet populos et foedera iungi.
> (*A.* 4.110-112)[1]

No matter what attitude towards the matter is adopted, the basic fact remains that the amalgamation of the peoples is the inevitable consequence of the union of their chiefs. Such a marriage, although it may be a sentimental union, will have to be a dynastic marriage in the sense that it is a political union, a *foedus.* This dual character of the marriage finds its reflection in the arguments with which Anna succeeds in eroding Dido's initial resistance. On the one hand, she maintains that it would be foolish for Dido not to satisfy her passion for Aeneas (*A.* 4.31-38), and on the other, she suggests to Dido the political advantages of having Aeneas as consort (*A.* 4.39-49).

> quam tu urbem, soror, hanc cernes, quae surgere regna
> coniugio tali! Teucrum comitantibus armis
> Punica se quantis attollet gloria rebus!
> (*A.* 4.47-49)

The marriage is to be an instrument of policy as well as a means of personal satisfaction. Its utility lies in the military strength which it brings.

Dido herself recognizes the political import of such a step. Any marriage would be for her a political alliance. This realization on

her part is made clear when she recalls her intention never to remarry.

> si mihi non animo fixum immotumque sederet
> ne cui me vinclo vellem sociare iugali
> (*A.* 4.15-16)

Sociare, a denominative formation from *socius,* has primarily a political connotation. The word occurs five times in the Vergilian corpus, all in the *Aeneid.* In four of the five instances it refers to a dynastic marriage: here in *A.* 4.16; twice of the marriage of Lavinia in *A.* 7.96 and 12.27-28, and in *A.* 9.593-594 of Numanus, recently married to a sister of Turnus and *tumidus novo praecordia regno* (9.596). The remaining use appears in Book 1 when Aeneas thanks Dido for taking the Trojans into *hospitium*: *O sola... miserata.... / quae nos... / urbe, domo socias*...(1.597-600). Vergil's usage corresponds to that of the Republican prose writers who employ the term, Cicero and Livy. In the two examples in Livy and in six of the eight in Cicero, the basic notion of a political union or alliance is applicable to a variety of situations. In a technical sense *sociare* is used to denote international agreements,[2] in a quasi-technical sense to designate the relations of Roman political men.[3] It further denotes marriage in a context in which marriage involves political implications.[4] The two remaining uses in Cicero are metaphorical.[5] The word is not found in Plautus, Terence, Lucretius, Catullus, or Propertius. The one appearance of the word in Horace, the one in the *Culex,* and three of the seven in Ovid are metaphorical usages.[6] Pseudo-Tibullus once and Ovid twice use *sociare* to designate sexual intimacy,[7] and Ovid uses it twice for marriage in contexts that are not political.[8] While Vergil exhibits the same lack of inhibition in using the word which Horace, the author of the *Culex,* and Ovid do, he contrasts with his fellow poets in restricting the meaning of the term to the primary political connotation which it has in the prose writers.

The political as well as the personal aspect of this marriage is evident in the choice of the gods whose favor Dido seeks when she has made her decision to pursue Aeneas.

> legiferae Cereri Phoeboque patrique Lyaeo,
> Iunoni ante omnis, cui vincla iugalia curae.
> (*A.* 4.58-59)

Aside from Juno who is specifically invoked as the goddess of marriage,[9] these gods all have associations which make them fit recipients of the prayers of a queen concerned with the prosperity of her city. The epithet *legiferae* is a reference to the tradition of Demeter as the promulgator of the technique of agriculture and, as a consequence, the founder of the civilized life of the city.[10] Dionysus like Demeter was θεσμόφορος,[11] and his ritual connections with Demeter are well known,[12] as are also Apollo's associations with law and ancestral custom.[13] These are the gods of *humanitas.* In the closing prayer of the *actio secunda* of the *Verrines* Cicero applies just this term to the rites of Ceres and Libera. They are rites *a quibus initia vitae atque victus, morum, legum, mansuetudinis, humanitatis hominibus et civitatibus data ac dispertita esse dicuntur* (5.72.187).

The introduction of the political theme into the love narrative of Book 4 with the suggestion repeatedly made at the beginning that the marriage with Aeneas has political implications and that it will be advantageous to Dido points to an essential feature of her character. Her typical mode of behavior is that of a political person. In Book 1 we learn that she reacts to the murder of her husband by gathering a band of political dissidents and leaving Tyre to found a new city. Her emotional interest in Aeneas develops in large part from her admiration for the qualities requisite for the ideal *imperator* which Aeneas possesses.

> multa viri virtus animo multusque recursat
> gentis honos; haerent infixi pectore vultus
> verbaque nec placidam membris dat cura quietem.
> (*A.* 4.3-5)

In addition to his appearance and his words, Aeneas' attractions are his *virtus* and his glorious lineage, which amounts to the same thing as *virtus* (see *A.* 4.12-13, *credo equidem, nec vana fides, genus esse deorum./ degeneres animos timor arguit*...). Aeneas' virtue is that complex of personal qualities, outlined by Ilioneus in *A.* 1.544-550, which suit a man for civic life and military command. The consideration of this *virtus* which now makes Dido want Aeneas as a lover and a husband disposed her at the start of relations with the Trojans to take them into *hospitium.* Dido prefaces her acceptance of Ilioneus' petition with a recognition of Trojan virtue.

> quis genus Aeneadum, quis Troiae nesciat urbem,
> virtutesque virosque aut tanta incendia belli?
> (*A.* 1.565-566)

She expresses the same thought when shortly after she repeats the invitation of *hospitium* to Aeneas. Teucer, as she explains to Aeneas, had told the story of Troy at the court of her father Belus.

> tempore iam ex illo casus mihi cognitus urbis
> Troianae nomenque tuum regesque Pelasgi.
> ipse hostis Teucros insigni laude ferebat
> seque ortum antiqua Teucrorum a stirpe volebat.
> quare agite, o tectis, iuvenes, succedite nostris.
> (*A.* 1.623-627)

It was the consideration of Trojan *virtus* that led her to depict the fall of the city on the walls of her temple, *sunt hic etiam sua praemia laudi* (*A.* 1.461). At every stage of Dido's familiarity with Aeneas and the Trojans there is a certain consistency in her behavior towards them. She responds favorably to them because they have the qualities which are humane in the Roman sense of the term, that is, which suit them for life in the *civitas*. The emotional attachment to Aeneas represents the ultimate intensification, the culmination of a relationship whose foundations remain the same.

The idea is established early and reinforced throughout that Dido is a queen encircled by barbarism. She has fled the savagery and inhumanity of her brother Pygmalion to found a new city. Even here she has barbarian peoples for neighbors and overlords. Venus describes the country to Aeneas as *fines Libyci, genus intractabile bello* (*A.* 1.339). Dido makes the excuse of *res dura et novitas regni* (*A.* 1.563) to Ilioneus for the harsh treatment of the Trojans. One imagines her on guard against attacks from the Africans as well as from Pygmalion. In her first speech to Aeneas Dido calls the country *immanibus oris* (*A.* 1.616). Anna raises with Dido the issue of threats from both the Africans and Pygmalion in the first scene of Book 4 (vv. 40-44), as Dido herself will do with Aeneas when later she pleads with him to stay (*A.* 4.320-321, 325-326). In this circumscribed world only the Trojans and Aeneas offer the possibility of stable and salutary relations. Dido's sense of isolation as a queen helps to turn her to Aeneas.

To gauge the idiosyncrasy of Dido's emotional response to Aeneas, we have only to compare A.R. 3.453-458, a passage which, as Pease on *A.* 4.3. (*multa...multis*) notes, is recalled by *A.* 4.3-5.[14] Apollonius lists the qualities of Jason which make Medea fall in love with him. They are all aspects of Jason's physical

presence: how he looked, how he was dressed, how he carried himself, how charming his voice was. The question of Jason's character does not enter into consideration because it cannot. At this point Medea is acquainted with Jason only in this superficial way. Dido, on the other hand, succumbs certainly because of the physical attraction, but also because she values Aeneas' character. In this second sphere, the reasons for Dido's attraction to Aeneas, the consideration of his *virtus* and *gentis honos,* are like those of a Roman aristocrat, not of a sentimental Greek heroine. Pliny, *Ep.* 1.14, a letter concerned with the selection of a husband, provides material for an instructive comparison. The analogy lies of course not in the circumstances, but in the criteria employed for making a good marriage. Pliny answers the request of Iunius Mauricus to recommend a husband for his niece, the daughter of his brother Iunius Arulenus Rusticus, an outspoken defender of senatorial privilege against the principate who paid by being condemned in A.D.93.[15] Pliny suggests Minucius Acilianus. He first reviews the family background: equestrian, but as good as senatorial since Acilianus' father refused an appointment as a praetorian by Vespasian; a grandmother who is *severitatis exemplum* even to the Patavini; and an uncle who is distinguished for *gravitate, prudentia, fide.* Pliny's conclusion is that *in summa nihil erit in domo tota quod non tibi tamquam in tua placeat.* Here as in the *Aeneid* the same presumption is made that there is an inherent connection between one's family background and one's character. That presumption is moreover justified in the case of Acilianus. Pliny notes that he is a paragon of *vigor* and *industria.* As a result, he has won the quaestorship, the tribunate, and the praetorship, and so releases Mauricius from the obligation of campaigning for him. The *vigor* and *industria* of Acilianus are a reflection, in the everyday world of the aristocratic politician, of the *virtus* of the legendary Aeneas. Hellegouarc'h (p. 253) notes the use of the word *industria* to designate conscientiousness in gathering votes, and he includes this quality among the manifestations of *virtus.* The standards for selecting a prospective husband which Pliny uses are then the same as Dido's, *virtus* and *gentis honos.* Dido's behavior is determined by Roman ways of thinking and acting. But, unlike the girl in the letter, she is an independent agent; she decides for herself what others decide for the niece of Mauricius. There are interestingly other points of correspondence between Pliny's letter and the narrative situation in

Aeneid 4. A marriage with Acilianus would have certain concrete advantages in the political domain. He has money and this should be a consideration for one *de posteris et his pluribus cogitanti.* Pliny further adds some comments on Acilianus' attractive physical appearance and notes that this is owed to the *castitati puellarum quasi praemium.* These two additional criteria, the political advantage of a marriage with Acilianus and his physical attractiveness parallel Dido's case. As we have seen, Anna uses the arguments of political interest and the *praemia Veneris* (*A.* 4.33) to persuade Dido to pursue marriage with Aeneas.

The emotional aspect of the Dido-Aeneas relationship does not obliterate its initial political character, but rather is an intensification and extension of it. The possibility of joining the emotional and the political in such a curious blend is one open especially to a Roman poet because of the peculiarities of Roman social institutions. Roman politics was conducted on the basis of personal relationships, and it is not uncommon to find that the language of the emotions is used to qualify pragmatic political relationships.[16] Two examples will suffice here. In *Fam.* 11. 27, to Gaius Matius, Cicero uses as the measure of the closeness of their relationship their mutual love and affection. *Nemo est mihi te amicus antiquior. sed vetustas habet aliquid commune cum multis, amor non habet. dilexi te quo die cognovi, meque a te diligi iudicavi* (2). This statement opens a series of paragraphs (2-6) in which Cicero lists Matius' services to him throughout the years. The purpose of the catalogue is to convince Matius that Cicero, because he remembers these favors, would not be disposed to commit the offence against their friendship about which Matius has complained: *quia sum admiratus te qui haec nosse deberes quidquam a me commissum quod alienum nostra amicitia credidisse* (6). The avowal of his love is Cicero's way of flattering Matius into a reconciliation, and it seems to be an extraordinary measure. *Att.* 14.13B, a letter of Cicero to M. Antonius from April, 44 B.C., however, shows how usual such protestations were. Antonius had written to consult Cicero about the restoration of Sextus Cloelius, an exiled supporter of P. Clodius. Antonius claimed that Caesar had authorized the restoration, but he said that in light of the hostility between Cicero and Clodius he was unwilling to bring Cloelius back without Cicero's prior consent. The opening of Cicero's reply to Antonius is effusive. *Quod mecum per litteras agis, unam ob causam mallem coram egisses. non enim solum ex oratione, sed etiam*

ex vultu et oculis et fronte, ut aiunt, meum erga te amorem perspicere potuisses. nam, cum te semper amavi, primum studio tuo, post etiam beneficio provocatus, tum his temporibus respublica te mihi ita commendavit ut cariorem habeam neminem. The expression of these sentiments is an example of Cicero's *facilitas*. *Ego autem Antonio facillimum me praebui,* he explains to Atticus in *Att.* 14.13A. Cicero gave his consent although he tells Atticus that Antonius' request was made *dissolute, turpiter, perniciose* (*Att.* 14.13A). He justifies his action to Atticus by saying that Antonius would have restored Cloelius even without his consent. The implication is that it was not worth the trouble to alienate Antonius by refusing. What emerges from a consideration of these passages is that the use of the vocabulary of the emotions was a conventional way of expressing the solidarity of political associates. In the Dido-Aeneas affair the correspondence of the love union with the political alliance results from taking the convention at face value and extending it to its logical conclusion. The idea was not entirely novel. Catullus had done something analogous when he used the vocabulary of Roman political associations in a metaphor to define his relationship with Lesbia.[17]

CHAPTER FOUR

DIDO'S LAMENT

The Dido of *Aeneid* 4 is a sentimental heroine conceived in the manner of Hellenistic love narrative. The primary fact about her is her passion, and the preoccupation of the book is to show her reacting to it as it develops in its successive stages. The narrative pattern of the Medea story in Apollonius, *Argonautica* and of the Ariadne story in Catullus, *Carmen* 64 provides the shape for the events of the book: the decision to yield, contrary to some moral obligation, to love, and the inevitable desertion by the lover which stimulates the lament of the woman.[1] The themes of the lament and their arrangement are conventional: the faithlessness of the lover in contrast to the services of the woman, her alienation, and finally her curse.[2] In the lament the heroine deals explicitly with the nature of the relationship because it is only in this way that she can place her pleas and entreaties on an objective basis. Although the traditional lament is not concentrated in *Aeneid* 4 into a single speech, Vergil is careful to reproduce reminiscences of his predecessors in the series of speeches made by Dido which constitute her lament.[3] Dido's appeals to Aeneas and her criticism of him, however, are made in accordance with the Roman code of behavior that regulates personal political relationships. In other words her lament presupposes the earlier narrative. While its format and even at times its phrases are determined by the literary tradition, its content follows the logic of Vergil's own account, not that of his predecessors. It is in fact the point at which the characterization of Dido as the ideal Roman dynast converges with the characterization of her as a Greek sentimental heroine.

The emphasis in the scholarship on the comprehensive but unreflective citation of the verbal reminiscences of the literary precedents shifts the attention away from the essential differences in the function of the traditional themes.[4] This is particularly true of the theme of faithlessness. In Apollonius and Catullus there is a uniformity in the application of the theme. The woman complains that her lover is breaking his promise to marry her. It is moreover a promise on the basis of which she has performed certain services

for him. As a result the narration of benefactions becomes a constituent element of the theme. Both the Medea of Apollonius and Ariadne are explicit on this point.

ἦέ σε πάγχυ λαθιφροσύναις ἐνέηκαν
ἀγλαΐαι, τῶν δ'οὔ τι μετατρέπῃ ὅσσ' ἀγόρευες
χρειοῖ ἐνισχόμενος; ποῦ τοι Διὸς Ἱκεσίοιο
ὅρκια, ποῦ δὲ μελιχραὶ ὑποσχεσίαι βεβάασιν;
ἧς ἐγὼ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον ἀναιδήτῳ ἰότητι
πάτρην τε κλέα τε μεγάρων αὐτούς τε τοκῆας
νοσφισάμην, τά μοι ἦεν ὑπέρτατα, τηλόθι δ' οἴη
λυγρῇσιν κατὰ πόντον ἅμ' ἀλκυόνεσσι φορεῦμαι,
σῶν ἕνεκεν καμάτων, ἵνα μοι σόος ἀμφί τε βουσίν
ἀμφί τε γηγενέεσσιν ἀναπλήσειας ἀέθλους·
ὕστατον αὖ καὶ κῶας, ἐφ' ᾧ πλόος ὔμμιν ἐτύχθη,
εἷλες ἐμῇ ματίῃ
(A.R. 4.356-367)

at non haec quondam blanda promissa dedisti
voce mihi, non haec miserae sperare iubebas,
sed conubia laeta, sed optatos hymenaeos,
quae cuncta aerii discerpunt irrita venti.
nunc iam nulla viro iuranti femina credat,
nulla viri speret sermones esse fideles;
quis dum aliquid cupiens animus praegestit apisci,
nil metuunt iurare, nihil promittere parcunt:
sed simul ac cupidae mentis satiata libido est,
dicta nihil metuere, nihil periuria curant.
certe ego te in medio versantem turbine leti
eripui, et potius germanum amittere crevi,
quam tibi fallaci supremo in tempore dessem.
(Catul. 64.139-151)

The use of the theme in this way derives ultimately from Euripides, *Medea* where Medea recounts her services to Jason (vv. 476-487) and then complains of the breach of the oaths which he made (v. 492 ff.). The causal relation between the solemn promises and the services rendered is not explicitly stated as in Apollonius and Catullus, but Medea's words clearly imply it.

ὅρκων δὲ φρούδη πίστις, οὐδ' ἔχω μαθεῖν
ἢ θεοὺς νομίζεις τοὺς τότ' οὐκ ἄρχειν ἔτι,

ἢ καινὰ κεῖσθαι θέσμι' ἀνθρώποις τὰ νῦν,
ἐπεὶ σύνοισθά γ' εἰς ἔμ' οὐκ εὔορκος ὤν.
φεῦ δεξιὰ χείρ, ἧς σὺ πόλλ' ἐλαμβάνου,
καὶ τῶνδε γονάτων, ὡς μάτην κεχρῴσμεθα
κακοῦ πρὸς ἀνδρός, ἐλπίδων δ' ἡμάρτομεν.
(*Med.* 492-498)

The relation of the heroines of the Greek tradition to their lovers then is that of mutual subscribers, as it were, to a contract. One party defaults, and the other raises objections.

Vergil follows suit by joining the charge of faithlessness to the narration of benefactions. Under the assumption that he merely reproduces the tradition, Dido also should complain of oaths taken and promises broken. But this, as we have seen, is not the case.

nusquam tuta fides. eiectum litore, egentem
excepi et regni demens in parte locavi.
amissam classem, socios a morte reduxi...
(*A*. 4.373-375)

Although the word *fides* may mean "promise", it clearly is not so used here. By recounting her benefactions Dido refers not to services rendered in accordance with some pre-arranged compact, but rather to the acts which initiated the successive stages of her relationship with Aeneas, the *hospitium* and the dynastic marriage. The nature of this relationship stipulates the meaning of *fides* in the context. It is the trustworthiness or loyalty which is expected, according to the Roman code, in personal political relationships and which requires the requital of service with service. The obligations imposed by *fides,* as Dido sees them, are peremptory: the only right course of action for Aeneas would be to remain as her consort. The motive which leads Dido to make her complaint is the same as that of the heroines of the Greek tradition—love. The object of the complaint is the same—the desertion by the lover. But the significant difference is the title under which she makes her complaint. Dido speaks in the manner of a Roman dynast, and she censures Aeneas according to a specifically Roman criterion.

Dido's assessment of Aeneas' departure as a violation of *fides* is her final judgment on his behavior. It is only in vv.373-378, in her last speech in the great scene of confrontation (*A*. 4.296-392) that *fides* is explicitly raised as an issue, but it is the unspoken standard

which informs the two preceding speeches. In this exchange the question under consideration is that of Aeneas' responsibilities towards Dido.

Dido sets forth her case in the first speech to Aeneas in vv. 305-330. Intimacy with him has come at a high price. Not only has she lost her title of honor as an *univira,* but she has earned the enmity of the Africans and even of her own Tyrians.

> te propter Libycae gentes Nomadumque tyranni
> odere, infensi Tyrii; te propter eundem
> exstinctus pudor et, qua sola sidera adibam,
> fama prior.
>
> (*A.* 4.320-323)

As much as the hostility of the Africans and the Tyrians, *pudor* for Dido is a matter of political as well as personal consequence. It is inextricably linked to *fama,*[5] and the political function of reputation is apparent in the series of events that lead to the rupture of relations between Dido and Aeneas. *Mala fama,* apotheosized, arouses the anger of Dido's overlord Iarbas about the changed political situation at Carthage.[6] The result is the enforced departure of Aeneas. Dido further suggests that her intimacy with Aeneas will cost her her own life. Although the initial reference to her death in v. 308 (*nec moritura tenet crudeli funere Dido?*) is obscure, the meaning becomes clearer in vv. 323-326.

> cui me moribunda deseris, hospes
> (hoc solum nomen quoniam de coniuge restat)?
> quid moror? an mea Pygmalion dum moenia frater
> destruat aut captam ducat Gaetulus Iarbas?

The implication is that she would rather kill herself than fall prey to her political enemies. One of Dido's purposes then is to represent Aeneas' departure as a threat to her political position. It is precisely this concern which she voices in the only direct plea which she makes to Aeneas in this speech, ... *miserere domus labentis et istam/ oro, si quis adhuc precibus locus, exue mentem* (*A.* 4.318-319). *Domus,* as Pöschl (p. 153) has recognized, refers to the royal Phoenician house ruling at Carthage, not to Dido's household as has sometimes been maintained.[7]

The suggestion of suicide is characteristic of the method of persuasion which Dido adopts in this speech. It is calculated to engage

not only Aeneas' emotions, but also his sense of duty. The assumption underlying the suggestion is that as her lover Aeneas would find Dido's death intolerable and that it would be unconscionable for him as a political ally to do nothing to protect the interests of one by whom his own interests have been served. This integration of the political with the emotional is a recurrent feature of the speech.

> nec te noster amor nec te data dextera quondam
> [*i.e.*, tenet] (v. 307)
> per ego has lacrimas dextramque tuam te
> [*i.e.*, oro] (v. 314)
> si bene quid de te merui, fuit aut tibi quicquam
> dulce meum [*i.e.*, oro] (vv. 317-318).

In each case a phrase whose obvious intention it is to elicit a sentimental reaction in Aeneas is coupled with one which refers to the responsibilities which he has incurred towards her. Dido's diction indicates what the criteria of responsibility are. In the absence of any compelling argument to the contrary, the only reasonable interpretation of *dextera* is that suggested both by Vergil's metaphorical use of the term elsewhere in the *Aeneid* and by the presentation in the course of the earlier narrative of the association of Dido and Aeneas in the terminology of political relationships. The meaning of Dido's appeal to his right hand is determined by the value assigned to *dextera* as the symbol of *fides* in personal political relationships. The phrase *si bene quid de te merui* again gives the indication of Dido's frame of reference for making claims on Aeneas. The term *merere* has its place in Roman political vocabulary. Both the active and, more commonly, the deponent forms of the verb are found, usually with a prepositional phrase introduced by *de* indicating the person affected. Hellegouarc'h (p. 169) defines the term *merere* or *mereri de aliquo* as "...gagner de l'officium à propos de quelqu'un et par conséquent 'lui avoir rendu service;' la nuance du verbe est généralement précisée par un adverbe: *bene* (*optime*) ou au contraire *male*." The *bene meritus* is the one who has earned the right of a return for the obligation he has observed or the service he has performed. *Merere* in its various forms appears twenty-seven times in the Vergilian corpus. But with the exception of *A.* 4.317 it is used nowhere with a qualifying adverb and prepositional phrase introduced by *de.* While the word then is common in Vergil's epic diction, its use in the form current in the

political vocabulary is not. Its sole appearance in that form in Dido's speech is to be judged as a conscious and deliberate reference to the code of behavior governing personal political relationships. Dido speaks like a Roman invoking a specifically Roman standard, namely the obligation to requite favor with favor.

Dido's invocation of the emotional attachment as a reason for Aeneas' staying is an argument not seen elsewhere in the tradition. The claims of the Medeas of Euripides and Apollonius and of Catullus' Ariadne are based on an objectively valid standard. Their lovers have obligated themselves by solemn promises, and even an impartial judge would acknowledge the binding force of an oath. This reticence about love is no doubt conditioned by the conventions of the epic genre.[8] Such considerations are below the dignity of a hero and would be apt to carry little weight with him. If the introduction of the argument from sentiment into Dido's speech is an aberration from the epic tradition, it is one generated by the logic of Vergil's presentation. As we have seen, in contemporary Rome it was a commonplace of the political vocabulary to apply to political relationships the language of the emotions. The profession of love was merely a conventional way for allies to express political solidarity. While there can be no question that Dido's appeal to Aeneas' love is based on a genuine fund of emotion, it is not merely the ineffectually sentimental gesture of a love-sick woman which neither expects nor requires a response. Dido speaks like a Roman dynast, and Aeneas answers her in kind. In his reply Aeneas remains true to the ideal of the epic hero by abstaining from any discussion of his feelings for Dido, but he does not totally exclude the consideration of the emotions from his presentation. On the one side stands the obligation, patently political, imposed by Anchises, Iulus, and the gods (see vv. 345-346 and 351-358) to found a new kingdom in Italy. This task represents for Aeneas not merely the acquiescence in an obligation emanating from on high, but also an emotional commitment.

> sed nunc Italiam magnam Gryneus Apollo,
> Italiam Lyciae iussere capessere sortes;
> hic amor, haec patria est.
>
> (*A.* 4.345-347)

It would be easy to read these last words to fit the stereotype of the Roman as the martinet who represses love for the sake of duty. But

in addition to the demands made by *pietas* towards the gods, Aeneas has to consider the debt of affection which he owes to his father, his son, and his own people. Italy is their right.

> et nos fas extera quaerere regna.
> me patris Anchisae, quotiens umentibus umbris
> nox operit terras, quotiens astra ignea surgunt,
> admonet in somnis et turbida terret imago;
> me puer Ascanius capitisque iniuria cari,
> quem regno Hesperiae fraudo et fatalibus arvis.
> (*A.* 4.350-355)

Before the attachment to Dido, Anchises and Iulus were the only objects of his affection. The urgency with which he feels the need to give them their due provides the emotional impetus for undertaking a divinely imposed mission for which he himself has no inclination (see v. 361, *Italiam non sponte sequor*). In Italy he will do what he would have wanted to do at Troy, ... *dulcisque meorum/ reliquias colerem*... (*A.* 4.342-343).[9] Aeneas, as Dido in her speech, makes the identification of political responsibilities and emotional attachments. The implication of his words is that the political mission in Italy which engages both his sense of duty and his affection for his people prevails over any responsibility towards or love for Dido.[10] Love and duty are merely the two sides of the same coin; it is as impossible for Aeneas as it is for Dido to separate the subjective from the objective. Their modes of thought are determined by Roman views of the interrelation of responsibilities with personal associations.

The recognition of the identity of the political and the emotional is of paramount importance for an understanding of the disagreement between Dido and Aeneas. In the conventional interpetation, the dilemma with which Aeneas is faced is one that alternates between love and duty.[11] But this view will not bear the scrutiny of Aeneas' own estimation of the situation. In opposition to the obligations imposed by his political mission stands Dido with her claims (*A.* 4.333-339). Here, where one would expect Aeneas to establish love and duty as antitheses, he assiduously avoids any mention of his affection for Dido. He rather assesses his liabilities to her in the terms of personal political relationships. As in the case of Dido's speech, the diction of Aeneas' words makes clear the conceptual

frame of reference within which the debate over responsibilities is conducted. There is no denial of his obligations towards Dido.

> ego te, quae plurima fando
> enumerare vales, numquam, regina, negabo
> promeritam....
> (*A.* 4.333-335)

The word *promeritam* is used advisedly; it appears nowhere else in the Vergilian corpus. Donatus on Terence, *Ad.* 201 defines the word as follows, *adiuvit, profuit, cui contrarium est commerere: nam mereri et promereri est praestare beneficium.* Like Dido's reference to her *merita* in *A.* 317, *promeritam* implies the notion of reciprocation of services within the context of a personal relationship.

The question then is not the fact of Aeneas' responsibility, but its extent. Aeneas limits his obligation to remembrance only, *nec me meminisse pigebit Elissae/ dum memor ipse mei, dum spiritus hos regit artus* (*A.* 4.335-336). His statement here is a recapitulation of the position which he adopted in his first speech to Dido in Book 1. As such, it throws light on his understanding of the nature of their relationship. Verses 597-610 of Book 1 were, as we saw, a virtual recognition on the part of Aeneas that the obligation imposed by *hospitium* to manifest *gratia* by *officia,* was incumbent on him although he admitted that he was unable to fulfill it. Under the circumstances all he could offer was everlasting verbal recognition of Dido's services to him,

> in freta dum fluvii current, dum montibus umbrae
> lustrabunt convexa, polus dum sidera pascet,
> semper honos nomenque tuum laudesque manebunt,
> quae me cumque vocant terrae.
> (*A.* 1.607-610)

The reminiscence of the passage from Book 1 in the scene of confrontation in Book 4 demonstrates again that Aeneas evaluates his association with Dido in the terminology of political relationships. This same perception emerges from his denial that a marriage ever existed between them, ... *nec coniugis umquam/ praetendi taedas aut haec in foedera veni* (*A.* 4.338-339). *Foedus,* a term current in Roman political vocabulary, designated the association entered into by participants bound by *fides,* and it could be applied to any type of *fides*-based relationship.[12] Aeneas here defines their relationship as Dido

implicitly conceived it in her opening speech. Marriage with Dido would be *foedera,* but not the kind in which Aeneas professes himself to be engaged.[13] As far as he is concerned, he is still the *hospes* whose responsibilities reach no further than the verbal expression of gratitude for services rendered. The criteria then which both Dido and Aeneas adopt for assessing responsibility are the same although the conclusions which they reach differ. This clarification of the political aspect of their association provides a perspective for understanding Aeneas' moral situation. Rather than a dilemma between love and duty, it is a conflict of two distinct sets of obligations, the observation of one of which excludes the fulfillment of the other, but each of which implies an engagement of his emotions.

Although Vergil is reticent about Aeneas' behavior, the information which he supplies about the progress of the relationship between Dido and Aeneas has the effect of compromising the accuracy of Aeneas' static view of it and of his responsibilities to Dido. Against the assertion that he is merely *hospes* stand the facts of his behavior. All that we hear of Aeneas' conduct is condensed into the rapidly moving narrative which follows on the incident in the cave and ends with the scene of confrontation (*A.* 4.173-295). The proximity of the narrative to the exposition of Aeneas' own view of the situation in his response to Dido in *A.* 4.333-361 invites us to make the comparison between his words and his deeds. Vergil's editorial comment on the incident in the cave (*A.* 4.172) makes it plain that, as the narrative begins, we are to understand that Aeneas has become Dido's lover, but has committed himself no further.[14] Dido's construction of the incident as marriage is reflected in the gossip which with the passage of time Fama spreads through the cities of Africa,

> venisse Aenean Troiano sanguine cretum
> cui se pulchra viro dignetur iungere Dido.
> (*A.* 4.191-192)[15]

Fama is malicious and speaks half-truths (*tam ficti pravique tenax quam nuntia veri, A.* 4.188), so we cannot put much stock in her designation of Aeneas as Dido's husband although we are inclined to believe that Aeneas during this time continues to be her lover. In his angry prayer to Jupiter, Iarbas repeats Fama's news, but in a somewhat modulated form.

femina, quae nostris errans in finibus urbem
exiguam pretio posuit, cui litus arandum
cuique loci leges dedimus, conubia nostra
reppulit ac dominum Aenean in regna recepit.
at nunc ille Paris cum semiviro comitatu,
Maeonia mentem mitra crinemque madentem
subnexus, rapto potitur...
(*A.* 4.211-217)

Aeneas is represented not merely as Dido's husband, but as the *dominus* over Carthage. As if to make certain that Jupiter understands, Iarbas reiterates his interpretation of Aeneas' position as lord of Carthage in a harsher, invidious phrase, *rapto potitur.* Iarbas' words leave the impression that Aeneas now not only lives with Dido as his wife, but that he is acting as Juno and Venus expected that he would in the event of a marriage with Dido. Aeneas would be master of Carthage (*liceat Phrygio servire marito, A.* 4.103), with a political alliance of the peoples and their rulers (*misceri populos, foedera iungi, A.* 4.112). With what warrant Iarbas embellishes Fama's story is left unsaid. If we are to believe either Fama or Iarbas, we must have other surer indications of Aeneas' behavior.

It remains for the next two tableaux of the narrative to provide the confirmation. Jupiter the all-powerful hears Iarbas' prayer and turns his gaze to Carthage to verify these assertions (*A.* 4.220). He is concerned with Aeneas chiefly as a link in the chain of Roman destiny, and so, understandably, he reacts with this point of view in mind. The sojourn in Carthage is taken to be a renunciation of the political mission in Italy

non illum nobis genetrix pulcherrima talem
promisit Graiumque ideo bis vindicat armis;
sed fore qui gravidam imperiis belloque frementem
Italiam regeret, genus alto a sanguine Teucri
proderet, ac totum sub leges mitteret orbem.
si nulla accendit tantarum gloria rerum
nec super ipse sua molitur laude laborem,
Ascanione pater Romanas invidit arces?
quid struit? aut qua spe inimica in gente moratur
nec prolem Ausoniam et Lavinia respicit arva?
(*A.* 4.227-236)

In Jupiter's speech Vergil leaves unsaid as much as he states explicitly. Lines 232-233 suggest that Jupiter sees Aeneas as having no intention of pursuing the *laus* of founding Rome. As a last resort, he must appeal to Aeneas' sense of obligation to his son and his descendants to extricate him from Dido and Carthage. The speech leaves us with a question. If Aeneas has renounced his political mission in Italy, to what does he give precedence? Merely the pursuit of pleasure with Dido? Were we to follow the standard interpretation of Aeneas' conflict as one between duty and desire, this would be a satisfactory answer to the question. But the narrative leads us in another direction. With the epiphany of Mercury to Aeneas, we see things no longer at the third remove, as it were, but plainly, for what they are. It becomes clear that Aeneas has gone beyond merely living with Dido—or even acquiescing in Dido's interpretation of their relationship as marriage. He has actively assumed the role of consort and king. When Mercury arrives at Carthage, he finds Aeneas dressed in Tyrian purple and occupied in the building of the city. His abrupt address of Aeneas corroborates all that we have heard, but were hesitant to accept as true.

> tu nunc Karthaginis altae
> fundamenta locas pulchramque uxorius urbem
> exstruis? heu, regni rerumque oblite tuarum!
> (*A.* 4.265-267)

Aeneas' actions give the observer no choice but to assume that he has taken Dido as his wife, that he has undertaken the administration of Carthage and consequently foresworn the political mission in Italy. It is the common opinion that Dido's story is a tragedy of self-deception,[16] but it is worthwhile to ask to what extent she has deceived herself. She has heard from Aeneas' own mouth the recitation of the numerous oracles which since the fall of Troy have been directing him to Italy. Against this she must balance the facts of his behavior. While there is no question that at the beginning of her intimacy with Aeneas her designation of the relationship as marriage is a delusion, it is equally true that he feeds and gives substance to the delusion. If in Roman eyes the consent of the parties involved was the indispensable element which distinguished cohabitation from marriage, then it is not difficult to understand why Iarbas, Jupiter, Mercury, and finally Dido herself are convinced that Aeneas has married her. Actions, not words, give the surest indica-

tion of mental state.[17] Under these circumstances Aeneas' formalistic argument that he has participated in no marriage ceremony must seem no more than specious.

Aeneas' rejection of Dido's claims moves her from pleading to vituperation. According to an interpretation commonly presented in the scholarly literature on this speech, the anger and hatred which the repudiation excites in Dido preclude any possibility of her genuine communication with Aeneas.[18] Dido, so we are told, has spoken of love. Aeneas rebuts her claim with the counter-claim of duty. The result is a torrent of abuse bereft of any relevance to or understanding of Aeneas' defence. This view rests on the questionable premise that the conflict between Dido and Aeneas moves between the poles of duty and desire. Despite the hissing tone of rage in this speech, Dido remains sufficiently within the bounds of rationality to speak to the point at issue. When in his reply Aeneas addressed the question of his relationship with Dido, he dispensed with any explicit reference to his emotional disposition to Dido and considered only the weight of his responsibilities towards her. Dido now pays him back in his own coin. Her final speech is an unrelenting criticism of Aeneas' behavior which takes as its criteria the same standards with which he had absolved himself of all liability. Its ruling idea is the condemnation of Aeneas as the violator of *fides* which finds its explicit expression in the comparison of her benefactions to his treacherous desertion (vv. 373-375). Although we do not hear of the violation of *fides* elsewhere in the speech, the notion gives shape to the remainder of Dido's censures. Implicit in her hope that he will be drowned at sea and in her threats of hounding him like a Fury (*A.* 4.382-387) is the charge that he is *impius.* The commentators note on vv. 382-384,

> spero equidem mediis, si quid pia numina possunt,
> supplicia hausurum scopulis et nomine Dido
> saepe vocaturum...

an ironic echo of Aeneas' words in *A.* 1.603-605,

> di tibi, si qua pios respectant numina, si quid
> usquam iustitiae est et mens sibi conscia recti,
> praemia digna ferant.[19]

Dido's hopes and threats rest then on the same foundation as Aeneas' prayer, namely that the gods ultimately protect the obser-

vation of the obligations in *fides*-based relationships. For the same reason Aeneas' assertion that the gods command him to leave excites Dido to scorn it as mere sanctimonious pretext.

> nunc augur Apollo,
> nunc Lyciae sortes, nunc et Iove missus ab ipso
> interpres divum fert horrida iussa per auras.
> scilicet is superis labor est, ea cura quietos
> sollicitat. neque te teneo neque dicta refello:
> i, sequere Italiam ventis, pete regna per undas.
> (*A*. 4.376-381)

Now is obviously not the time to present Dido with such matters. Aeneas was aware of the oracles directing him to Italy, but he disregarded them and made his commitment elsewhere. If these considerations were negligible at the time when Aeneas assumed the role of king and consort, why do they suddenly assume a compelling validity?

It is also from the perspective of her judgment on Aeneas' *fides* that the opening words of the speech must be viewed.

> nec tibi diva parens generis nec Dardanus auctor,
> perfide, sed duris genuit te cautibus horrens
> Caucasus Hyrcanaeque admorunt ubera tigres.
> (*A*. 4.365-367)

The condemnation of Aeneas takes the form of a rhetorical figure that is attested as early as the *Iliad*. The notion that the compassionless person is born from sub-human parents is undoubtedly older still. In form Dido's words are an imitation of Patroclus' condemnation of Achilles in *Il*. 16.33-35, and the similar charge against Theseus in Ariadne's lament in Catul. 64.154-157 was a stimulus to the inclusion of the hyperbole here. But this conscious literary reminiscence serves in its context as more than a reproach for insensitivity. It is the culmination of a theme which recurs throughout the Dido-Aeneas narrative, that of the connection between honorable behavior and noble birth. As Dido enters the successive stages of her relationship with Aeneas, she does so with the thought of his *virtus*. The recognition of Trojan virtue (*A*. 1.565-566) disposes her to accept Ilioneus' plea for *hospitium*. When she repeats the offer to Aeneas, she dwells on his parentage.

tune ille Aeneas quem Dardanio Anchisae
alma Venus Phrygii genuit Simoentis ad undam?
(*A.* 1.617-618)

The explicit connection between *virtus* and birth is made when Dido relates to Aeneas Teucer's estimation of the Trojan race.

ipse hostis Teucros insigni laude ferebat.
seque ortum antiqua Teucrorum a stirpe volebat.
(*A.* 1.625-626)

Accordingly Aeneas and the Trojans are to be *hospites. Quare, agite, o tectis, iuvenes, succedite nostris* (*A.* 1.627). When Dido's thoughts turn to marriage with Aeneas, his *virtus* is among her considerations, and again its relation with birth is established, *multa viri virtus animo, multusque recursat/ gentis honos....* (*A.* 4.3-4),[20] and the connection is made between birth and character, *credo equidem, nec vana fides, genus esse deorum./ degeneres animos timor arguit...* (*A.* 4.12-13). In each case Aeneas' exalted parentage is taken as a justification for assumptions about his character as a man of *virtus. Virtus,* as we have seen, is that complex of virtues which are proper to the ideal Roman *imperator.* The repudiation of Aeneas' noble descent then becomes the repudiation of all those qualities by which Vergil defined Aeneas as the suitable representative of Roman destiny, in short, of his *humanitas.*[21]

Like the theme of faithlessness the theme of alienation is traditional in the lament of the Hellenistic sentimental heroine. The desertion by the lover leaves the heroine in a state of absolute isolation. To attach herself to her lover, she has had to sever the ties to the only social group in which she has a place, the family. The satisfaction of the passion excludes the possibility of fulfilling the social and ultimately moral obligations which she owes to the group —hence her sense of alienation. This element recurs as a constant feature in the Medeas of Euripides and Apollonius and the Ariadne of Catullus. Both the Medeas and Ariadne, when faced with the realization of their abandonment, articulate the fear which they have should they be returned to their fathers. The fear arises from the knowledge that in choosing the love of the stranger they have transgressed paternal authority. This choice is not merely an inconsequential act of filial insubordination; rather it assumes the

proportions of a criminal action. The Medea of Euripides speaks of her decision as a betrayal,

> νῦν ποῖ τράπωμαι; πότερα πρὸς πατρὸς δόμους,
> οὓς σοὶ προδοῦσα καὶ πάτραν ἀφικόμην;
>
> (*Med.* 502-503)

The terror which Apollonius' Medea feels at the thought that her father has discovered her assistance to Jason carries her to the brink of suicide and in the end forces her to flee to the Argonauts' encampment (A.R. 4.11-13). It is the index of the gravity of Medea's act that she expects the worst on returning.

> τίνα δ' οὐ τίσιν ἠὲ βαρεῖαν
> ἄτην οὐ σμυγερῶς δεινῶν ὕπερ οἷα ἔοργα
> ὀτλήσω...;
>
> (A.R. 4.379-381)

This same sense of guilt haunts Ariadne when she considers going back to Crete, *an patris auxilium sperem? quemne ipsa reliqui...?* (Catul. 64.180). From the little we know of Hellenistic poetry, the construction of a moral dilemma of this type seems to be a standard element of the tradition of love narrative. Parthenius, for example, in the collection of plot summaries for love stories which he offers to Cornelius Gallus for transformation into epic or elegy, provides an important source of information on the themes of Hellenistic love narrative.[22] In his book we see for the most part a series of accounts in which the indulgence of a passion has to be balanced against the infringement of some positive moral prescription which arises regularly from the sphere of family relations—to name just some, incest (*narr.* 5, 11, 13, 17, 31, 33), marriage (*narr.* 4, 23, 25, 27, 37), the bond of guest-friendship (*narr.* 1, 2, 3, 4, 18), and the obligations to father and fatherland (*narr.* 5, 9, 21, 22). In the tradition as we can see it, that is, in Euripides, Apollonius, and Catullus, the notion of a transgression of some moral prescription becomes an essential component of the theme of alienation.

The air of immorality with which the heroine is invested is intensified by the attribution to her of criminal acts, and her sense of alienation is deepened proportionately. Euripides' Medea throws it up to Jason that she can expect anything but a friendly reception from the daughters of the murdered Pelias (*Med.* 504-505). Love leads the Medea of Apollonius beyond the neglect of paternal

authority to the slaughter of her brother Absyrtos (A.R. 4.445-451), an act which once again makes her liable to punishment from her father and which alienates her as well from her kinswoman Circe (A.R. 4.739-748). Ariadne's complicity in the killing of her brother the Minotaur somewhat ludicrously heightens her feelings of desolation (Catul. 64.181, cf. 150-151). This bizarre use of the motif of brother murder by Catullus serves as an instructive commentary on the whole tradition. Klingner argues for the transfer of the motif from Medea's murder of Absyrtus in the story of Euripides and Apollonius. He maintains that it is out of place in the Ariadne narrative and that its appearance is understandable only as an imitation of Euripides and Apollonius. Klingner's conclusions (*Studien,* p. 194), however, have to be put into perspective. "Das Bestreben, die Dinge um des Pathos willen auf die äusserste Spitze zu treiben, ist unverkennbar." In this baroque manipulation of the situation which he calls "die Dialektik der Leidenschaft" he perceives (p. 194, n. 3) something un-Greek and by implication Roman. "Ob ein griechischer Dichter so weit darin gegangen wäre, die sachliche Ausdenkbarkeit der Dialektik der Leidenschaft zu opfern, scheint zweifelhaft." Although Ariadne's considerations may be ludicrous, Catulus' use of the motif of brother murder is attributable primarily to the force of a tradition rather than to some congenital lack of taste. Its introduction makes his narrative conform to a pattern evident not only in the Medea story, but also in other love stories told by Hellenistic poets whose tradition is represented in Parthenius' collection. The lover must commit immoral acts to reach the goal of satisfaction of his passion. As with the Medea of Euripides and Apollonius, the murder of the brother is another in a series of reprehensible acts initiated by Ariadne's decision to abandon father and family for the love of a stranger. The choice of indulging a passion then must be invested with an air of immorality and even criminality. Only in this way can the theme of alienation be given its full development.

In adopting the theme of alienation Vergil shows himself to be at the same time most open to the influence of the tradition and most free to accommodate it to his own purposes. Dido's legendary fidelity to the memory of her dead husband, as we know it from the accounts of Timaeus and Justinus, provides the basis for the construction of a moral conflict in the style of the Hellenistic poets. In the presentation of Dido's dilemma in the opening scene of *Aeneid* 4,

Vergil demonstrates his adherence to the Hellenistic tradition. Knauer has shown (p. 154) that the temporal sequence of the events narrated in Books 1-3 of the *Aeneid* depends on that of *Odyssey,* Books 5-8, but that this sequence is broken off at *A.* 4.6.[23] The new chronology of *Aeneid* 4 is instituted by a series of reminiscences of Hellenistic poetry. At the beginning of the book Dido has passed a fitful night (v.5) troubled by dreams, and it is these dreams which occasion the speech in which she sets forth to Anna the conflict that her love for Aeneas has caused. This situation is clearly an imitation of Apollonius' treatment of Medea's conflict in *Argonautica* 3. Medea has a prophetic dream which prefigures her involvement with Jason (vv. 616-632), she awakens (vv. 632-635) and then speaks an anguished monologue (vv. 636-644). The opening line of Dido's speech, *Anna soror, quae me suspensam insomnia terrent,* parallels the first line of Medea's, Δειλὴ ἐγών, οἷόν με βαρεῖς ἐφόβησαν ὄνειροι (A.R. 3.636).[24] The passage in Vergil, however, seems to be, more than a simple imitation of Apollonius, an allusion to the whole tradition of love narrative.[25] Winfried Bühler argues (pp. 60-61) convincingly that Apollonius' treatment of Medea's dilemma served as the source of inspiration for the opening both of Moschus' *Europa* and of Ovid's narrative of Byblis in *Met.* 9.454 ff. The *Europa* begins with an allegorical dream in which Europe and Asia, personified as women, vie for the possession of Europa (vv. 1-15). The girl awakes in fright and tries to unravel the meaning of her dream in a monologue (vv. 16-27). So too Ovid. After setting forth the preliminaries (vv. 454-467), he starts the narrative with an account of Byblis' dreams (vv. 468-471) and then gives her monologue of reaction. This repetition in Moschus, Vergil, and Ovid leaves the impression that Apollonius' sequence of dream, awakening, and speech become a standard way of beginning a love narrative.

Although Vergil is scrupulous in his evocation of the literary tradition, the moral dilemma which Dido is made to confront is of a different order from that of the Medeas and Ariadne. As we have seen, in choosing love they violate a moral standard which has an objective reality. They are conscious of having pursued a course of action which will merit punishment. They have controverted a value which is shared by their community. Their perception of their actions as wrong is not therefore a subjective judgment. Dido's desire for Aeneas, on the contrary, finds its obstacle in the self-

imposed obligation to remain faithful to the dead Sychaeus, and Dido is guilty of wrong-doing only in so far as she violates a norm which is not to be recognized as a positive moral obligation. The question of the *univira* has been discussed in the scholarship on Vergil, but one aspect of it remains to be considered. The point of reference of the treatments of this matter is the attitude which was current in Roman society toward remarriage.[26] The evidence from the funerary inscriptions, cited by Gordon Williams, shows that to have one husband during the course of her life was the ideal mode of conduct for a Roman woman. But that does not mean that this was the only licit mode of conduct. The epitaphs imply as much. It redounded to a woman's honor that she was *solo contenta viro* (*anth.*, II, 643.5) or that *unum sortita maritum/ servavi casta pudorem* (*anth.*, II, 2, 1523.7-8). The assertions are calculated to distinguish the women whom they describe and to excite the admiration and approval of the reader. The marital mores of the late Republic and early empire, which hardly need documentation here, lead to the same conclusion: remaining *univira* was an ideal, but in no sense a moral obligation. The marriage legislation of Augustus gives the same indications. According to the *lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus* and the *lex Papia Poppaea* widows and divorced women were required to remarry within a specified period if they were to avoid the penalties imposed on the unmarried.[27] It is much more appropriate to assume that in establishing these provisions Augustus was willing to dispense with a high-minded but relatively inconsequential ideal than to do violence to a positive moral prescription. If a woman's having only one husband in her life elicited social approval, that is no reason for assuming that having more than one was grounds for condemnation.

Heinze's argument on the point is somewhat circular:

> ...unter allen Zeugnissen, die uns die hohe Schätzung der *univira* lehren, ist keines charakteristischer als die Nachricht, dass an den Altären der *Pudicitia* nur 'Matronen von anerkannter Keuschheit, die in erster und einziger Ehe lebten' [Livy, 10.23.9] opfern durften. Wie sich die Praxis der virgilischen Zeit zu dieser idealen Forderung stellte, ist bekannt, aber dass wenigstens in den Kreisen, die auf altrömische Sittlichkeit noch etwas hielten, die Forderung als solche aufrecht erhalten wurde, dürfen wir schon aus Virgil schliessen. (p. 126)

Inferences drawn from Vergil's treatment should not, without further justification, be used as proof for the current regulations of Roman morality. Even if we accept the ritual impediments imposed on a woman married more than once as a reflection of the moral standards of contemporary society rather than of the remote past in which they were established, it would not be justified to apply this criterion in an assessment of Dido's behavior. On the assumption that the moral values which operate in *Aeneid* 4 are shared values, it is curious that only Dido condemns remarriage. It offends the moral sensibilities of no one else. Instead of resorting to a line of specious argumentation, Anna is direct in her refutation of Dido's scruples, *id cinerem aut manis credis curare sepultos?* (*A.* 4.34),... *placitone etiam pugnabis amori?* (*A.* 4.38).[28] Dido herself calls her union with Aeneas in the cave a marriage,

> ...neque enim specie famave movetur
> nec iam furtivum Dido meditatur amorem:
> coniugium vocat, hoc praetexit nomine culpam.
> (*A.* 4.170-172)[29]

If a second marriage were to excite universal censure, it does not seem likely that Dido would leave herself open to an embarrassment of this sort, for camouflaging her discreditable behavior with Aeneas as *coniugium* would only compound her difficulties. After Dido has killed herself, Vergil tells us, ... *nec fato merita nec morte peribat,/ sed misera ante diem subitoque accensa furore* (*A.* 4.696-697). Although infidelity to Sychaeus is Dido's self-professed reason for suicide (*A.* 4. 547-552), according to the all-seeing narrator it is madness, not some principle of justice acting through Dido, which destroys her. The most convincing demonstration, however, of the proposition that Dido's dilemma is a self-made conflict is the way in which the motif of moral choice is integrated into the theme of alienation. In the case of the Medeas and Ariadne it was the commission of criminal acts which produced their feelings of isolation. But Dido's betrayal of Sychaeus, as we shall see, is not the cause of her alienation.[30] Rather it is only a circumstance peripheral to her isolation. Only when she has been overwhelmed by the sense of desolation, does the thought of her infidelity return to her and ultimately lead her to suicide.

Two passages in *Aeneid* 4 deal with the question of Dido's motives for suicide. In vv. 450-473, where Vergil narrates the events fol-

lowing Aeneas' second refusal to stay, we learn that Dido sees the sacrificial wine which she has offered at the altars of the gods turn to blood (vv. 453-455). Next she imagines that the voice of Sychaeus calls to her from the cenotaph in the palace compound, and she hears the cries of an owl, symbol of death. It would not be difficult for Dido, who has made infidelity to Sychaeus the matter of a divine curse, to draw a connection between these events: the gods are angry and demand her death. Finally she dreams that a hostile Aeneas pursues her and that she, utterly alone, wanders vainly in search of her own people (vv. 465-468). All these considerations recur in one form or another in the monologue of vv. 534-552, where Dido makes the final decision to kill herself, but here they are presented in such a way as to give a perception of their interrelation. First, she dwells on her estrangement from the Africans, from the Trojans, and even from her own people (vv. 534-546). Only after she has convinced herself that she has no place to turn, do her thoughts bring her to Sychaeus and suicide. *Quin morere ut merita es, ferroque averte dolorem* (v. 547). *Ut merita es* is explained by vv. 550-552.

> non licuit thalami expertem sine crimine vitam
> degere more ferae, talis nec tangere curas;
> non servata fides cineri promissa Sychaeo.

She will herself exact the penalty for the violation of the oath that she put under the protection of the gods. The whole process of punishment following on transgression is internalized in Dido in a way that makes a comparison with the Medeas and Ariadne impossible.

The monologue of *A.* 4.534-552 is meant to evoke the memory of the literary tradition, but the circumstances which precipitate Dido's crisis are quite different from those of the Medeas and Ariadne. To emphasize to Jason the desperate state of her isolation, Euripides' Medea reviews the options open to her in a series of rhetorical questions (*Med.* 502-504). Apollonius (4.376-381), Catullus (64.177-183) and Vergil, here, all use this device to similar effect. But, whereas the idea underlying the questions of the Medeas and of Ariadne in Catul. 64.180-181 is that they have no place to turn for fear of being punished for their criminal acts, Dido can think only of her political alienation. She has compromised herself with the Africans by rejecting their proposals of marriage,

but nevertheless taking a consort (*A.* 4.534-536). If she were to follow the Trojans to Italy, she would have to go alone because her own people would refuse to submit to a second migration (*A.* 4.543-546). But to go with the Trojans is an impossibility because they have shown themselves to be ungrateful and faithless.

> Iliacas igitur classis atque ultima Teucrum
> iussa sequar? quiane auxilio iuvat ante levatos
> et bene apud memores veteris stat gratia facti?
> quis me autem, fac velle, sinet ratibusve superbis
> invisam accipiet? nescis heu, perdita, necdum
> Laomedonteae sentis periuria gentis?
> (*A.* 4.537-542)

As in the case of the Africans and of her own people, Dido perceives her estrangement from the Trojans as a political alienation. If from our point of view the notions of fidelity and gratitude are not necessarily linked, they certainly were so in the domain of Roman political relationships. *Fides,* as we have seen, manifests itself in *gratia,* the disposition to show thanks concretely by requiting service with service. Aeneas' treachery, his decision to leave, is proof that he and the Trojans have no gratitude for past benefactions, the *hospitium* and the share in the new kingdom. They therefore would be unwilling to requite favor with favor, that is, to take her with them and in effect to continue their alliance with her. Only by taking this Roman way of thinking into account can we fully understand Dido's meaning.

The diction of v. 539 makes it clear that the conceptual frame of reference of Dido's assessment of the Trojans' behavior is provided by the Roman code of political relationships. *Gratia* and its functional equivalent *grates* appear eight times in the Vergilian corpus. With the exception of the application of *gratia* in the sense of "thankfulness or recompense" of unploughed land in *G.* 1.83 and in the sense of "delight, pleasure" or Greek χάρις in *A.* 6.653,[31] these words are used only in the context of relationships that are patently political. In *A.* 7.400-403, where Amata attempts to incite the Latin matrons to an insurrection against the authority of Latinus, *gratia* has the meaning of "political influence" or "authority."[32] The usual meaning of concrete expression of gratitude for services rendered occurs in *A.* 1.600, where Aeneas thanks Dido for the *hospitium,* in *A.* 7.232, where Ilioneus assures Latinus of the Tro-

jans' reliability as political allies, and in *A.* 9.298-299 and *A.* 11.508-509, where Ascanius and Turnus respectively express their thanks to Euryalus and Camilla for extraordinary military services. If *gratia* in *A.* 4.539, *et bene apud memores veteris stat gratia facti,* does not have a political connotation, it would be an aberration from Vergil's regular usage.

One further point remains to be discussed. It is attractive to take *bene* as modifying *facti* to produce the phrase *gratia benefacti.* The phrase would reenforce our understanding of *gratia* in its political connotation. *Benefactum* is the poetic synonym for *beneficium,* the everyday word of the political vocabulary which is metrically unacceptable in hexameter. Although it has been asserted that *bene* is in tmesis with *facti,*[33] this view seems unlikely on metrical and structural grounds. The line is divided at the third foot strong caesura after *memores. Veteris* as modifier of *facti* balances *bene* as modifier of *memores.* On the other hand, as far as sense is concerned, the connection of *bene* with *facti* is a natural one to make. Pease, for example, notes *ad loc.*, "*bene*: this may modify *memores* or *stat* or *facti*, most appropriately the last, with perhaps a diffused influence on the other two words as well." In a case like this where conclusions based on metrical and structural considerations conflict with semantic expectations, it is best not to press the point. The significant matter is that the suggestion is made that *bene* is to be understood with *facti,* and that in itself is sufficient to confirm our understanding of *gratia* with its political connotation. The rarity of the word *benefactum* indicates that the suggestion is made deliberately. It appears only once in Vergil's works, in *G.* 3.525, in the purely metaphorical sense of the labors of a plow bull. *Bene* itself is relatively uncommon. It occurs three times in the *Eclogues* (2.48; 3.94; and 9.6), and four times in the *Aeneid* (4.317, 539; 9,157, 206), but nowhere, except in *A.* 4.539, in a context that even suggests *benefactum.*

The comparison of the theme of alienation in *Aeneid* 4 with its use in the earlier representatives of the tradition shows the essential difference in Vergil's conception of Dido. Her sentimental attachment to Aeneas implies a political commitment, but not a criminal act. The element of moral conflict is introduced for different reasons from those which generate its appearance in Euripides, Apollonius and Catullus. By supplying Dido with a motive for suicide it contributes to satisfying Vergil's own requirement of presenting the complete destruction caused by Aeneas' association with this woman,

and it has the further advantage of preserving at least two of the basic features of the traditional Dido legend, the faithfulness to the dead husband and the self-inflicted death. We see once again here, as in the development of the theme of faithlessness, that Dido uses the terminology of Roman political vocabulary to define and assess her relationship with Aeneas. The love union with Aeneas was a political alliance, and it results in an alteration in Dido's relations with the groups to which she is attached politically. Her fears of the Africans and in particular of Iarbas are justified. Iarbas' words in his prayer to Jupiter make Dido's situation clear.

femina, quae nostris errans in finibus urbem
exiguam pretio posuit, cui litus arandum
cuique loci leges dedimus, conubia nostra
reppulit ac dominum Aenean in regna recepit.
(*A.* 4.211-214)

Dido is no more than a vassal queen, and the *loci leges* do not permit such threats to Iarbas' position and authority (*cf.* Anna's argument, ..*Teucrum comitantibus armis/ Punica se quantis attollet gloria rebus, A.* 4.48-49). Although Vergil does not elaborate the hostility of the Carthaginians (*te propter.../...infensi Tyrii, A.* 4.320-321), it is not difficult to imagine their resentment at a foreigner's status as consort and partner of Dido. Unlike the protagonists of the Greek tradition, Dido is a political woman, and any consideration of her emotional attachment to Aeneas has to be made with that aspect of her character in mind.

The political aspect of the Dido-Aeneas relationship emerges most clearly from Vergil's use of the theme of the curse. As a constituent element of the lament of the sentimental heroine the curse appears fully developed before Vergil only in Catullus. Ariadne's desire for revenge on Theseus finds its expression in the form of a prayer in which the statement of her wish (Catul. 64.198-201) is preceded by an elaborate invocation of the Eumenides (vv. 192-197). Catullus undoubtedly had in mind Medea's wish in A.R. 4.385-387 for the Erinyes to injure Jason, although this and the other imprecations of A.R. 4. 382-385 are not formally a curse. Despite the fragmentary nature of our knowledge of the tradition of Hellenistic love narrative, there is reason to believe that the curse was a standard feature. Heinze notes (p. 137, n. 2) both the account

of Phyllis and Demophoon preserved in Apollodorus, according to which Phyllis curses Demophoon before she kills herself, and also the twenty-first narrative of Parthenius, in which Euopis curses Thymoetus before she commits suicide. As we look at the curse in Apollonius and Catullus, one trait draws the attention: Medea and Ariadne wish to requite their lovers eye for eye and tooth for tooth, no more no less.

> μνήσαιο δὲ καί ποτ' ἐμεῖο
> στρευγόμενος καμάτοισι, δέρος δέ τοι ἶσον ὀνείρῳ
> οἴχοιτ' εἰς ἔρεβος μεταμώνιον· ἐκ δέ σε πάτρης
> αὐτίκ' ἐμαὶ ἐλάσειαν Ἐρινύες, οἷα καὶ αὐτὴ
> σῇ πάθον ἀτροπίῃ
>
> (A.R. 4.383-387)

Medea's present distress, her evanescent hopes of marriage, and the loss of her country become the measure of Jason's suffering. With a prophetic irony that borders on the comic, Ariadne curses Theseus the *immemor* (*cf.* Catul. 64.135) with forgetfulness, *sed quali solam Theseus me mente reliquit/ tali mente, deae, funestet seque suosque* (vv. 200-201). The same sense of strict justice prevails in Dido's curse of Aeneas.

> at bello audacis populi vexatus et armis,
> finibus extorris, complexu avulsus Iuli
> auxilium imploret videatque indigna suorum
> funera; nec, cum se sub leges pacis iniquae
> tradiderit, regno aut optata luce fruatur,
> sed cadat ante diem mediaque inhumatus harena.
>
> (*A.* 4.615-620)

In one way or another the evils which Dido wishes to see inflicted on Aeneas are a reflection of the injuries which she herself has suffered: the military threats to which she is now exposed (*cf.* vv. 320-321, 325-326), her helplessness and isolation, and her own imminent and premature death after a humiliating alliance (*cf.* v. 520, *non aequo foedere amantes*). In one respect there is nothing unusual about the curses of either Medea or Ariadne or Dido: fantasies of revenge are often constructed around reversals of situation of this sort.

The distinguishing characteristic of Dido's curse is to be found elsewhere. Transcending the desire for personal injury to Aeneas, it becomes a curse called down upon a nation.

tum vos, o Tyrii, stirpem et genus omne futurum
exercete odiis, cinerique haec mittite nostro
munera. nullus amor populis nec foedera sunto.
(*A.* 4.622-624)

The combination of *amor* and *foedera* in this last injunction is of particular significance. In company with *foedera, amicitia,* rather than *amor,* would seem to be more appropriate; it was the usual term for designating the relationship between nations.[34] Although *amor* has its place in the vocabulary of political *amici,* it is a term which emphasizes the emotive side of a relationship and is rarely applied to a group, not to mention a nation.[35] The presence of the word here suggests that Dido is drawing an analogy between her relationship with Aeneas and that of the Carthaginians with the Trojans. But an analogy implies reciprocity. While Dido's connection to Aeneas was one of *amor*, it was also one of *foedera.* The political relationship is then transparent in the emotional relationship. If we understand Dido's attachment to Aeneas as concomitantly sentimental and political, then light is shed on the second portion of the curse with its reference (especially in v. 625, *exoriare aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor*) to Hannibal and the Punic Wars. It is not an appendix devoid of immediate relevance to its context, artificially and naively attached to the private affair of two individuals in order to invest it with an historical dimension. Because of the political nature of their relationship, Aeneas' desertion is an offense against both Dido and Carthage. The public and political side of Dido's personality cannot be separated from the private. The enmity which Aeneas' desertion of Dido demonstrates is therefore to earn the hostility of the generations of Carthaginians to come. As in the case of Dido's prayer for harm to the person of Aeneas, the evil inflicted is the measure of the evil to be requited. The historical animosity of Carthage and Rome is a necessary and inevitable consequence of a loyalty betrayed.

It is in fact Dido's sense of outrage at this act as a political betrayal which provokes the curse. The political implications of Aeneas' departure outweigh any consideration of the personal injury which Dido has suffered. In this respect Dido contrasts with Medea and Ariadne. Both Apollonius and Catullus explicitly make as the motive of the curse the desire of revenge for the imminent physical danger with which Medea and Ariadne are threatened.

Medea plainly fears that her father will kill her if she is handed over to him.

> τίνα δ'οὐ τίσιν ἠὲ βαρεῖαν
> ἄτην οὐ σμυγερῶς δεινῶν ὕπερ οἷα ἔοργα
> ὀτλήσω, σὺ δέ κεν θυμηδέα νόστον ἕλοιο;
> μὴ τόγε παμβασίλεια Διὸς τελέσειεν ἄκοιτις,
> ᾗ ἔπι κυδιάεις· μνήσαιο δὲ καί ποτ' ἐμεῖο, *etc.*
> (A.R. 4.379-383)

Theseus' abandonment of Ariadne on the deserted Naxos is tantamount to consigning her to death (*cf.* Catul. 64.186-187 and 152-153), and this thought is uppermost in her mind as she pronounces her curse,

> non tamen ante mihi languescent lumina morte,
> nec prius a fesso secedent corpore sensus,
> quam iustam a divis exposcam prodita multam
> caelestumque fidem postrema comprecer hora.
> (Catul. 64.188-191)

In the opening lines of her speech Dido articulates the preoccupation that dominates throughout, both in the curse itself (vv. 607-629) and in the thoughts which lead up to it (vv. 590-606). '*...pro Iuppiter! ibit! hic,*' *ait* '*et nostris inluserit advena regnis?*'. Aeneas' departure is an insult to the majesty of Carthage. Dido curses him, not like Medea or Ariadne, as the cause of her death, not for having destroyed their love, as well she may, but because he is the traitor to a relationship which she thinks of only in its political aspect.

> infelix Dido, nunc te facta impia tangunt?
> tum decuit cum sceptra dabas. en dextra fidesque,
> quem secum patrios aiunt portare penatis,
> quem subiisse umeris confectum aetate parentem!
> (*A.* 4.596-599)

The mordant irony of Dido's reference to the quintessential symbol of Aeneas' *pietas,* the act of carrying his father and household gods from the wreckage of Troy, is the index of her profound disillusionment with the man to whom she gave a share in royal power. The thought that he could be capable of *facta impia,* though it ought to have, never entered her considerations at the time when she allied herself to him. The evidence before her, the sight of his ships sailing

off, makes that conclusion incontrovertible. Her initial reaction, in a momentary loss of self-possession, was to redress the insult done to her kingdom by launching an attack (vv. 590-594). When she returns to sanity, she is left only with the reality of her misjudgment (vv. 595-599) and regrets for her previous inaction (vv. 600-606). The curse (vv. 607-629) is her last and only resort.

This understanding of the first half of the speech (vv. 590-606) rests on an interpretation of vv. 596-597 that is controversial. The commentators of the English-speaking world, Henry, Page, Conington, Pease, Austin, and R. D. Williams, all prefer to take the *facta impia* of v. 596 as a reference to Dido's infidelity to Sychaeus rather than to Aeneas' desertion of Dido.[36] The reason for accepting this view, when a reason is given, seems more expedient than satisfactory.[37] The focus of attention of these commentators is on the immediate context of vv. 596-597, and the conclusion that results from their considerations is at least initially attractive. Since they claim that no adequate meaning for *tum decuit cum sceptra dabas* in v. 597 emerges from *facta impia* if understood as an allusion to Aeneas' action, they assert that the phrase must refer to Dido's infidelity. Page in the comment on v. 597 states the objection succinctly, "Some explain *facta impia* of the evil deeds of Aeneas. But, until he deceived her, how could his evil deeds touch her?" A suggestion advanced by some is that Dido is thinking of the treacherous nature of the whole Trojan race when she says *tum decuit cum sceptra dabas.*[38] Henry and Page rightly reject this assumption as a way out of the difficulty.[39] The only justification for superimposing Dido's mention of the *periuria gentis Laomedonteae* in v. 542 on the *facta impia* of v. 596 is that that thought is still fresh in her mind. But one may as well use v. 552, *non servata fides cineri promissa Sychaeo,* to demonstrate the meaning of *facta impia.* If anything, the conclusion that the citation of this line yields should be more probable since the thought of the broken vow to Sychaeus occurs to her after she has referred to Trojan treachery. In either case the method is arbitrary because it neglects the one control for verifying the conclusion, the context in which the phrase *facta impia* appears. With the suggestion about Laomedontid perjury dismissed, the objection still stands that Aeneas' impious deeds could not have touched Dido before he had committed any.

The only possible way to avoid this criticism and yet retain *facta impia* as referring to Aeneas is to posit a shift in the meaning of the

phrase from v. 596 to v. 597. There are two possibilities for this second meaning. First, *facta impia* in v. 597, extrapolated from the preceding line, could mean Dido's violation of her promise to her dead husband.[40] The objection which Pease in the comment on v. 596 makes to seeing in vv. 596-597 a reference to both Aeneas and Dido, however, seems sound, "...Dido, as the context shows, is making no attempt to divide the guilt between two offenders; her feeling is either bitter blame of Aeneas or remorseful self-reproach...." The second alternative is implied in Wagner's interpretation of v. 597, *tum decuit, etc.*: "tum, quum eius fidei se suaque crederet, suspectam eam habere oportebat."[41] The impious deeds of v. 596 would be Aeneas' desertion while in v. 597 the extrapolated phrase would connote the possibility of Aeneas' committing impious deeds. There can be no objection on semantic grounds to this sort of modulation in the meaning of a phrase, and the absence in v. 596 of any explicit specification of whose the impious deeds are facilitates the transition. Conington in the comment on v. 596 considers Wagner's view and then rejects it: "...but the question recurs, had he given ground for suspicion?" Perhaps this is not the right question to ask. In a literal translation Dido's words are, "Is it only now that impious deeds touch you. They ought to have at the time when you were handing over the sceptre." Two observations have to be made. First, Dido speaks of herself as having engaged in a political act, the sharing of royal power with Aeneas. Second, the statement implies that there is some connection between *pietas* and this act. A question which presents itself for formulation is this: why should thoughts about *pietas* have touched, that is, affected, or entered into the considerations of, Dido when she made this alliance? On the assumption that the *facta impia* are Aeneas', the relevance of the question becomes immediate if we consider the background of Roman social and political institutions on which the Dido-Aeneas relationship is predicated. *Pietas,* the steadfast observation of obligations, is the mark of the reliability of a participant in a political relationship. The objection of Conington is beside the point. Anyone entering an alliance of the type of which Dido speaks would realize, if he were prudent, the necessity of considering the reliability of the prospective ally. As we have already seen, Ilioneus based his plea to Dido for *hospitium* on the *pietas* of Aeneas and the Trojans. The assumption underlying the plea is that the matter of *pietas* would be the determining factor in the

decision. Dido's words in vv. 596-597 reflect the same values and attitude. If their tone is one of self-recrimination, it is self-recrimination for having been negligent. The accusation, of course, could have been made only from hindsight. To make explicit this interpretation, then, vv. 596-597 would mean, "Unhappy Dido, is it only now that Aeneas' impious deeds touch you? The possibility of his committing impious deeds ought to have touched you at the time when you were handing over the scepter." The shift in meaning of *facta impia* from one line to the next is admissible. As a result, there are no reasons, based on a consideration of context, for dismissing out of hand the phrase as a reference to Aeneas and consequently being forced back as a last resort to taking the words as a reference to Dido. The interpretation moreover has the advantage of being consistent with Vergil's conception of the Dido-Aeneas relationship as regulated by Roman social and political values.

While this interpretation meets the objection that *facta impia* when understood of Aeneas cannot yield a satisfactory meaning for *tum decuit cum sceptra dabas,* it does not answer the question whether the impious deeds are Aeneas' or Dido's. The only place to look for the solution to this problem is in the context, that is, in the relation of vv. 596-597 both to what precedes and to what follows. Those who take *facta impia* of Aeneas do not deal with the issue of context. The exception is Wagner who merely asserts the connection of the lines in question to what comes before them, "...sed illud ex praegressa oratione elicies, quod his verbis [*i.e.*, *tum decuit cum sceptra dabas*] aptum sit. Nempe omnis res spectat ad fidem ab Aenea, si non verbis, rebus tamen olim confirmatam. Itaque nunc se ait perfidia eius tangi, quum serum sit..."[42] Those on the other side of the question are so intent on showing that *facta impia* as an allusion to Dido is the only way to make sense of *tum decuit cum sceptra dabas* that as a result they forego a consideration of the context. The consequence is that they are led to the untried assumption that there is no context, or rather a break in context.[43] Dido begins the speech in a fit of rage against Aeneas; then, because the *facta impia* must be hers, she pauses to reflect on her own sins, only to resume the tirade against him a few lines later. The whole matter deserves to be reviewed. The sight of the orderly departure of the Trojan fleet (vv. 586-588) excites Dido to the uncontrolled outburst of the beginning of the speech (vv. 590-594) in which she calls for an attack. Self-possession returns with the realization that this course of action is

madness (v. 595). It is at this point that the attitude of reflection sets in: *infelix Dido, nunc te facta impia tangunt?* The emphatic *nunc* surely refers to the present moment when Dido sees the ships sailing away. *Tangunt* means "touch" in the sense "affect," "produce an emotional reaction in." Vergil uses *tangere* with this meaning three other times, and it should be added that in at least two of those instances the word carries the connotation of affecting in such a way as to produce a particular action: in Amata's plea to Turnus in *A.* 12.56-60,

> Turne, per has ego te lacrimas, per si quis Amatae
> tangit honos animum....
>
> unum oro: desiste manum committere Teucris.

and in Turnus' plea to Aeneas in *A.* 12.932-934,

> ...miseri te si qua parentis
> tangere cura potest, oro...
> ...Dauni miserere senectae.[44]

This connotation of *tangere* fits the context of v. 596. The sight of Aeneas' departure has just angered Dido to the point of issuing orders for an attack. Under the circumstances it seems eminently reasonable to understand the *facta impia* as Aeneas'. Although the tone changes from v. 594 to v. 595, there are no grounds for positing a discontinuity in the thought.

Taking the preceding lines into account shows that *facta impia* in v. 596 must refer to Aeneas, but this does not confirm the assumption that in the transition from v. 596 to v. 597 the phrase does not shift its reference from Aeneas to Dido. Again the only way to resolve the question whether Dido is speaking of herself or Aeneas is to consider the context, in this case, that which follows, *en dextra fidesque, etc.* In the statement that begins with these words Dido complains that Aeneas is bereft of *pietas*. Since this same thought animates v. 596, it becomes unlikely in the extreme that in the intervening words, *tum decuit cum sceptra dabas,* Dido turns aside to consider her own actions. This improbability turns into an impossibility when we consider the function of *en* in v. 597. The etymological dictionaries inform us that as a deictic particle *en* has the meaning of *ecce*; hence it bears the connotation of suddenness or surprise.[45] As Austin notes on v. 597, *en* sometimes, as here, is overlayed with the tone of indignation. At least as far as Vergil's

usage is concerned, one further point should be added. Deictic *en* sometimes has the force of an "inferential" particle with the sense "because, look!" or "for, look!". When it does, it introduces a statement which is adduced to substantiate the proposition which immediately precedes it. The statement introduced by *en* provides the material from which the inference made in the previous statement is drawn. Of the twenty appearances of deictic *en* in Vergil's writings, there are four instances in which *en* unequivocally has this meaning: in *Ecl.* 1.11-13, where Meliboeus shows that chaos reigns over the whole countryside by citing as proof his own situation.

...undique totis
usque adeo turbatur agris. en ipse capellas
protinus aeger ago; hanc etiam vix, Tityre, duco;

in *G.* 4.494-496, where Eurydice infers from death's overtaking her a second time that some irrational act is the cause,

illa 'quis et me' inquit 'miseram et te perdidit, Orpheu,
quis tantus furor? en iterum crudelia retro
fata vocant, conditque natantia lumina somnus;

in *G.* 4.322-328, where Aristaeus supports the proposition that his divine mother has become indifferent to his welfare by pointing to his failure in beekeeping,

...quid me praeclara stirpe deorum

invisum fatis genuisti? aut quo tibi nostri
pulsus amor? quid me caelum sperare iubebas?
en etiam hunc ipsum vitae mortalis honorem,
quem mihi vix frugum et pecudum custodia sollers
omnia temptanti extuderat, te matre relinquo;

and in *A.* 5.671-673, where Ascanius attempts by pointing to himself to show the women who are burning the fleet that they are acting contrary to Trojan interests,

...non hostem inimicaque castra
Argivum, vestras spes uritis. en, ego vester
Ascanius...

(*cf.* *A.* 5.678-679, ... *piget incepti lucisque, suosque/ mutatae agnoscunt excussaque pectore Iuno est.*).[46] *En* in *A.* 4.597, understood in the sense

that is apparent in these passages, that is, as meaning "for, look" or "because, look" indicates a close relationship between the two sections of the line. The ironic reference to Aeneas' right hand and *fides,* introduced by *en*, substantiates the pronouncement which Dido has just made. The possibility of Aeneas' acting impiously ought to have affected her, that is, entered into her considerations, when she was making the alliance, because, look, the evidence now before her demonstrates his true character. The implication is that had she known then what is now obvious, she would never have become involved. The recognition that in v. 597 *en* functions to introduce a statement that substantiates the preceding proposition then establishes the continuity between the two sections of the line and excludes the interpretation that Dido thinks of herself in the words *tum decuit cum sceptra dabas.*

As Vergil leads us through the vicissitudes of Dido's emotions in the course of her lament, he offers as a unifying thread her recurring allusions to the social norms by which the Romans regulated behavior in political associations. Dido's lament recapitulates in the traditional order the themes of the lament of the Greek sentimental heroine, but in *Aeneid* 4 the form is endowed with a new content and a new meaning. Distraught and sick to the point of frenzy at the prospect of losing Aeneas, she makes the most effective argument which she can for his remaining, one that is calculated to appeal to the virtues which are used to define Aeneas himself: she places her claim on his *pietas* and his *fides.* When she is met with only rebuffs, a mood of self-pity envelops her. She sees herself alone and abandoned. Alienated because of her association with Aeneas, she is the victim of ingratitude, his unwillingness to reciprocate the favors which she has lavished on him. Self-pity yields place to a visceral desire for revenge, and once again Dido seizes on Aeneas' infractions of *pietas* and *fides* to justify her curse. *Accipite haec,* she prays to the gods, *meritumque malis advertite numen* (*A.* 4.611). At every point we are made to see Dido the Carthaginian ironically as a figure whose modes of thought are in essence Roman.

The attribution of Roman characteristics to Dido is not, however, limited to Vergil's presentation of her pleadings with and condemnations of Aeneas. She shows herself, in the scruples which she feels at becoming involved with Aeneas, sensitive to the peculiarly Roman ideal of *univiratus.* Political as well as emotional considera-

tions lead her to set aside this ideal, but the neglect of it comes back to haunt her, and, in the end, like some wayward Lucretia, she exacts the penalty for the betrayal of her dead husband. Although Dido's motives for suicide are more complex than guilt toward Sychaeus, we cannot help but feel that in the self-eulogy which constitutes her *novissima verba* this betrayal is close to the surface of her consciousness.

> vixi et quem dederat cursum Fortuna peregi,
> et nunc magna mei sub terras ibit imago.
> urbem praeclaram statui, mea moenia vidi,
> ulta virum poenas inimico a fratre recepi,
> felix, heu nimium felix, si litora tantum
> numquam Dardanidae tetigissent nostra carinae.
> (*A.* 4.653-658)

Her greatness lies, in part, in having avenged Sychaeus, and she would have remained *felix* in this respect had Aeneas never arrived. The thought of the infidelity is then implicit. But Dido sees herself as more than the ideal wife *manquée*. She takes pride first of all in her political achievements: Fortuna has granted her the lot of founding-a city. If we think back to Venus' biography in Book 1, which is the only information that Vergil supplies about Dido's earlier career, we see that it is by gathering a band of supporters, taking Sychaeus' wealth, and establishing a new city that Dido takes her vengeance against Pygmalion.[47] The very act which justifies Dido's title to greatness as an ideal wife assumes a political significance. It is perhaps because Vergil wished to underscore Dido's character as a political woman that he made her dying words, as has often been noticed, resemble so closely in tone the sepulchral inscriptions of aristocratic politicians of the Republic. At the end, as at the beginning of Book 4, Dido is portrayed as a representative of Roman ideals.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE DIDO EPISODE AND THE FIRST HALF OF THE EPIC

In the ideal that person is *pius* who maintains his obligations towards the gods, towards his country, and towards his family.[1] Aeneas succeeds in attaining that ideal only fitfully in the first half of the epic,[2] and, as a result, we see him here engaged in a crisis of *pietas* on a number of occasions. Vergil treats the problem with the highest degree of elaboration and complexity in the Dido episode, but deals with it within a smaller compass in the episodes of the fall of Troy in Book 2 and of the burning of the fleet in Book 5, and alludes to it in the opening scenes of the poem. Given this general thematic similarity, one may well ask if there are any specific connections between the Dido story and the other episodes. An investigation reveals that there are common motifs which bind them all together, and it indicates thereby the integration of the Dido episode into the ensemble of the first half of the poem. A further advantage of the investigation of common motifs is that it contributes to illuminating the manner in which Vergil resolves in Book 6 the problem of Aeneas' *pietas*.

Attention is drawn to the disparity between Aeneas as he is and as he should be in the opening scenes of the poem. His character as the man of *pietas* and his task as mediator of Roman destiny are established in the narrator's prologue (*A.* 1.1-33), and this definition of Aeneas emerges once again, in grander form, from the exchange of Venus and Jupiter (*A.* 1.223-296). These two passages frame the narration of the storm at sea and its aftermath where we receive our first view of the man himself. Aeneas speaks twice, and each time his words produce an impression at variance with the image of him as the prototypical Roman suggested by the surrounding passages. The juxtapositions are deliberate. One aspect of these speeches[3] is worthy of being singled out here: the insistence on Aeneas' attachment to the settled life of the city, specifically of Troy. Both speeches are imitations of Homer's *Odyssey*, and the clarity of the reminiscences invites comparisons. In the first speech (*A.* 1.94-101) Aeneas, trapped by the storm set in motion by Juno,

like Odysseus (*Od.* 5.306-312), overtaken by the storm sent by Poseidon, wishes that he had died the hero's death in combat. Aeneas' thoughts, however, contrast with Odysseus' in an important way. Odysseus thinks of the Greeks, invaders on the broad plain of Troy, dying to honor the sons of Atreus and receiving the honors and homage attendant on a glorious death on the battlefield. The vexation (see v. 298, ὀχθήσας) which Odysseus feels at getting instead from fate a sorry death at sea finds no expression in the speech in the *Aeneid.* Aeneas rather regrets not meeting his end in the sight of his father before the lofty walls of Troy, fighting to defend his country. His identity is attached to the settled life which revolves around family and city, and so, not surprisingly, his thoughts are immersed in the memory of a place and of people long since dead and buried.

This same preoccupation with Troy and the settled life appears on the surface of Aeneas' consciousness in the second speech (*A.* 1.198-207). The seas have now become calm, and Aeneas with a remnant of his fleet has found refuge on the African coast. Like Odysseus as he and his companions sail toward the monstrous Scylla (*Od.* 12.208-216), Aeneas speaks to hearten his men. Odysseus' purpose is to inspire his men to the physical courage necessary for a safe escape. Survival is not the issue with Aeneas. His aim is to solace his companions not only by reminding them, like Odysseus, of their past successes in adversity, but also by providing them with a vision of the future. Hence the end of the speech for which there can be no Homeric parallel.

> per varios casus, per tot discrimina rerum
> tendimus in Latium, sedes ubi fata quietas
> ostendunt; illic fas regna resurgere Troiae.
> durate, et vosmet rebus servate secundis.
> (*A.* 1.204-207)

Aeneas longs for a fixed and peaceful home which he can think of only as a resuscitated Troy. The definition of his future city as *sedes quietas* accords, however, neither with what we know nor with what Aeneas himself has heard about his destiny. The opening lines of the poem announce the Romans as *populum late regem belloque superbum* (*A.* 1.21), and Jupiter makes it clear that war is to be Aeneas' personal lot as well (*A.* 1.263-264). Aeneas is aware of this much. The prophecies of Helenus (*A.* 3.456-460) and the auguries of An-

chises (*A.* 3.539-543) have taught Aeneas not to expect a peaceful future. He, however, remembers only as much of divine revelation as suits his own ambitions.

Aeneas' attachment to the settled life of the city is a determining factor of his behavior in the episodes of Books 2 and 5. On the night of Troy's fall Hector appears in a dream to bid Aeneas to save the national gods and build a new city for them across the sea (*A.* 2.289-295). In face of what can only be termed a summons to *pietas* (obligations to gods, country, and, by implication, family are maintained in the flight which Hector commands), Aeneas seeks a hero's death (*A.* 2.314-317). But his heroism lacks the element of egoism characteristic of Achilles or Odysseus: the society which would repay him with honor is disintegrating before his eyes, and he knows it. Aeneas' heroism realizes itself in defence, however futile, of Troy.[4] His own self-image as the defender of the settled life of the city brings him into conflict with the demands of *pietas.* The reader may be inclined not to see Aeneas' action as impious: the commands of Hector come in a dream, and to these Aeneas has little reason for accommodating his behavior,[5] nor does he have the knowledge of his future destiny which the reader shares from the first and which Aeneas gains only in the course of his wanderings. But, at the same time, the manner of presentation of the scenes of Aeneas in combat raises second thoughts. The sequence is framed by divine interventions. Aeneas awakens from the dream-vision to rush into the fighting. The injunctions of Hector moreover, as is well known,[6] are validated by the appearance of Panthus fleeing the acropolis and carrying the *sacra* of Troy. What Hector has bidden, Venus in the end must ensure by detaching Aeneas from his civic heroism.

The case is less ambiguous in Book 5. When the news of the fleet in flames reaches Aeneas, he is overcome by the same conflict which the Trojan matrons experience before they hurl the torches, that of the desire for the settled life of the city with the requirements of the fates.[7] There are, however, no extenuating circumstances here. By this time Aeneas knows his destiny clearly. Significantly it is after, and not before, Jupiter's clear and present sign, the rain quenching the flames on the ships, that Aeneas hesitates to be as faithful as the god.[8]

In the episodes of Book 2 and Book 5 Aeneas passes the crisis of *pietas* successfully: Venus and Anchises intervene to set him on the

true path. But there is more at work than simply the imposition of authority to determine a course of action. In both cases the engagement of Aeneas' emotions is an essential element in the resolution of the crisis. In *A.* 2.594-620 Venus' revelation that the destruction of Troy is the handiwork of the gods has a negative effect: it deters him from further indulgence in heroism. But it is her appeal to his love for his family that leads him back to his house and out of Troy. It would be fair to say that the scene dramatizes in the form of the encounter with Venus Aeneas' own inner state. The horror which he feels as he witnesses the slaughter of Priam brings to him the image of the beloved father, son, and wife whom he has deserted (*A.* 2.559-563). In the same way Anchises guides Aeneas to continue his mission with the double spur of divine authority (*imperio Iovis huc venio...A.* 5.726) and paternal affection (*nate, mihi vita quondam, dum vita manebat,/ care magis, nate...*, *A.* 5.724-725). The interconnection of emotion and the fulfillment of obligation is again touched on at the close of the narration of the dream-vision of Anchises.

> et Iovis imperium et cari praecepta parentis
> edocet et quae nunc animo sententia constet.
> (*A.* 5.747-748)

With these words Aeneas' decision to depart is reported. Jupiter and the *carus parens* are put on an equal footing.

In the incidents at Troy and in Sicily, then, Aeneas' own attachment to the settled life of the city threatens to divert him, but the engagement of his affection for his family leads him to the undertaking of his duty. It is with this pattern in mind that the Dido story must be viewed. Were we to search for it, we would find no explicit statement of Aeneas' motives for lingering in Carthage. The narrative is allusive rather than straightforward. At his first appearance in the epic Aeneas is overwhelmed by a sense of despair over ever establishing a city.[9] This mood is intensified by his feelings of having been betrayed by the gods. The tone of bitterness with which Aeneas identifies himself to the disguised Venus in Book 1 is unmistakable.[10] He announces himself matter-of-factly as *pius Aeneas, super aethera notus* (*A.* 1.378, 379), gives an abbreviated account of his wanderings from Troy, and ends with a statement that infuses his initial self-definition with an air of irony: *ipse ignotus, egens, Libyae deserta peragro/ Europa atque Asia pulsus* (*A.* 1.384-385). The treatment which he receives from the gods for his *pietas* is the

antithesis of his expectations. He wants his interlocutor to understand this, and Venus responds to this complaint accordingly—by assuring him that he is *haud invisus caelestibus* (*A.* 1.387). But not even the knowledge of his mother's solicitude can dispel Aeneas' sense of betrayal. As she takes her leave of him, she discloses her true identity, but this revelation evokes only a reproach, *quid natum totiens, crudelis tu quoque, falsis/ ludis imaginibus?* (*A.* 1.407-408). In Africa, however, Aeneas finds the antidote to his frustrations. In the middle of the wilderness a new city is taking shape. As Aeneas mounts the hill that overlooks Carthage, he sees the orderly and purposeful activities of the new settlers building their city, and he compares them to the labors of bees (*A.* 1.430-436). The bee simile, taken with slight modifications from *G.* 4.162-169, is meant to symbolize the notion of the regeneration of society,[11] and it provides a reflection of Aeneas' deepest personal aspirations, *o fortunati, quorum iam moenia surgunt* (*A.* 1.437). The society renewed is one in which Aeneas and the Trojans will be offered a share as equal partners. Aeneas had told Venus that he was *ignotus,* but he finds that both he and Troy are memorialized and given a place of honor in the heart of the city on Dido's temple. And finally Dido will prove willing and able to supply the material wants of Aeneas and his people. Africa, in short, provides the satisfactions which the fates have so long withheld. The narrative intimates that the episode at Carthage will be a crisis of Aeneas' *pietas.*

We anticipate Aeneas' making a decision, but the narrative of Book 4 confounds our expectations. Book 4 is Dido's book. We are presented with the spectacle of the queen choosing to yield to love and suffering the inevitable consequences. If the narrator has any interest in Aeneas, it is an interest in a character who is necessary in the overall scheme of things, but nevertheless of secondary importance. Our glimpses of Aeneas are fleeting and provide just enough substance to sustain the action of the narrative. Aeneas appears the first time in the book for the hunt and for the consummation of Dido's love. When he returns, he is dressed in Tyrian purple and presiding over the construction of Carthage. He is caught, as it were, in the act, and Mercury quite rightly addresses him as *regni rerumque oblite tuarum* (*A.* 4.267). The narration of Aeneas' lapse from *pietas* is unobtrusive, being all but obliterated by the immediacy of his response to Mercury's admonition. He gathers his captains, organizes the departure, and prepares for the meeting

with Dido. Thereafter we see Aeneas only in the proper attitudes of *pietas* which Vergil's initial definition of the hero led us to expect. He makes his case to Dido by arguing that his god-ordained responsibilities outweigh any that he may have towards her; he resists the entreaties which Anna carries to him; and on the night of Dido's suicide he obeys without delay Mercury's dream-warnings to flee. The pattern of the narrative, as far as Aeneas is concerned, is analogous to the pattern which can be discerned elsewhere in the account of his career from the fall of Troy. Aberration from fate's plan stimulates divine intervention, the result of which is to set Aeneas on his true course. The Carthaginian affair is, however, unique in one respect: now Aeneas is allowed a greater degree of freedom of action than anywhere else in the narrative of his wanderings. We see here most clearly the dissonance of Aeneas' existence. As soon as the restraints are lifted, however temporarily, he acts in accordance with his own inclination rather than in conformity with the responsibilities incumbent on him.

> si te nulla movet tantarum gloria rerum
> [nec super ipse tua moliris laude laborem,]
> Ascanium surgentem et spes heredis Iuli
> respice, cui regnum Italiae Romanaque tellus
> debetur.
>
> (*A*. 4.272-276)

By establishing as antitheses Aeneas' aspirations (or lack thereof) and the designs of fate, Mercury's words underscore the rift between private desires and public obligations which manifests itself in Aeneas' behavior. Like Anchises' entreaty to continue the course to Italy and make the journey to the underworld, Mercury's commands make their appeal on the basis of divine authority (*ipse deum tibi me claro demittit Olympo/ regnator...*, *A*. 4.268-269) and Aeneas' own sense of paternal affection. When Aeneas puts his case to Dido, he explains that the thought of Anchises and of Ascanius, whom he is cheating of his due, impel him to follow the fates to Italy. Just as in Book 2, when Aeneas abandons his heroism, here too it is because of perfectly natural emotions, loyalty to and love for his father and his son, that he assumes his responsibilities towards family, country, and gods.

The paradox of the episode at Carthage is that just when Aeneas achieves the tenuous balance between his own internal disposition

and the diverse requirements of *pietas*, he lays himself open to the justifiable charge of *impietas*. In Book 4 Aeneas' wants and desires take him a step beyond the neglect of the responsibilities incumbent on him. By acquiescing in Dido's construction of their relationship as marriage and by assuming actively the role of consort and partner in royal power, Aeneas entangles himself in a web of obligations from which he cannot be extricated with impunity by the fiat of a god. He is wrong, but not for leaving Carthage. This point is not in question, for the case stands as Aeneas put it to Dido. The justice of Aeneas' decision to obey the commands of the gods, however, detracts in no way from the justice of Dido's criticisms of him. His wrong consists in having involved himself in a relationship to which it would be impossible to remain faithful. And so we find that throughout her lament Dido subjects Aeneas to an unrelenting criticism whose effect is to undermine the image of Aeneas as the prototype of Roman virtue which Vergil has labored assiduously to create.

In *Aeneid* 4 we see the extent to which Aeneas strays from the norm of *pietas* which Vergil establishes for the definition of his character. His longing for the settled life, the *sedes quietas,* leads him to enter a relationship whose obligations are antithetical to those imposed by the gods. Vergil's comment on Aeneas' behavior is not made, however, explicitly. It effects itself, rather, through the development of plot and character. That Book 4 of the *Aeneid* should be Dido's book is perhaps the most arresting curiosity of the epic. Reasons can be adduced both for the presence of the episode and the form which it assumes, but none of these suffices to explain why in a poem whose stated subject is Aeneas as the founder of Rome, the narrator fixes our attention so long and intensely on a character of at most secondary importance in the economy of the epic. As early as the *Odyssey* we see the epic hero involved in amorous adventures, and by Vergil's day the narration of such an incident is almost *de rigeur.*[12] One function then of the Dido story is to satisfy the expectations of Vergil's audience. Vergil's adoption of the Hellenistic tradition of love narrative necessitates that he give an exposition of the effects of love on the protagonist of his story. Since the conventions of epic do not allow the epic hero to be presented as the prey of love, there is no choice but to make Dido the main character. All of this may explain the inclusion of the story in the epic and the form which it takes, but, unless we are willing to accept

the Dido narrative as a brilliant, but gratuitous expenditure of poetic talent, we must look elsewhere for the reason why Vergil chooses to concentrate his attention on Dido.

If the *Aeneid* is a poem about Aeneas, then it is reasonable to assume that each of its parts, even those which deal with him indirectly, has some significance for the elucidation of his character. From this point of view the ultimate justification for the appearance of the Dido episode is that it makes some statement about Aeneas. One of the results of Vergil's obvious interest in Dido is that he allows himself the opportunity to develop her character fully. We are introduced to her in Book 1 as a great and noble queen, the founder of a city and a guardian and representative of civilization and the social values which the Romans themselves prized. She is in every respect the equal of Aeneas. When in Book 4 she pleads with Aeneas to stay and then criticizes him for leaving, it is these same values which serve as the basis of her arguments. Her criticisms of Aeneas show more effectively than any direct statement of Vergil's the inadequacy of Aeneas as the hero of *pietas*. The purpose of characterizing Dido as an ideal Roman dynast is to establish a standard against which Aeneas may be judged. Irony contributes a great deal to the force of Vergil's implicit criticism of his hero. Dido is a Carthaginian, and Roman prejudice against Carthaginians lived long after the terrors which inspired it were removed. The stereotype of the Carthaginian as faithless and, for that reason, dangerous became a part of the culture.[13] Vestiges of that prejudicial attitude manifest themselves in Vergil. Jupiter in Book 1 sends Mercury to mollify Dido and the Carthaginians, as if they could not be trusted on their own to give Aeneas a friendly reception (*A.* 1.302-304). Venus finds it necessary to ensure her son's safety by making Dido fall in love with him. Her reason is mistrust of Carthaginians: *quippe domum timet ambiguam Tyriosque bilinguis* (*A.* 1.661). The attitude of Jupiter and Venus, of course, finds no support in the narrative. Vergil is merely manipulating overtly Roman prejudices, only to deflate them subsequently by his presentation in Book 4 of Dido censuring Aeneas according to Roman conceptions of the valuable.[14]

A second result of Vergil's expansive treatment of Dido is to enlist our sympathies on her side. It is only by involving us in the details of Dido's passion—her surrender to love, her pleadings, her reaction to rejection, and the preparations for and execution of her

suicide—that Vergil engages both our understanding and our emotions. Were it simply a question of Dido's yielding to an illicit love or that her tragedy is, as one scholar has put it, that of "a noble woman made foolish by passion,"[15] we might feel that she deserves to suffer, if not to die as she does die. She is in fact presented in this way in the earlier narrative of Book 4. Infected by Venus with love for Aeneas, she decides to pursue a marriage with him, but she will not herself take the initiative. Her frustrated desire becomes her obsession, to the point of leading her to neglect her duties as queen (see *A.* 4.86-89). The storm on the day of the hunt provides an opportunity, and in the cave Dido satisfies her desire, although there is clearly no marriage. But, as the narrative subsequent to the cave scene demonstrates, Aeneas is as willing to commit himself as Dido herself. In the end we are made to feel that Dido is, as she herself says, *capta ac deserta* (*A.* 4.330), the victim of Aeneas' caprice, tossed aside when he realizes that his obligations to her are incompatible with his other obligations. As a result of Vergil's deliberate and almost exclusive concentration on Dido in Book 4, we experience as fully as an observer can the deleterious effect of Aeneas' fall from *pietas*.

The results are disastrous, and not merely for Dido. As we have seen, in the speech of the curse Dido makes Aeneas' desertion, which at that point she sees primarily as a political betrayal, into the motive for her curse of him and his progeny. From the opening lines of Book 1 we learn that it is fated for Rome and Carthage to be enemies and for Rome to destroy Carthage (*A.* 1.19-22). Why this will be accomplished is left unsaid. In Book 4 we are made to see Aeneas as the proximate cause of this hostility. The enmity of Carthage is presented as the legacy of Aeneas to his people. Although Rome is in the end victorious, it is the memory of the horrors of the Hannibalic War which is meant to be evoked by the frighteningly powerful close of Dido's speech.

> exoriare aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor
> qui face Dardanios ferroque sequare colonos,
> nunc, olim, quocumque dabunt se tempore vires.
> litora litoribus contraria, fluctibus undas
> imprecor, arma armis: pugnent ipsique nepotesque.
> (*A.* 4.625-629)

However unwittingly—for he cannot foresee the consequences of his own actions—Aeneas becomes a source of disaster for his own descendants. From this point of view the terms of the basic theme which Vergil uses for the exposition of the character of Aeneas appear in a different light. There is posited not so much a tension between Aeneas' own desires and ambitions and his obligations to his people as a tension between his own desires and ambitions and their interests. As the prototype and embodiment of the Roman people, he and all he does assume a suprahuman significance. His social and religious obligations are co-terminous with the welfare of his people.[16] This implication of the theme is there, just below the surface, in the other relevant episodes. Aeneas' lapse into heroism on the night of Troy's fall and his contemplated attempt to settle in Sicily are inimical to the cosmic plan for the regeneration of the Trojan race into the rulers of the world and the disseminators of civilization. But it is in the Dido episode that the development of the theme in this form receives its most perspicuous treatment. From this viewpoint it is possible to see the function of the Dido episode as that of clarifying the issues involved in the question of Aeneas' *pietas*.

The disparity between Vergil's definition of Aeneas as the man of *pietas* and the manner in which he represents Aeneas acting in the first half of the epic establishes a tension which must be resolved. In examining the way in which the resolution is effected, it is possible to discern an intimate connection between it and the various crises of Aeneas' *pietas* in Troy, Sicily, and Carthage. As we have seen, in the episodes in question a supernatural agent orders Aeneas to follow his duty, but the commands are efficacious because what they order is consonant with his emotional disposition. The theme of the interconnection of emotion and the fulfilment of obligation reaches its culmination in the sixth book. We learn of the necessity of Aeneas' catabasis for the first time in the dream-vision of Anchises in Book 5. As Anchises presents it, the descent to the underworld has as its purpose the elucidation of Aeneas' social mission (*tum genus omne tuum et quae dentur moenia disces,* v. 737). The descent itself is no more than an enlargement in scope of the task, imposed by Helenus, of consulting the Sibyl for practical information about establishing the god-ordained kingdom in Italy (*A.* 3.456-460). In contrast we find in Book 6 that the supra-personal motive assigned to the catabasis has no place in the petition which

Aeneas makes to the Sibyl: *ire ad conspectum cari genitoris et ora/ contingat*...(*A.* 6.108-109).[17] In Aeneas' prayer Anchises is the aged and infirm companion who shared all the travails of the wanderings; for the Sibyl to unite father and son in the realms of the dead is an act of pity (*A.* 6.110-117). The catabasis then represents for Aeneas the satisfaction of a personal desire.[18] Its motive arises from a natural emotion, and it leads, as does his love for father and family in the episodes of Books 2, 4, and 5 to the consummation of his *pietas.*

The catabasis is, however, a consummation of a different order. The Sibyl makes it plain that in seeking union with Anchises in the underworld Aeneas seeks a true death.[19] The catabasis then implies a total effacement of the self. In order for Aeneas to controvert the natural order and return to life from death, the Sibyl requires the retrieval of the golden bough as the sign of his worthiness as one beloved of the gods and marked by preeminent *virtus* (*A.* 6.129-131). It has been argued persuasively that the bough is to be taken as the symbol of death in life and life in death.[20] As such it reenforces our understanding of the catabasis as a real death. That the bough yields itself to Aeneas is the validation of his petition. It confirms both the divine favor and the attainment of the *virtus* to which the gods have been directing him.[21] Like the request itself to make the catabasis, it reveals his transcendant state of self-abnegation.

The retrieval of the golden bough is, however, only one of the two preconditions which the Sibyl lays down for the making of the catabasis. She speaks darkly of the necessity of burying the corpse of one of Aeneas' men (*A.* 6.149-152). It is at this point, with the burial of Misenus, that we see the specific implications of Aeneas' self-denial. The introduction of Misenus into the narrative of Book 6 is of manifold significance. The reminiscence of Elpenor in the *Odyssey* which it evokes is obvious: like Elpenor, Misenus is a precursor of his lord into the realms of the dead. But the identification of Misenus and Aeneas is not made merely for the sake of a literary reminiscence. The story which Vergil assigns to Misenus follows a familiar mythological pattern. Misenus, outstanding as a trumpeter, challenges the gods to a musical contest (*A.* 6.171-174). Like Arachne or Marsyas, Misenus is the type of personal willfulness which sets itself up in opposition to the cosmic realities represented by the gods.[22] His death at the hands of Triton then

represents the death of the individual will which is antithetical to some higher truth. In burying Misenus, Aeneas buries symbolically his own will which has run counter to his divinely imposed mission. The interconnection between Misenus and Aeneas has, however, an even more specific reference. Misenus had been the trumpeter of Hector, and, after his death, he had followed Aeneas. He symbolizes, as has been noted, the evil fortune of Troy.[23] Troy is, however, a burden to Aeneas not only in this respect, but also because it encumbers him emotionally. As we have seen, it represents for Aeneas the settled life of the city. It is emblematic then of Aeneas' personal desire which came into conflict with the demands of *pietas* at the fall of Troy, in Sicily and in Carthage, and as such it distracts him from Italy and a future of bloodshed and war.

The burial of Misenus is only a specific manifestation of the state of total self-abnegation to which Aeneas' filial love has led him in the request to visit his father in the realm of the dead. The Sibyl tells Aeneas that the dead body of Misenus pollutes (*incestat, A.* 6.150) the fleet. By burying it and removing the taint, Aeneas makes himself *castus* and therefore *pius.* He is now prepared to find and take the golden bough, the proof of the god's favor and his own *virtus,* and the means as well by which he can complete in fact the act of *pietas* which he contemplates.

The *pietas* which is predicated of Aeneas finds in the first half of the epic its antithesis in his personal desires and ambitions. In the episodes in which Vergil develops the theme of the tension within Aeneas, there is a constancy in the motifs which the poet uses. Aeneas is the civilized man, and, quite understandably, the attachment to the settled life of the city turns him from the nomadic existence and the future of war which the fates offer. This attachment provides the motivation for Aeneas' behavior explicitly in the episode of the burning of the fleet in Book 5, and allusively, but no less unmistakably in the episodes of the fall of Troy and of the sojourn in Carthage. The broader scope of the Dido narrative allows the possibility of an expansive treatment, and we see there most clearly the implications of Aeneas' aberration from the ideal of *pietas.* The tension within Aeneas is resolved by the syncretization of his emotions with the demands of his social mission. The motif of the interconnection of emotional disposition and the fulfilment of obligations is touched upon in the episode of the fall of Troy, is

deployed in fully developed form in the narrative of the rupture with Dido, and culminates in the final resolution of the catabasis. Love for his father brings Aeneas to the world of the dead, even at the expense of setting aside his desire for the settled, civilized life.

CHAPTER SIX

THE DIDO EPISODE AND THE WAR IN LATIUM

In the first six books of the epic Vergil is concerned with the problem of Aeneas' internal struggle und ultimate success in attaining *pietas*. In Books 7 through 12 *pius Aeneas* must fight against the *impii*. The second half of the epic presents in most general terms an inverted pattern of the first. While the first half of the poem is episodic in the diversity of its narrative, if not in its structure, the second half concentrates on one event with its manifold ramifications, the war with Turnus and Latinus. At the beginning of Book 7 Latinus appears as the pious man. Omens and oracles have informed him of the divine will that his daughter marry a stranger and that the offspring of this marriage exalt the Latin race into the position of rulers of the world. When Aeneas arrives, Latinus sees in him the fate-appointed man, follows the dictates of *pietas*, and offers him a political alliance and his daughter Lavinia in marriage—at the expense of alienating Turnus. Personal desires and ambitions conspire to shatter an easy accomplishment of fate's design.[1] The queen's vehement support of Turnus, Turnus' own insistence on the honoring of his claims, and the resentment of the people at the intrusion of the foreigners force the weak and ineffectual Latinus to betray his promises to Aeneas and enter a war against him.

There is in all of this a keen irony. We are meant to see in the narrative of the war an inversion of the pattern of the Dido-Aeneas alliance. Aeneas is a victim of a betrayal of trust as he himself had victimized Dido. At the beginning and the end of the second half of the epic Vergil draws parallels between the narrative of the war in Latium and the Dido episode. Book 7 recapitulates in an elaborate chiasmus the events of Book 1. The first book opens with the turbulence of the winds unleashed by Juno. When the shipwrecked Aeneas has reconnoitered the place, he views under the protective covering of Venus' magical cloud the petition of the Trojan Ilioneus to Queen Dido for *hospitium*. With the acceptance into *hospitium*, the book ends in the serenity of the banquet at the royal palace. Serenity is the mood of the opening of Book 7. The scene is one of the

tranquility of nature. Aeneas' fleet glides over a dead-calm sea to the mouth of the Tiber (*A.* 7.27-28). The river flows *fluvio amoeno* (30-32) through a grove. Birds fill the air with their songs (32-34).[2] After reconnoitering, Aeneas sends an embassy headed by Ilioneus to seek an alliance with King Latinus. This *hospitium,* however, leads to the paroxysms of violence caused again by a cosmic force. Juno unleashes the fury of hell to infect the Latins with war madness. Beyond Vergil's obvious intention of fashioning symmetrical introductions to the two major divisions of his poem, it is clear that specific reference is made to the reciprocal relationship of the embassies to Dido and Latinus. Each is the focal point of the sequence of events of which it forms a part; each mediates between the polar opposites of tranquility and violence around which the books are constructed.

As we examine the parallelism between the two passages, it becomes obvious that we are dealing not merely with an inversion of pattern, but as well with a controversion of the expectations which the poet arouses. Dido and Latinus both sit in temples as they conduct their audiences. The pictures on Dido's temple glorify the war at Troy; Latinus' temple celebrates *res Italae.* Troy and Italy appear throughout the first half of the epic as antinomous forces, the one representing a distraction of Aeneas' will from the god-imposed mission, the other the future to which *pietas* leads. The relationship with Dido is prefigured in the evocation of Troy and the past as a misstep; the relationship with Latinus appears as the attainment of a goal. In the audience with Dido, Ilioneus' assumption is that Dido is a barbarian queen whom he must school in the ways of civilization. Civilized behavior is itself formulated in the terms of a specific cultural ideology. The suspicion with which Ilioneus views Dido merely heightens a mood of uncertainty which Vergil deliberately strives to create.[3] Contrary to the expectations elicited, Dido proves herself an adherent of the benign social values which Ilioneus espouses. On the other hand, Vergil manipulates the opening of Book 7 to create the opposite mood of security. The civility of manners which the Latins enjoy corresponds to the tranquility of nature which is conveyed in the narrative of Aeneas' arrival in Latium. The Latins seem to live in a kind of Isles of the Blessed.

Rex arva Latinus et urbes
iam senior longa placidas in pace regebat.
hunc Fauno et nympha genitum Laurente Marica
accipimus; Fauno Picus pater, isque parentem
te, Saturne, refert, tu sanguinis ultimus auctor.
(*A.* 7.45-49)

We have the sense that Aeneas has arrived in Italy at the time of its primeval golden age, *aurea.../ saecula...Latio regnata per arva/ Saturno quondam...*(*A.* 6.792-794), which is destined to be restored only with Caesar Augustus.

This perception of Italy is sustained throughout Ilioneus' interview with Latinus. In a reversal of the pattern of the embassy to Dido, it is now Latinus, not Ilioneus, who speaks first. The reversal is significant. Ilioneus had argued to Dido that the Trojans were not pirates, but acted in accordance with the standards of civilized behavior, and therefore merited humane treatment. Latinus' speech obviates such an argument. He professes familiarity with the Trojans and assumes that they are sailors, lost or blown off course, *qualia multa mari nautae patiuntur in alto* (*A.* 7.200). To encourage the Trojans to enter *hospitium,* he assures Ilioneus of the salutary treatment which they may expect.

ne fugite hospitium, neve ignorate Latinos
Saturni gentem haud vinclo nec legibus aequam,
sponte sua veterisque dei se more tenentem.
(*A.* 7.202-204)

In characterizing the Latins as *Saturni gens* Vergil here alludes to what he makes explicit in Book 8, namely that Saturn is to be associated not only with an age of peace, but also an age of civilization. As Evander conducts Aeneas through the sights of the future Rome, he gives an account of the origins and development of the Latin people (*A.* 8.314-327). The assumptions about the nature of civilization which Vergil makes in this abbreviated ethnography of the Latins are the same as the ones which inform his treatment of the establishment of relations between the Trojans and the Carthaginians in Book 1. Before the arrival of Saturn, the natives had lived haphazardly, surviving by gathering food and hunting, and improvidently, without any planning or economy (*A.* 8.316-318).[4] Saturn introduces them to agriculture, organizes their scattered

and apparently nomadic bands into a settled community,[5] and provides them laws (*A.* 8. 321-322). The implications are clear. Civilization develops within the context of a city whose economy is based on agriculture. Urban life has as its concomitant laws. The laws themselves presuppose the notion of justice and, with it, the other modes of behavior which promote benign social intercourse among people. Latinus' invocation of the Saturnian virtue and *aequitas* of the Latins is the indication that they act as civilized men. It is calculated to exhort the Trojans to seek *hospitium,* and it implies, as did Ilioneus' treatment of *iustitia* in the speech to Dido, the whole range of social values which operate in the civilized life of the city and foster benign intercourse. To it Ilioneus responds with a pledge of Trojan *fides* and *gratia.* Like Dido in Book 1 Latinus is made to appear as a representative of *humanitas.*

The objection has been raised that there is an inconsistency in Latinus' and Evander's presentations of the institutions of Saturn.[6] Specifically Evander asserts that Saturn introduced laws while Latinus is understood to say that the Latins have no laws, but act justly of their own free will and in accordance with the behavior of Saturn. Evander's view of the institutions of Saturn, which takes as its premise the organization of men into a political community, differs radically from the one which Latinus is said to present. This latter brings to mind the traditional golden age of Saturn, such as is presented in Ovid's *Metamorphoses,* as a time when men *sine lege fidem rectumque colebant* (1.90) and when they did not yet live in cities (*nondum praecipites cingebant oppida fossae,* 1.97)[7] and had no need for agriculture (*ipsa quoque immunis rastroque intacta nec ullis/ saucia vomeribus per se dabat omnia tellus,* 1.101-102). Ovid's golden age assumes a stage of human development antecedent to the rise of political society. For a number of reasons it seems unlikely that Vergil wishes to evoke the memory of this traditional golden age with Latinus' proclamation that the Latins observe the institutions of Saturn. First, although Vergil in the fourth *Eclogue* subscribes to the traditional notion of the golden Saturnian age as a preternatural paradise, his conception of it evolves considerably by the time he writes the *Aeneid.*[8] The golden age which Augustus will build is one capable of realization by men of the everyday world and within the limitations of the everyday world. It is a restoration of the peculiarly human institutions of Saturn: political community based on laws and justice with a resulting universal peace. Although the golden

age of Augustus appeals to us as a utopia, it is a fantasy composed of features of the world as it is. To attribute to Latinus' assessment of the Saturnian character of his people a reference to the traditional mythical golden age of a Hesiod or an Ovid would be to posit an anomaly in a conception that is both clearly distinct from the standard notion and elsewhere consistent in the *Aeneid.* Second, the narrative context of Book 7 argues against such an understanding. As Latinus makes his declaration about his people, he sits in a temple, itself the meeting place of his senate, in the middle of a city surrounded by a country where pastoral and georgic activities are the means of support. Third, and most immediately relevant to the interpretation of Latinus' evaluation of his people's character, there is no reason to assume from his words an absence of laws among the Latins. To state that a people is just not because of the restraint imposed by laws, but of their own free will is not the same as to assert that they have no laws. It is possible to adduce as a parallel to Latinus' statement a remark which Sallust makes about Roman mores before the great decline attendant on the fall of Carthage in 146 B.C.: *ius bonumque apud eos non legibus magis quam natura valebat* (*Cat.* 9.1). Latinus no more than Sallust asserts that the spontaneous cultivation of justice precludes the existence of laws. We saw in Evander's ethnography in Book 8 that before the arrival of Saturn the inhabitants of Latium had *neque mos neque cultus.* What *mos* means in the context of that passage is clear. It is best to understand that the *mos veteris dei* which Latinus claims the Latins follow is the civilized behavior which is the concomitant of life in a city ruled by laws and justice.

Vergil assimilates Latinus to Dido as a representative of civilized behavior or *humanitas* by one further parallel in the narratives of Books 1 and 7. When, on the morning after his shipwreck on the Libyan coast, Aeneas sets out to investigate the terrain, he assumes that he has come to a land beyond the confines of civilization.

> ut primum lux alma data est, exire locosque
> explorare novos, quas vento accesserit oras,
> qui teneant (nam inculta videt), hominesne feraene,
> quaerere constituit sociisque exacta referre.
> (*A.* 1.306-309)

Uncultivated as the place is, it proves, however, to be a shore which Dido has purchased for the sake of plowing, and it will nourish the

fledgling city.[9] No such doubts enter Aeneas' mind on the day of his arrival in Latium when he commissions his men to scout the country:

> quare agite et primo laeti cum lumine solis
> quae loca, quive habeant homines, ubi moenia gentis,
> vestigemus et a portu diversa petamus.
> (*A.* 7.130-132)

He expects that they will find men living within the walls of a city. When he dispatches the embassy to Latinus, his orders are for a political alliance to be established (*pacem exposcere Teucris, A.* 7.155). The assumption underlying his command is that the correspondents to this alliance hold in common with the Trojans the values of civilization which are essential to salutary social intercourse. This is also obvious in the gifts which Aeneas makes to Latinus. Aeneas transmits to him tokens of the civilization of the past which are to be absorbed into the civilization of the future.

> dat tibi praeterea fortunae parva prioris
> munera, reliquias Troia ex ardente receptas.
> hoc pater Anchises auro libabat ad aras,
> hoc Priami gestamen erat cum iura vocatis
> more daret populis, sceptrumque sacerque tiaras
> Iliadumque labor vestes.
> (*A.* 7.243-248)

The *res divinae humanaeque* of Troy are entrusted symbolically to one who seems an apposite curator. The Latinus narrative presents an inverted pattern of the Dido narrative. In Book 1 the transition is from uncertainty to security about the civilized mores of the inhabitants of the strange land. In Book 7 the initial favorable assumption is controverted. The golden age which Aeneas enters on his arrival in Latium proves to be ephemeral. Through the agency of Allecto the dark and impious side of this world is revealed.

Allecto's efforts are directed to the goal of creating a rupture of the political alliance which Latinus has entered with Aeneas. Juno assigns this explicitly as Allecto's task when she gives her her instructions.

> tu potes unanimos armare in proelia fratres
> atque odiis versare domos, tu verbera tectis

funereasque inferre faces, tibi nomina mille,
mille nocendi artes. fecundum concute pectus,
dissice compositam pacem, sere crimina belli.
(*A.* 7.335-339)

Juno selects Allecto for her henchman because she is a divisive force, capable of shattering the ties of *pietas* even when they are strengthened by ties of blood.[10] If she is able to set a house against itself or a nation against itself in civil war, so much the easier will it be to disrupt a relationship whose observation is sanctioned by more remote ties, *pietas* to the gods and the standards of civilized behavior. By her actions Allecto negates the possibility of salutary intercourse with the Trojans.

en, perfecta tibi bello discordia tristi;
dic in amicitiam coeant et foedera iungant.
(*A.* 7.545-546)

Amicitia and *foedera* are now beyond the grasp of Latinus or Aeneas. It is worthwhile noting in this context Vergil's use of the traditional legendary material in his narration of the war in Latium. The accounts of Livy (1.1.5-2.6) and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (1.57-59) show that together with the version of the legend in which Aeneas fights against Latinus and Turnus there was current another in which Turnus faces Latinus and Aeneas as opponents. Because the plot of the *Aeneid* is so familiar, it is easy to overlook the fact that an audience hearing Book 7 recited for the first time would be held in suspense about the side which Latinus will take until the last scene of the narrative before the catalogue, when Juno bursts open the doors of Janus' temple and the king acquiesces by his withdrawal. The words of Allecto, disguised as Calybe, to Turnus even suggest a configuration of Latinus and Aeneas against Turnus.

rex ipse Latinus,
ni dare coniugium et dicto parere fatetur,
sentiat et tandem Turnum experiatur in armis.
(*A.* 7.432-434)

Turnus might well have turned out to be the new Achilles attacking the city of Latinus. In choosing the form of the legend which he does, however, Vergil exploits the possibility of developing the narrative into a story of the betrayal of trust within a political relation-

ship.[11] By placing the narrative of the alliance in structural response to Book 1 and accommodating it to the narrative pattern of that book, he intends a comparison with the alliance with Dido.

A political alliance with salutary effects is beyond the reach of Aeneas. The alliance with Latinus, no less than the one with Dido, is a misstep. Its promise for the attainment of the goal which *pietas* demands of Aeneas is illusory. In the end the gods direct him to the true alliance. As at the beginning of Book 8 Aeneas ponders with deep anxiety the hysteria for war which has overtaken Latium, he falls into sleep by the banks of the Tiber. The river god appears in his dreams and bids him seek out Evander's aid. Unlike the alliance with Dido or Latinus, the treaty with Evander has no peaceful purpose. It is a military pact. Upon reflection we see the justification for the presentation of the relationship with Evander as the true alliance: Aeneas' destiny in Italy is war.

As in Book 7, here in Book 8 a conscious effort is made to draw a connection between the alliance with Evander and the Dido episode. The parallelism is clear in the first scene in the book in which Aeneas appears.

> Talia per Latium. quae Laomedontius heros
> cuncta videns magno curarum fluctuat aestu,
> atque animum nunc huc celerem nunc dividit illuc
> in partisque rapit varias perque omnia versat,
> sicut aquae tremulum labris ubi lumen aënis
> sole repercussum aut radiantis imagine lunae
> omnia pervolitat late loca, iamque sub auras
> erigitur summique ferit laquearia tecti.
> nox erat et terras animalia fessa per omnis
> alituum pecudumque genus sopor altus habebat,
> cum pater in ripa gelidique sub aetheris axe
> Aeneas, tristi turbatus pectora bello,
> procubuit seramque dedit per membra quietem.
> (*A.* 8.18-30)

Although the commentators note the reminiscences of Book 4 in this passage, it is difficult to extract from the treatment of the commentaries a sense of the pattern and significance of the reminiscences. Clearly Vergil wishes to evoke the memory of the night of Dido's suicide. Verses 26-27 (*nox erat, etc.*) recall vv. 522-527 of Book 4 (*nox erat, etc.*) where the quietude of nature is contrasted with Dido's

anxious wakefulness.[12] In silence and solitude Dido's emotions swell on a tide of anger (*magnoque irarum fluctuat aestu, A.* 4.532), and Aeneas in v. 19 *magno curarum fluctuat aestu.*[13] The line endings of *A.* 4.532 and 8.19 are reformulations of Catul. 64.62, ...*magnis curarum fluctuat undis,* where Ariadne, just aroused from sleep, looks out over the waters at the departing Theseus.[14] The repetition of the reminiscence of Catullus here in Book 8 is significant, for it forms part of a network of literary reminiscences which are taken from the amatory narrative of Vergil's tradition and are designed to bring us back to Book 4. Aeneas' darting mind is compared to light reflected from basins of water. The simile is an imitation of A.R. 3.756-760, where Medea's heart, trembling at the dangers which Jason must face, is compared to sunbeams playing on the water in bowls. The simile occurs in the passage in which Apollonius narrates Medea's waverings in the middle of the night before she makes the final decision to aid Jason. The passage is introduced moreover by a description of Medea's agitated sleeplessness in contrast to the calmness of night (νὺξ μὲν ἔπειτ', ff., 3.744-751). Scholarly explanations for the appearance of the simile here in Book 8 make little of the fact that the simile *together* with the description of night appeals to the reader familiar with Apollonius as a deliberate reference to the anguished Medea.[15] The association of Dido with Medea is one which Vergil has firmly established, and it accounts for the rather unexpected paralleling of Aeneas to Medea. By stirring the memory of the passage in the *Argonautica,* Vergil brings us back to the realm of amatory narrative and recalls the night of Dido's suicide with its introductory *nox erat,* itself an evocation of Apollonius' Medea.[16] The purpose of the parallel literary reminiscences is to draw attention to the similarity of Dido's and Aeneas' situations. Like Dido, Aeneas retreats to confront the emotional turbulence within him caused by the violation of an alliance and to plan a course of action. The description of Dido's over-wrought emotional state serves as the introduction to the speech (*en, quid ago?,* ff., *A.* 4.534) in which Dido considers the various courses of action open to her. Lines 20-21 of Book 8, themselves a repetition of *A.* 4.285-286, confirm that we are to see Aeneas here, like Dido, considering his options. Both Dido and Aeneas are figures of solitude. Dido sees herself alienated from the Africans, the Trojans, and even from her own people. By his selection of a particular variant of the traditional legend, Vergil isolates Aeneas and pits him against the combined forces of the Italians.

But we see here again, as in Book 7, not merely the repetition of a pattern, but its inversion. The violation of trust by Aeneas brings Dido to the point of self-destruction; the idea of attacking Aeneas comes late, and she never treats it as a real possibility. Tiber, on the other hand, leads Aeneas to his destiny, a military pact and war. In entering the alliance with Evander and accepting the leadership of the Etruscan forces, Aeneas sees himself as the vindicator of a betrayal of trust.

> heu quantae miseris caedes Laurentibus instant!
> quas poenas mihi, Turne, dabis! quam multa sub undas
> scuta virum galeasque et fortia corpora volves,
> Thybri pater! poscant acies et foedera rumpant.
> (*A.* 8.537-540)

Aeneas' words contain an ironic echo of the lament for fallen Troy which he made in his first speech in the epic.

> saevus ubi Aeacidae telo iacet Hector, ubi ingens
> Sarpedon, ubi tot Simois correpta sub undis
> scuta virum galeasque et fortia corpora volvit.
> (*A.* 1.99-101)

Circumstances force Aeneas into the role of the invader. The Sibyl had prophesied the war in Latium as a second Trojan War with Turnus the new Achilles (*A.* 6.88-94), but it would have been difficult for Aeneas to foresee that his is the lot of the aggressor. He assumes that role, as Dido cannot and will not, in defence of an alliance that has been broken.

It is the horror and the irony of the *Aeneid* that the career of the protagonist is developed in an inverse relation to his hypothetical goal. The purpose of Aeneas is to lay the foundations for Rome and a golden age when mankind will be given civilization, laws and justice will rule, and peace will prevail. The closer, however, Aeneas moves towards that goal, the farther it recedes from him. His progress is an illusion. At the beginning of the epic we see Aeneas amidst the ruins of the lost civilization of Troy. He is forced to become a nomad, and the promise of something better in Italy prevents him at every turn from founding a city and regenerating civilized society. When he does arrive in Italy, he is assimilated to Achilles, his Trojans to the invading Greeks, issuing from a city built in the likeness of a camp (see *A.* 7.157-159) and fighting for a

stolen bride. If, in the end, Aeneas becomes an active participant in violence, it is, nevertheless, a creative violence undertaken in the name of peace and civilization and at the behest of a divine providence which is presented as ultimately benevolent. Although this violence is creative, we, like Aeneas, are spared any real or satisfactory vision of its products. This restraint on Vergil's part is deliberate. It forms part of the statement which he makes in writing the *Aeneid.* Even at the close of the epic the best which Vergil can offer is a scene between Juno and Jupiter of harmony restored in heaven. On the earth below the epic ends with a violent death. There is here no reconciliation, not even the civilized formalities of a funeral which complete the *Iliad.* Turnus' soul flees angrily to the shades below. This passage to the underworld recalls another, at the end of Book 6, when Aeneas exits to the world of the living through the ivory gate of false dreams. We are left at the close with a sense only of the vanity of Aeneas' goal.

The scene of Turnus' death is profoundly disturbing. Its position as the final scene of the epic attracts the attention. It leaves the impression that here Vergil is making a special comment on Aeneas and indeed even on the idea of Rome. It has been suggested that we see in Aeneas' killing of Turnus an example of a *privatum odium* overcoming considerations of *publica utilitas.*[17] Vergil is reminding his audience, Augustus included, of the harm caused to society by the imposition of the individual will when it is irrational. The suggestion is attractive, but it raises a question: how do we distinguish the personal from the political in an epic in which politics is viewed in personal terms? The political order demanded by the gods and fate serves the family and ultimately the individual.[18] Political relationships are above all personal relationships. Dido and Aeneas, whatever their differences of opinion, both see their association in these terms. In Aeneas' eyes the war in Latium is a personal quarrel between him and Latinus.

> nec bellum cum gente gero; rex nostra reliquit
> hospitia et Turni potius se credidit armis.
> aequius huic Turnum fuerat se opponere morti.
> (*A.* 11.113-115)

Turnus is the *tertium quid* who has disrupted the harmony between them. Aeneas' account of the cause of the war corresponds to the one which Latinus makes to Turnus at the beginning of Book 12.

victus amore tui, cognato sanguine victus
coniugis et maestae lacrimis, vincla omnia rupi;
promissam eripui genero, arma impia sumpsi.
(*A.* 12.29-31)

Political issues are reduced to personal terms.

This cardinal fact about the *Aeneid* has application to the final scene of the poem. When we see Aeneas rising up in grief and fury to bury the sword in Turnus' chest, it is easy to forget that he is brought to this point not simply by the force of emotion. If his emotions lead him, what they lead him to is the fulfillment of an obligation. When the Trojans return the dead body of Pallas to Evander, the father turns his thoughts to vengeance.

vadite et haec memores regi mandata referte:
quod vitam moror invisam Pallante perempto
dextera causa tua est, Turnum gnatoque patrique
quam debere vides. meritis vacat hic tibi solus
fortunaeque locus. non vitae gaudia quaero,
nec fas, sed gnato manis perferre sub imos.
(*A.* 11.176-181)

The death of Turnus is a payment owed to Evander; the *foedus* entered with Evander puts Aeneas under that obligation. Aeneas himself views the situation in analogous terms in his lament over Pallas' body, *hi nostri reditus exspectatique triumphi?/ haec mea magna fides?* (*A.* 11.54-55). *Fides* requires of him not the return of a corpse, but a victor's parade. By Evander's and Aeneas' recognition of the obligations of their *foedus,* Vergil indicates that the killing of Turnus is an act of violence undertaken in the vindication of *fides.* We are presented here with a repetition of the events of Book 8 where Aeneas enters the pact with Evander and accepts the command of the Etruscans in order to right the wrong done by the violation of his alliance with Latinus. The figure of Dido once again comes before our eyes for the purpose of effecting a comparison. Betrayed by Aeneas Dido can only turn inward and destroy herself; Aeneas, by contrast, in defence of *fides* assumes the role of the aggressor.

Verbal echoes from *Aeneid* 4 show that Dido is clearly on Vergil's mind in the final scene of the kill.[19] After the reconciliation with Juno, Jupiter sends from heaven, in order to disengage Juturna from Turnus' side, one of the Dirae who sit at his throne. As the

Dira approaches, she transforms herself into the shape of a bird and flits before Turnus' face.

> alitis in parvae subitam collecta figuram,
> quae quondam in bustis aut culminibus desertis
> nocte sedens serum canit importuna per umbras....
> (*A.* 12.862-864)

These lines recall the nocturnal owl which Dido hears hooting in the palace compound and calling her to death.

> solaque culminibus ferali carmine bubo
> saepe queri et longas in fletum ducere voces.
> (*A.* 4.462-463)

Juturna, in the description of her reaction to the omen, is assimilated now to Anna, now to Dido herself. She begins her mourning for Turnus as Anna did for Dido, *unguibus ora soror foedans et pectora pugnis. A.* 12.871 is a repetition of *A.* 4.673. Like Anna (*comitemne sororem/ sprevisti moriens? eadem me ad fata vocasses, A.* 4.677-678), she would have accompanied her brother in death (*possem.../...misero fratri comes ire per umbras, A.* 12.880-881). Like Dido in the first grips of passion (*sed mihi vel tellus optem prius ima dehiscat/ vel pater omnipotens adigat me fulmine ad umbras, A.* 4.24-25), she wishes the earth to open and swallow her (*o quae satis ima dehiscat/ terra mihi Manisque deam demittat ad imos?, A.* 12.883-884). Vergil chooses to evoke the memory of Dido and Anna as helpless victims. If there is any significant pattern in the reminiscences, it is this. But we are invited to make a comparison. Dido is the one who has been wronged by Aeneas; Turnus is clearly the *impius* who in strict justice gets only what he deserves. The result is a paradox. The moral stance which one adopts has no bearing on the portion in life which one is handed. Dido and Turnus are opponents of Aeneas' mission, but they are each related to him differently on the issue of moral behavior. Even so, they both die. Political power, not the dispassionate consideration of justice, appears as the ultimate reality and the ultimate arbiter.

Aeneas' establishment of relations with Latinus and the recapitulation of the motif with his engagement in *hospitium* with Evander are the cardinal points of the narrative of the second half of the *Aeneid.* The disintegration of the alliance of Latins and Trojans turns Aeneas to a new beginning. The association with Evander

determines not only the successful prosecution of the war, but more importantly the gruesome manner of its conclusion. Beginnings and endings are significant points, and it is at these, curiously, that Vergil chooses to elicit the memory of Dido. Were we to ignore the political dimension of the episode at Carthage, it would be difficult to perceive the meaning of Vergil's evocation of Dido at the crises of Aeneas' career in Italy. It is clear that the foundation of the relationship between Aeneas and Latinus is provided by a specific ideology of civilization and civilized behavior. This same ideology pervades the narrative of the episode at Carthage, both when Dido takes Aeneas in and she criticizes him for leaving. Without this recognition, the possibility is excluded of realizing that Dido's behavior offers a pattern against which we are to judge Aeneas' actions in the series of events that lead from peace to war with the Latins. When confronted, as Dido was, with the betrayal of trust within a personal political relationship, Aeneas acts no better than she, perhaps worse. Dido is vindictive, but only verbally. Violence is not beyond her, but it is self-directed. Aeneas, on the other hand, at the direction of the gods, assumes the role of the aggressor in the vindication of the Latins' violation of trust. A similar syndrome is evident in the death of Turnus. Aeneas avenges Pallas as much under the force of his obligation to Evander as on impulse. The system of values which Vergil adopts does not allow blame to attach to Aeneas: the gods demand that he undertake the war; *fides* requires the payment of Turnus. But an irony remains. Rome's mission is the shackling of war, the reign of universal peace, and the reconciliation of brothers at strife. We are, however, permitted no glimpse of these among men as they live their life on earth.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

[1] For a discussion of allusive and structural imitation see Wigodsky, pp. 1-15.

[2] See, for example, Heinze, pp. 133-138, Highet, pp. 220-231, Hross, pp. 72-114, Oksala, pp. 167-197. See on *A.* 4.305-330, 365-387, 534-552, and 590-629, among the commentators, Austin, Conington, Henry, Page, Pease, and R. D. Williams. The conclusions of Hügi, pp. 98-99 on the relationship of Dido to the Medea of Apollonius provide a valuable perspective on the question of literary reminiscence in the episode: while Vergil wants to show that he is indebted to the tradition, he does not sacrifice the independence of his own creation.

[3] On the themes of the lament and their arrangement see below, p. 37 and nn. 2 and 3, Chap. 4.

[4] There is always the possibility of Naevian influence although it is not even certain that the *Bellum Punicum* contained an episode narrating an emotional relationship between Dido and Aeneas. See Wigodsky, p. 34, "Thus while there are difficulties either way, it seems that no decisive argument has been brought against a Dido episode in Naevius' second book". Even if Vergil were influenced by a Dido-Aeneas episode in Naevius, the line of descent from Vergil back to Catullus, Apollonius, and ultimately Euripides indicates the primary influence on the pattern of his narrative of the affair.

[5] Pease cites on *A.* 4.373 (*nusquam, etc.*) *Med.* 412-413 as well as Catul. 64.143-144. Highet, p. 223 adds A.R. 4.358-359. The Apollonius passage deals with Jason's foreswearing of his oath to Medea; *Med.* 412-413 and Catul. 64.143-144 are gnomic statements about oath-breakers.

[6] Pöschl, p. 165 understands *dextera* as a reference to Aeneas' *Treuversprechen*; see also p. 152, where the author speaks of Aeneas' *Treuwort.* In neither case does he specify the content of the promise. Highet, p. 223 cites *Med.* 488-498. The closest parallel in these lines to Dido's mention of Aeneas' right hand is to be found in *Med.* 496-498

> φεῦ δεξιὰ χείρ, ἧς σὺ πόλλ' ἐλαμβάνου,
> xαὶ τῶνδε γονάτων, ὡς μάτην κεχρῴσμεθα
> xαxοῦ πρὸς ἀνδρός, ἐλπίδων δ'ἡμάρτομεν

where Medea presents Jason as he once was, the suppliant clasping her knees and her right hand, pleading for assistance and promising a marriage in return. Lines 492-495 show clearly that Medea is talking about Jason's oath. Pease on *A.* 4.307 (*data dextera*) cites with some diffidence as possible sources both *Med.* 21-22 and A.R. 4.99-100, ὣς ηὔδα [i.e., Jason] xαὶ χεῖρα παρασχεδὸν ἤραρε χειρί/ δεξιτερήν, where Jason seals his oath to marry Medea (see A.R. 4.95-98) with the handshake. Pease connects these lines with the complaint that Medea makes to Jason in her lament, A.R. 4.358-359, ...ποῦ τοι Διὸς Ἱκεσίοιο/ ὅρκια, ποῦ δὲ μελιχραὶ ὑποσχεσίαι βεβάασιν. The remark with which Pease introduces these passages for consideration is illustrative of the assumptions that are generally made about the relation between Vergil's narrative and the literature to which it alludes. "Two Greek sources for this line are cited, but can hardly decide for us the type of pledge here meant..." It is assumed that the meaning of an allusive phrase does not emerge from its context, but is specified by the meaning of the phrase to which it alludes. The distinction between a literary allusion and the transposition of phrases from a source is completely blurred.

[7] This conclusion does not seem unwarranted in light of Heinze's views on Vergil's method of literary imitation. On pp. 251-252 Heinze again addresses the

issue of imitation in the Dido episode. "Wenn er Didos Jammer und Verzweiflung ausdrücken will, so verkörpern sich ihm diese Gefühle nicht intuitiv in anschaulichem Bilde, das sich aus dem eigenen Innern losrang, sondern er hält nach fertigen, von anderen bereits gestalteten Bildern Umschau, die sich mit der gedachten Situation zur Deckung bringen lassen. Er ist darin selten so weit gegangen wie in diesem Falle..." Vergil takes from other authors those phrases whose meaning suits his own narrative. If a borrowing is not suited to its narrative context, then there must be an inadequacy in the narrative. Again the literary reminiscence is treated as a simple transposition.

8 On this point see below p. 55 and n. 29, Chap. 4.

9 See *ThLL,* vol. 5, pt. 1, *s.v. dext(e)ra,* col. 925, 38-41; col. 927, 64-80; col. 934, 30-47. Boyancé, pp. 101-105 discusses the association of the right hand with *fides*

10 Comment on *A.* 4.307-308; see also on *A.* 4.314. Paratore on *A.* 4.317 offers an interpretation that blends Mackail's and Buscaroli's views, "...la destra di Enea è invocata come se fosse stata porta a Didone nel rito nuziale, come pegno di fedeltà...." Ameye, p. 325, n. 1, gives a variation on the interpretation of *dextera* as the symbol of conjugal fidelity. "...Énée est impie pour Didon parce que les serments d'amour, *dextra, fides,* sont sacrés pour elle." But in Book 4 we hear as much of oaths of love as we do of oaths of marriage.

11 In the *Thesaurus* article the only references specifically cited for *dextera* in the context of marriage are those to the joining of hands at the marriage ceremony; see col. 925, 79-81. As far as I am aware, there are only two texts in Republican literature in which *dextera* is used in a context that at a superficial glance suggests fidelity in marriage. In Plautus, *Am.* 923-924, Jupiter, disguised as Amphitruo, pleads with Alcmena not to be angry over the accusations which the real Amphitruo has made against her.

per dexteram tuam te, Alcumena, oro, opsecro
da mihi hanc veniam, ignosce, irata ne sies.

With an irony which everyone but Alcmena can enjoy, Jupiter borrows the language of the suppliant in order to persuade her. In the second passage Ovid narrates Odysseus' encounter with Circe.

ille domum Circes et ad insidiosa vocatus
pocula conantem virga mulcere capillos
reppulit et stricto pavidam deterruit ense.
inde fides dextraeque datae thalamoque receptus
coniugii dotem sociorum corpora poscit.
(*Met.* 14. 294-298)

Ovid's account is surely facetious. The exchange of *fides* with the clasping of right hands establishes amicable relations, which in turn lead straight to Circe's bedroom. *Coniugium* and *dos* are used ironically. It would be an extreme position to see the clasping of right hands as a mutual commitment to conjugal fidelity.

12 Pease is not the only one to have presented this view. Donatus on *A.* 4.307 allows the possibility of *dextera's* referring to *hospitium.* Forbiger notes on *A.* 4.314, "per dextram quam hospes mihi porrexisti...." Benoist comments on *dextera* in *A.* 4.307, "L'union des mains était un gage d'alliance ou de protection." All three cite *A.* 3.83 as a parallel; Benoist adds *A.* 3.610.

13 It appears well over one hundred times in the *Aeneid.* For the frequency of appearance see Wetmore, *s.v.*

14 This is not to say that the sphere of reference of *dextera* is exclusively political. See Plautus, *Capt.* 438-445; Terence, *An.* 289-291; Ovid, *Met.* 6.494ff. and 6.506.

15 See in addition Cicero, *Ver.* 5.40.104, *Phil.* 10.4.9; Caesar, *Gal.* 1.20.5; Nepos, *Them.* 8.4; Horace, *Ep.* 1.7.94; Livy, 7.42.6, 22.30.6, 23.9.3, 25.16.13, 25.18.7, 28.34.1, 40.46.15, 41.25.4.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

[1] A convenient summary of the important general bibliography is found in Ross, pp. 82-87 and footnotes. Seager in the introduction to his translation of Gelzer's *Die Nobilität der römischen Republik* and *Die Nobilität der Kaiserzeit*, pp. xi-xii gives a brief summary of these developments in the study of Roman history. Of particular importance as a reference source for the study of political vocabulary is Hellegouarc'h.

[2] See, for example, Cicero's definition of justice in *Fin.* 5.23.65, *quae animi affectio suum cuique tribuens atque hanc quam dico societatem coniunctionis humanae munifice et aeque tenens iustitia dicitur, cui sunt adiunctae pietas, bonitas, liberalitas, benignitas, comitas, quaeque sunt generis eiusdem.* See also Hellegouarc'h, pp. 265-267.

[3] See Hellegouarc'h, p. 276 and p. 277, n. 6.

[4] The punctuation with a semi-colon after *pigebit* in v. 233 and a period after *armis* in v. 235 is mine. The following editions of the *Aeneid* punctuate the end of v. 233 with a period and the end of v. 235 with a colon: Mynors; P. A. Hirtzel, *P. Vergili Maronis Opera* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900); Conington. Page writes a period at the end of v. 233 and a semi-colon at the end of v. 235. The result of these punctuations is to leave the impression that Ilioneus' adjuration of the *fata* of Aeneas and his right hand mighty in *fides* and martial deeds serves as an attestation of the truth of the statement that follows in vv. 236-240, namely that many nations had wanted the Trojans to settle with them, but that the fates required these refugees to go to Latium. Reasons can be adduced for interpreting the text as containing a full stop after *pigebit* in v. 233 and an attenuated pause after *armis* in v. 235. One could interpret that Ilioneus believes it necessary to support his claim of divine will by asserting the morally upright character of Aeneas with the reference to his right hand. In that case *fides* would be attenuated to the point of having only the significance of rectitude in the most general sense of the term. The similarity of situation of the passage to *A.* 1.544-549 and the proximity in meaning of *fides* and *pietas* suggest, however, that the invocation of Aeneas' right hand, as a symbol of his *fides* and military valor, has the same function as the assertion of Aeneas' *pietas* and military valor. In the passage in Book 1 *pietas* and military valor guarantee that Aeneas will perform the *officia* incumbent on him. In Book 7 *fides* and military valor guarantee that the Trojans will not be *indecores*, that is, that they will manifest *gratia* towards Latinus. In each case, the guarantee, in turn, becomes the basis for a request for a benefaction. We are dealing with *fides* and its symbol, the right hand, as elements of the Roman code of personal political relationships. A statement in Cicero, *Deiot.* 3.8, provides a parallel, striking both in its thought and logic, to Ilioneus' words to Latinus. Cicero pleads with Caesar to dispel the suspicion that he harbors any malice towards King Deiotarus, *quam ob rem primum metu, Caesar, per fidem et constantiam et clementiam tuam libera ne residere in te ullam partem iracundiae suspicemur. Per dexteram istam te oro quam regi Deiotaro hospes hospiti porrexisti, istam, inquam, dexteram non tam in bellis neque in proeliis quam in promissis et fide firmiorem.* Caesar's right hand, firmer in its *fides* than in its martial prowess should be the guarantee of his sincerity, concretely manifested by performing the favor requested; just so, Aeneas' right hand guarantees the *gratia* of the Trojans. It seems therefore preferable to read a weak pause after *pigebit* in *A.* 7.233 and a full stop after *armis* in v. 235.

[5] For a collection of passages see Hellegouarc'h, p. 268, nn. 3 and 4. See also Klingner, *RG*, p. 724 and p. 743, n. 66.

[6] Klingner, *RG*, pp. 719-724.

[7] For bibliography see Hafter, pp. 303-304; Hellegouarc'h, p. 267, n. 7; Klingner, *RG*, p. 737, n. 1.

[8] The view of *humanitas* presented in the following pages is the result of a preliminary study of the word and of the concept which it signifies.

[9] Riginos, pp. 146-147 notes that the anecdote was transferred to Plato from Aristippus. The antithesis between civilized and uncivilized behavior implied in Cicero's use of the anecdote is explicitly made in frag. 9A (Manneback) of Aristippus although here it is an antithesis between Greeks and barbarians. When Aristippus was shipwrecked and washed onto the shores of an unknown land,

> ἐθάρρησε θεασάμενος ἐπὶ τῆς ψάμμου διάγραμμα γεωμετρικόν. ἐλογίσατο γὰρ εἰς Ἕλληνάς τε καὶ σοφοὺς ἄνδρας, οὐκ εἰς βαρβάρους ἥκειν.

The notion of the priority of civilization, in the sense of behavior regulated by law and justice in a political state, over culture, in the sense of the pursuit of speculative knowledge, is emphasized in Cicero's introduction to *de Republica*: *nihil enim dicitur a philosophis quod quidem recte honesteque dicatur quod non ab his partum confirmatumque sit, a quibus civitatibus iura descripta sunt* (*Rep.* 1.2.2).

[10] See Richardson, p. 196.

[11] See the discussion in Sherwin-White, *RP*, pp. 8-13 on Strabo's use of this criterion for judging a people as barbarian or civilized.

[12] See Klingner, *RG*, pp. 720-722 for the connection between wit, humor and intellectual activity.

[13] See Hellegouarc'h, p. 269 for a collection of passages.

[14] As in Cicero, *Rep.* 1.2.2, the notion of the priority of the civilizing function of the political state over intellectual endeavors is implicit in this passage where the art of political organization (*A.* 6.851-853) is contrasted with the liberal arts (*A.* 6.847-850).

[15] See, for example, the characterization of Labrax in Plautus, *Rud.* 651-653,

> fraudis, sceleris, parricidi, peiiuri plenissumus,
> legerupa inpudens, inpurus, inverecundissumus,
> uno verbo apsoluam, lenost.

In Terence, *Ph.* 509-513 Doris is *homo inhumanissimus.* In *Ad.* 160-161 Simo ironically describes himself as *optima fide.*

[16] See Klingner, *Virgil*, pp. 401-402, 495 for the connection between the attribution of justice to Dido here and Virgil's statement of Rome's mission in *A.* 6.687ff.

[17] *CQ*, pp. 150-151.

[18] Klingner, *RG*, p. 723. The arguments are repeated in his *Virgil*, pp. 398-400. For a similar view of Dido's humanity see Büchner, *RE*, col. 1345, 47-53.

[19] See the commentary on *FGrH*, iii 566 F 82.

[20] See Hellegouac'h, p. 205.

[21] For the interpretation of *vultum demissa* (*A.* 1.561) as a description of maidenly modesty rather than of embarrassment see Hügi, p. 85 who notes in the phrase a reminiscence of A.R. 1.790 (Hypsipyle) and A.R. 3.1008 (Medea). Hügi finds the reminiscence inappropriate. But even if the words recall Apollonius' ἐγκλιδὸν ὄσσε βαλοῦσα, why must they denote modesty only? Hügi, however, points to the parallel of *A.* 1.572-573 to A.R. 1.827-830, Hypsipyle's offer for the Argonauts to settle in Lemnos and for Jason to become king; he suggests that the reminiscence is meant to establish a contrast between the conciliatory conclusion of the Hypsipyle episode and the disharmonious one of the Dido episode. May it not also suggest the position which Aeneas is to occupy in Carthage? On Aeneas' position see below pp. 30, 45-48.

[22] In the scene with Cupid, before the great banquet takes place, Venus calls the relationship *hospitium*: ... *vereor quo se Iunonia vertant/ hospitia...* (*A.* 1.671-672).

[23] See Hellegouarc'h, p. 50.

[24] *Gratia* appears six times: in *G.* 1.83; *A.* 4.539; 6.653; 7.232, 402; 9.298.

[25] *Grates* appears in *A.* 1.600; 2.537; 11.508. *Grates* in *A.* 11.508 serves as the direct object not only of *referre* in v. 509, but also of *dicere* in v. 508. Moussy, p. 66 notes the distinction which Vergil here makes between the verbal manifestation of gratitude (*grates dicere*) and the requital of benefaction with benefaction as a mark of gratitude (*grates referre*). See his p. 66 and p. 68 for the synonymity of *grates referre* and *grates persolvere* with *gratiam referre*; pp. 262-264 and p. 270 for the sense of *gratiam referre*; and p. 44 and p. 251 for the original meaning of *gratia*.

[26] See Hellegouarc'h, pp. 203-206 on *gratia* and especially pp. 204-205 for the connection between *gratia* and *officium*.

[27] Hellegouarc'h, p. 362.

[28] Hellegouarc'h, pp. 383-384.

[29] Hellegouarc'h, pp. 365-367.

[30] Hellegouarc'h, p. 387.

[31] See also *A.* 8.169, quoted below p. 28 for the explicit connection of *foedus* with the joining of right hands. The expression *foedera iungere* recurs in *A.* 4.112; 8.56, 641; 12.822. See also *A.* 11.356 (*pacem hanc aeterno foedere iungas*). Needless to say, each time the phrase appears, it refers to the establishment of a political alliance.

[32] For the political significance of the term *amicitia* see Hellegouarc'h, pp. 48-54 and Ross, pp. 83-84.

[33] The evidence here presented throws light on Dido's mention of Aeneas' right hand in *A.* 4.307 and 314. There is no more necessity in her case than in the case of the Latinus episode to assume a physical joining of right hands. She uses *dextera* symbolically to refer to Aeneas' *fides*. Under these circumstances, Vergil has no need to narrate a scene in which right hands are joined together; much less are we to imagine that they join hands at a marriage ceremony.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

[1] See above, n. 31, Chap. 2. Vergil uses here the same expression, *foedera iungere*, as he does elsewhere for the establishment of a political alliance.

[2] Cicero, *Rep.* 2.7.13 uses the word to define the alliance of Romulus and Titus Tatius after the war resulting from the rape of the Sabine women, *qua ex causa bellum cum Romanis Sabini intulissent proeliisque certamen varium atque anceps fuisset, cum T. Tatio rege Sabinorum foedus icit, matronis ipsis quae raptae erant orantibus, quo foedere et Sabinos in civitatem adscivit sacris comunicatis et regnum suum cum illorum rege sociavit.* Livy, 29.11.1, writes of the time when Greece was not yet allied to Rome, *Graecia quondam hauddum ullo foedere sociata.*

[3] In *Planc.* 40.95 Cicero speaks of his relationship with C. Vergilius, ...*quocum me uno vel maxime cum vetustas, tum amicitia, cum mei fratis collegia, tum rei publicae causa sociarat.* In *Planc.* 30.73 Cicero addresses Laterensis in reference to his services to Cicero during his exile, *qui cum mihi esses amicissimus, cum vel periculum vitae tuae mecum sociare voluisses, cum me in illo tristi et acerbo luctu atque discessu non lacrimis solum tuis, sed animo, corpore, copiis prosecutus esses, dum meos liberos et uxorem me absente tuis opibus auxilioque defendisses, sic mecum semper egisti, te mihi remittere atque concedere ut omne studium meum in Cn. Plancii honorem consumerem....* In *Flac.* 10.21 Cicero speaks of the situation where the witnesses in the case are living in the house of the prosecutor, *quid? si testium studium cum accusatore sociatum est, tamenne isti testes habebuntur?* In *Rep.* 1.25.39 Cicero uses *sociare* in Scipio's definition of a political state, *est igitur, inquit Africanus, res publica res populi. populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus.* The word again apears in the definition of a political state in *Rep.* 6.13.13, *nihil est enim illi principio deo qui omnem mundum regit, quod quidem in terris fiat acceptius quam concilia coetusque hominum iure sociati, quae civitates appellantur.*

[4] Livy uses the word to indicate marriage in the speech of Canuleius in 4.4.5-6, *an esse ulla maior aut insignitior contumelia potest quam partem civitatis velut contaminatam indignam conubio haberi? quid est aliud quam exsilium intra eadem moenia, quam relegationem pati? ne adfinitatibus, ne propinquitatibus immisceamur cavent, ne societur sanguis.*

[5] In *Leg.* 1.11.32 Cicero writes of the common trait of all men to value morally upright conduct and to hate evil-doers. The conclusion of the argument is that *quibus ex rebus cum omne genus hominum sociatum inter se intelligatur, illud extremum est quod recte vivendi ratio meliores efficit.* In *de Orat.* 3.32.131 Catulus praises Crassus, *cum tu... vim rerum cognitionemque comprehenderis, eamque omnem cum eius, qui consilio et oratione in civitate valeat, scientia atque exercitatione sociaris.*

[6] Horace, *Carm.* 4.9.3-4; *Culex* 301; Ovid, *Met.* 8.547-548; 11.5; *Fast.* 2.246.

[7] [Tib.] 3.37; Ovid, *Am.* 2.8.5; *Ep.* 3.109.

[8] *Met.* 10.635; *Ib.* 15.

[9] See de la Ville de Mirmont, p. 317 who maintains that Juno is invoked as well as the protectress of Carthage.

[10] See above, n. 10, Chap. 2. Pease on *A.* 4.58 (*legiferae, etc.*) sets out evidence for Ceres as the founder of civilized life and as a goddess of marriage. His conclusion is that "...while Ceres is doubtless invoked as a founder of civilized life, she also merits a place here among the deities supervising the marriage relation." His citations show that Ceres-Demeter was connected with marriage, but surely the point of *legiferae* is to emphasize her association with the establishment of law and civilized life.

[11] See Pease on *A.* 4.58 (*patrique Lyaeo*).

[12] See Mylonas, p. 238.

[13] See Guthrie, pp. 183-189. *Cf.* also de la Ville de Mirmont, p. 514.

[14] See also Hügi, p. 90, n. 1.

[15] Sherwin-White, *LP,* p. 117 (introduction to commentary on *Ep.* 1.14).

[16] For the use of emotive language in the political vocabulary, see Hellegouarc'h, pp. 142-151.

[17] See Ross, pp. 80-95.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

[1] The narrative of *Aeneid* 4 is built around two cardinal events, first, Dido's decision to yield to her love for Aeneas and, second, her discovery that she is to be abandoned by him. These considerations of Dido's choice and discovery which serve as principles of construction are the same as the ones which inform Apollonius' treatment of the Jason-Medea story. Much of the narrative of *Argonautica* 3 deals with the introduction, and development, of the Medea episode into the larger story of the adventures of Jason. Apollonius prepares the reader for the subsequent development of the story of Medea's love in the opening scenes: the conversation of Hera and Athena (vv. 6-35), the interview of the two goddesses with Aphrodite (vv. 36-110), and the encounter of Aphrodite and Eros (vv. 111-166). The result of these events is incorporated into the narrative of Jason's arrival at Aeetes' court: Eros wounds Medea (vv. 275-298), and she feels the first effects of the newly conceived passion (vv. 451-470). But the core of the Medea story, and indeed of the whole book, is contained in vv. 616-824. Medea struggles with her passion and ultimately chooses to indulge it. Medea's decision is the central event of the book. All the action rises to it and falls from it. In Book 4 Apollonius relates Jason's adventures subsequent to the taking of the fleece. At one point in the course of the events narrated Medea is faced with the possibility of being returned to her father. Jason, entangled in difficulties with the pursuing Colchians

led by Absyrtus, negotiates a settlement. He is to retain the fleece on condition that an impartial judge determine Medea's disposition. Medea's discovery of these new arrangements institutes a new phase of the action. She argues with Jason, dissuades him from his plan, and hatches with him the scheme to murder Absyrtus. Medea's reaction to her proposed abandonment is presented in the speech of vv. 355-390. In *Carmen* 64 Catullus concentrates on Ariadne's discovery of her abandonment. The central tableau of the narrative is the monologue of Ariadne, vv. 132-201, the lament which is generated by the realization of her abandonment. The other elements of the narrative are disposed around this crucial speech. The account opens with Ariadne waking to find herself on the deserted shore (vv. 50-75). There follows a purely narrative section in which the information necessary for understanding Ariadne's situation is set out (vv. 76-123). A brief passage (vv. 124-131) recapitulates the description of the initial scene (vv. 50-75) and serves as an introduction to the monologue. The sections following the monologue are arranged according to the same logic. Forty-seven lines (202-248) deal with the subsequent fate of Theseus. A large part of this section of the narrative is spent in relating Aegeus' *mandata* to Theseus before he departs for Crete (vv. 212-237). The narrative of Jupiter's assent to Ariadne's curse and of Theseus' forgetfulness (vv. 202-211; 238-248) frame Aegeus' speech to the departing Theseus. By incorporating Aegeus' speech into the narrative, Catullus violates the chronological sequence which he had previously established. He could have placed the speech in the section (vv. 76-123) in which he dealt with the events leading up to Ariadne's abandonment. By disposing the narrative as he does, Catullus obviously wishes to focus on Ariadne's abandonment as the central issue.

[2] Both Ariadne's monologue in Catul. 64.132-201 and Medea's speech to Jason in A.R. 4. 355-390, when he is ready to abandon her on the island of Artemis, conform to the same pattern. Each is tripartite, and each takes up the same themes in the same order: 1) faithlessness and benefactions: A.R. 4.355-376; Catul. 64.132-163; 2) alienation: A.R. 4.376-381; Catul. 64.164-187; 3) curse: A.R. 4.382-390; Catul. 64.188-201. Although the sequence of presentation became traditional, the themes of faithlessness and alienation can be traced back to the agon of Euripides' *Medea*: faithlessness and benefactions, vv. 473-498; alienation, vv. 499-515.

[3] Dido delivers nine speeches in *Aeneid* 4. All but one (*Anna soror, quae me suspensam insomnia terrent,* v. 9ff.) occur in the last two-thirds of the book after Aneas has taken his decision to leave. Four of the eight have no direct relation to the Hellenistic tradition of love narrative. *Anna, vides toto properari litore circum,* v. 416ff., *inveni, germana, viam (gratare sorori),* v. 478ff., and *Annam, cara mihi nutrix, huc siste sororem,* v. 634 ff. have the purpose of advancing the plot line. Dido's *novissima verba (dulces exuviae, dum fata deusque sinebat,* v. 651ff.) with its allusion to Roman sepulchral inscriptions, has no precedent in Hellenistic love narrative. The debt which the remaining four speeches owe to the tradition is obvious. *Dissimulare etiam sperasti, perfide, tantum,* v. 305ff. and *nec tibi diva parens generis nec Dardanus auctor,* v. 365ff., both addressed to Aeneas in the scene of confrontation, deal with his faithlessness and her benefactions. *En, quid ago? rursusne procos inrisa priores,* v. 534ff. takes up the theme of alienation, and *flaventisque abscissa comas 'pro Iuppiter! ibit,'* v. 590ff. is devoted to the curse. Vergil recapitulates the traditional themes in the traditional order.

[4] The conclusions of Hügi, pp. 93-95, on literary reminiscences in the scene of confrontation between Dido and Aeneas, *A.* 4.296ff. are valuable as a guide: Vergil demonstrates his adherence to the tradition, but is not so interested in doing this as to forfeit the independence of his creation.

[5] By *pudor* here and in *A.* 4.27 Dido means no more than the praiseworthy mode

of behavior in which a woman marries only one man in the course of her life. See *anth.*, II,2,1523.7-8, *unum sortita maritum/servavi casta pudorem.* Its connection with *fama* here is implicit as it is explicit in Dido's words in *A.* 4.322-323.

[6] See below, pp. 45-48, 58-59.

[7] Pease, *ad.loc.* refers to Ovid, *Ep.* 7.163, *parce, precor, domui quae se tibi tradit habendam,* where the context makes it clear that Dido means that she is offering Aeneas royal power (see v. 152, *resque loco regis sceptraque sacra tene*). For the view of *domus* as Dido's household see Austin, *ad.loc.* The remarks of Page and Conington, *ad.loc.* are ambiguous.

[8] For a discussion of this topic see Pöschl, pp. 161-162.

[9] *Cf.* Klingner, *Virgil,* p. 448 on Aeneas' hierarchy of desires.

[10] There seems to be no recognition in the scholarly literature that Aeneas tells Dido not only that his obligations prevent him from remaining with her, but also that he faces the choice between love for her and love for his own people and that he does not decide in her favor. This is not to deny that Aeneas loves Dido; it is a question of choices.

[11] This opinion is virtually universal. See, for example, Pöschl, "...tritt Liebe mit überindividuellen Bindungen in Konflikt...."; R. D. Williams, *Vergiliana,* p. 425, "...she [*i.e.*, Dido] is not prepared to believe that anyone should subordinate their personal life to requirements imposed by the gods. This is Aeneas' position and Dido entirely rejects it."; Quinn, *VA,* p. 143, "...his protest that personal feelings must be subordinated to duty is beyond her comprehension."; Austin in the introductory remarks to vv. 331-361 (p. 106), "It is no fault of Virgil's that the harsh conflict between duty and desire is what it is."

[12] See Hellegouarc'h, pp. 39-40.

[13] In discussing vv. 338-339, Pöschl, p. 166, states that the emphasis on *haec* in the phrase *non haec in foedera veni* shows that there was some kind of *foedus* between Dido and Aeneas. He does not, however, have any more to say on the matter.

[14] See below p. 55 and n. 29.

[15] On the passage of time during which talk of Dido and Aeneas spreads see Mehmel, p. 93 and Pease on *A.* 4.173 (*Fama*). For *viro* as meaning husband see Pease on *A.* 4.192 (*viro*).

[16] See, for example, R. D. Williams, *Vergiliana,* p. 422; Quinn, *VA,* pp. 140-141.

[17] On the consensual character of Roman marriage and the relevance of that matter to the Dido-Aeneas narrative see Quinn, *LE,* p. 163 and Gordon Williams, *TO,* pp. 381-383. Neither, however, accepts the possibility that it is a question of marriage between Dido and Aeneas. Williams, pp. 382-383, remarks, "It is impossible to imagine lovers who do not make statements and promises which, regarded in cold blood, are ambiguous and probably go further than the speaker intended. It is in this area of ambiguity that Vergil has set his drama, and he could reasonably rely on Roman readers to plot the range of ambiguity within the institutions which they knew. Marriage could exist without ceremony and formality, simply by the consent of both parties." But, as we see, it is not a question of promises, but of actions. Quinn's view of the situation ("But now he lets her sweep him along into a lasting liaison which she hopes will develop into marriage," *VA,* p. 141) closely resembles that of Pöschl ("Die Schuld des Aeneas liegt...darin... dass er die Herrschaft über Carthago mit ihr teilte und dadurch die Hoffnung eines dauernden Bündnisses erweckte.", p. 167). The desire to limit Aeneas' responsibility is understandable. Vergil consistently underplays Aeneas' role in the affair. But we must consider the possibility that the narrative supplies enough information to make a judgment as to whether Dido's conviction about their being married is founded on hopes or reality. It would be well to consider in this context the remarks

of Crook ("Marriage was a matter of intention; if you lived together 'as' man and wife, man and wife you were.", p. 101) and Corbett ("...there was nothing but *affectus maritalis* to distinguish marriage from concubinage. Though a placing of a woman at the man's disposal, roughly described as *domum deductio,* appears to have been necessary in the celebration of marriage, this was no safe criterion, for its object might have been precisely concubinage. *Affectus maritalis* is a mental condition hard to establish if one party is dead or denies that it ever existed... Certain *indicia* were therefore admitted as proving marriage unless the presumption was rebutted. Thus cohabitation with a free woman who has not been a prostitute was presumed to be marriage....", p. 95).

[18] See Pöschl, p. 157-158; R. D. Williams, *Vergiliana,* pp. 423-424; Klingner, *Virgil,* p. 449.

[19] See Austin and Pease, *ad.loc.,* and R. D. Williams, *Vergiliana,* p. 425.

[20] See R. D. Williams, *Vergiliana,* p. 424.

[21] It is worthwhile noting in this connection an observation which Nethercut, p. 90, makes of a parallel between Book 1 and Book 4. In describing the Trojans preparing for departure, Vergil compares them to a colony of busy ants.

> ac velut ingentem formicae farris acervum
> cum populant hiemis memores tectoque reponunt,
> it nigrum campis agmen praedamque per herbas
> convectant calle angusto...
> (A. 4.402-405)

The words *populant* and *praedam* in this passage recall to Nethercut Ilioneus' words to Dido in *A.* 1.527-528.

> non nos aut ferro Libycos *populare* penatis
> venimus, aut raptas ad litora vertere *praedas,*

and he sees in the parallel a support for the contention of his article that Vergil's intention is to present Aeneas and the Trojans throughout the epic as invaders and agents of destruction. It is possible to see the full significance of this parallel between Book 1 and Book 4. Ilioneus' words in Book 1 argue that the Trojans are not pirates and therefore are not antipathetic to the values and modes of behavior of civilized life. The ant simile of Book 4 with its echo of Ilioneus' words, however, suggests that we see Aeneas and the Trojans acting as Ilioneus asserted they would not. It implies, as Dido does in her censure of Aeneas, a controversion of the values of *humanitas.*

[22] Parthenius makes direct reference in the narration of some stories (*narr.* 11, 14, 21, 34) to the poets on whom he was drawing for those particular accounts, and supplementary notes on the sources of some stories are written in the margins of the ninth or tenth century *codex Palatinus graecus,* n. 398, in which the book has been transmitted. Although Parthenius was not the author of these notes, there is no reason to doubt that they supply reliable information. See Rohde, pp. 122-123. With the exception of Sophocles and Licymnius, two fifth century poets, all the poets cited as sources were active during the late fourth and /or third centuries—Philetas, Simmias of Rhodes, Moero, Hermesianax, Alexander Aetolus, Apollonius of Rhodes, Euphorion, to name some—the learned scholar poets of the early Hellenistic period.

[23] See also Hügi, pp. 91-92.

[24] *Cf.* de la Ville de Mermont, p. 317, n. 5.

[25] *Cf.* Hügi, pp. 90-91.

[26] The classic discussion is to be found in Heinze, pp. 125-126. See also Gordon Williams, *JRS,* pp. 23-24; Klingner, *Virgil,* pp. 441-442. Rudd, pp. 42-49, has an excellent treatment of the subject whose conclusions are profoundly different.

[27] See *CAH,* vol. 10, p. 454 and Funke, pp. 185-186. Funke's remark on the evidence in inscriptions for the remarriage of women in the first and second centuries A.D. bears repeating. "Dass den Frauen, die nur einem Mann gehört haben, dieses ausdrücklich als Ruhmestitel auf ihren Grabstein geschrieben wird, bestätigt nur, dass das Gegenteil allgemeine Übung war." The same may be said of the first century B.C.

[28] It is generally assumed that Anna believes remarriage is wrong. This is evident in the remarks in the literature on *A.* 4.50-51, *tu modo posce deos veniam sacrisque litatis/indulge hospitio....* See Page, *ad loc.*: "*veniam*] 'favour,' i.e., in order to avert the evils presaged by her dreams, cf. 9."; Pease, on v. 50 (*veniam*), "...*venia* meaning indulgence for some fault or neglect and *pacem* denoting the attitude of goodwill or favor on the part of the deity which the worshipper seeks in prayer."; Conington, *ad.loc.*: "...'Posce deos veniam,' to avert the anger portended by the ill-omened dreams of v. 9."; Austin, *ad.loc.*: "...Anna means indulgence for Dido's forgetfulness of Sychaeus and of her pledge to him."; Funke, p. 185, "...diese Forderung [for a woman to be *univira*] hat im allgemeinen sittlichen Empfinden eine so starke Kraft, dass z.B. Vergil ihre Missachtung mit der Notwendigkeit verbinden kann, die Götter darob venia und pax anzuflehen,"; Quinn, *VA,* pp. 137-138, "There are, Anna admits, two obstacles to marriage. First, Dido has vowed she will not remarry; well, she must get the gods to agree to let her abandon her vow (50: *tu modo posce deos veniam*)."; Klingner, *Virgil,* p. 442, "...der Trost der Religion könne etwa noch übrige Gewissenbedenken beschwichtigen."; Büchner, *RE,* col. 1367,6, Anna advises Dido "die Götter zu versöhnen". The assumption is that *venia* means indulgence in the sense of pardon or forgiveness. But this is a secondary meaning of the word. See Schilling, pp. 39-40, "... 'grâce divine' que le juste obtient de préférence à l'impie est le sens premier du mot; un sens profane est apparu assez tôt qui, de 'complaisance' a glissé à 'pardon'; mais c'est une extension laïque qui n'a jamais fait oublier la valeur religieuse originelle. Il n'est que de vérifier l'emploi du mot dans Virgile pour s'en assurer: presque partout la résonance religieuse est perceptible.... Si Virgile ne s'est pas limité à la stricte acception religieuse du terme, il s'est plu à la souligner parfois par des rapprochements significatifs: 'Tu modo posce deos *veniam* sacrisque litatis...' (*A.*, IV, 50) suggère Anna à Didon en proie au désespoir; le rapprochement *deos-veniam* est renforcé par la présence du mot *litatis* qui appelle d'heureux présages." The recognition of the meaning of *venia* makes clear Anna's words in *A.* 4.50-51. She has presented the political advantages of marriage with Aeneas, and she now advises Dido to seek divine approval. She recommends that Dido do no more than any public figure at Rome would do before embarking on an undertaking of national consequence.

[29] Line 172, *coniugium vocat, hoc praetexit nomine culpam,* shows that Dido and Aeneas have become lovers, but that they have not been married. *Nomen* indicates that the relationship is not marriage. Dido calls it marriage, but the relationship which she covers over with this name is a *culpa.* Therefore the *coniugium* and the *culpa* are two different matters. On this point see Rudd, p. 41. I understand *culpa* in the only meaning which seems reasonable to me, that is, as engaging in sex out of wedlock though a woman ought not. On the application of the term to illicit sexual intimacy see *ThLL, s.v.,* vol. 4, col. 1302,67-1303,18. It should be noted that the connotation of *culpa* in v. 172 differs from its connotation in *A.* 4. 19 (*huic uni forsan potui succumbere culpae*), although in both passages the word conveys the notion of impropriety in sexual behavior. The context of v. 19 shows that Dido is considering marriage with Aeneas; but such a marriage would be contrary to the obligation which she feels to the dead Sychaeus. If *culpa* in v. 172 referred to remarriage, Dido would then be involved in the illogicality of glazing over her censurable act with the

very name of the act. Understanding *culpa* as illicit sexual intimacy in v. 172 sheds light on the sentiment expressed in vv. 170-171. After becoming intimate with Aeneas, Dido is influenced neither by appearances nor talk, and she no longer engages in a secret love. (The observation of Gordon Williams, *TO,* p. 379, deserves to be repeated, "...when Vergil speaks here of a 'secret love,' he does not mean that Dido had been secretly making love with Aeneas, but that she had been feeling love for him and not talking about it.") Public opinion would be outraged at the news that the queen, though unmarried, was intimate with Aeneas. The application of a palliative would therefore be necessary. If, on the other hand, *culpa* meant marriage, we would again be involved in logical difficulties. In that case, public opinion would be against Dido for remarrying when she ought not, but then no amount of protests that it was marriage would quell the disapproval or save her face.

Dido then calls marriage that which is clearly not marriage at this point. In an attempt to save Dido from moral turpitude and its just deserts, Gordon Williams, *TO,* pp. 379-380, takes the position that Dido is convinced, from the moment she leaves the cave, that she is married to Aeneas. His argument is that both Dido and Anna speak of the relationship with Aeneas only as a marriage (p. 381). The truth of this observation, however, does not make it necessary for Dido to be any more blind to the meaning of the incident in the cave than the narrator or his audience. Quinn's observation in *VA,* p. 141, that at this point Dido hopes that it will develop into a marriage (quoted above, n. 17; see also his *LE,* p. 38) seems closer to the mark. Rather than disabusing Dido of the notion that they are married, Aeneas, as we have seen, by his subsequent behavior gives Dido every justification for assuming that her hope has been fulfilled.

[30] The remark of Rudd, p. 49, has relevance here, "...the story of Dido and Sychaeus has no necessary connection with the story of Dido and Aeneas. Dido could, after all, have been captivated and then deserted by Aeneas even if she had not sworn to remain a widow or even if she had never previously been married."

[31] See Norden on *A.* 6.653.

[32] For this meaning of *gratia* see Hellegouarc'h, p. 206.

[33] Damsté, p. 179.

[34] Hellegouarc'h, p. 49ff.

[35] Hellegouarc'h, pp. 146-147.

[36] See these commentators, *ad loc.*

[37] The line of argument which Henry adopted is followed by Conington and Pease; Page's is the same although he does not cite Henry as his source. See below. Austin and R. D. Williams seem to have tired of the discussion. Austin on v. 596 merely dismisses the matter, "...it is nonsense to refer the words to Aeneas, as some editors do." R. D. Williams' statement at v. 596, "...this [referring *facta impia* to Aeneas] is inappropriate to the context and meaning of *tangunt,*" is enigmatic.

[38] For example, Ladewig and Schaper on v. 597; Benoist on v. 597; Klingner, *Virgil,* p. 459, n.1.

[39] Neither, however, presents reasons for the rejection of the assumption.

[40] Heyne on vv. 596-597 presents this as a possible interpretation although it is not the one which he prefers. Kvíčala, pp. 192-193 adopts this interpretation.

[41] In Heyne on vv. 596-597.

[42] In Heyne on vv. 596-597.

[43] Henry, p. 814, Austin, on v. 590, and R. D. Williams, on vv. 584ff., are all aware that their interpretation of vv. 596-597 has the effect of fragmenting Dido's line of thought, but none questions the validity of the assumption. Henry, however, apparently believes that the oscillation of Dido's thought from Aeneas to

herself and then back is unusual enough to warrant some justification; he cites as a parallel a speech from Metastasio's *Clemenza di Tito.* Contrast with these the remarks of Klingner, *Virgil,* pp. 459-460, n. 1, on the unity of the speech.

[44] The third instance is in *A.* 1.459-463, where it would perhaps be pressing the point to attribute to *tangunt* the connotation which it has in *A.* 12.56-60, 12.932-934, and *A.* 4.596.

[45] See *s.v. en* Walde, Ernout and Meillet. For *en* and *em* as alternate ways of transcribing the same sound and for *em/en* as a deictic particle see Luck, pp. 47-49.

[46] A case might be made for *en* with the inferential meaning in *Ecl.* 5.65-68, *A.* 1.459-462, and 12.230-233. Prof. Carrie E. Cowherd has brought to my attention a clear instance of 'inferential' *en* in Tib. 1.2.25. Luck cites a number of passages (with his own emendations) in which *em/en* can be construed as "inferential": Plautus, *Capt.* 532 (pp. 59-60), Terence, *Ph.* 139 (p. 53), *Eu.* 237 (pp. 57-58), *Ad.* 559 (p. 66), *anth.,* II, 3, 1866 (p. 68).

[47] On this point see Pease on *A.* 4.656 (*ulta virum*).

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

[1] See Pease on *A.* 4.393 (*pius*) for a collection of passages giving the standard ancient definitions of *pietas.*

[2] For a general discussion of this aspect of the presentation of the character of Aeneas in the first half of the poem see de la Ville de Mirmont, pp. 270-271.

[3] For discussions of these speeches see Knauer, p. 150, n. 1 and p. 172, n. 2; Clausen, pp. 77-81; Oppermann, pp. 147-148.

[4] See *A.* 2.314-317, 322, 352-354, 431-434.

[5] *Cf.* the remarks of Büchner, *RE,* col. 1351, 61-65, on the dream, "Deutlich genug, um diese Rede der Traumerscheinung als Wink der Götter zu verstehen und doch nicht deutlich genug, um ein Handeln gegen diesen Rat als Ungehorsam gegen sie erscheinen zu lassen."

[6] Büchner, *RE,* col. 1352, 5-15; Klingner, *Virgil,* p. 416.

[7] Compare the emotions of the Trojan women in *A.* 5.616-617 (*...vox omnibus una;/ urbem orant...*) and *A.* 5.654-656 with the vacillation of Aeneas in *A.* 5.700-703. This similarity of emotional disposition ought to be kept in mind when considering the view that Aeneas' vacillation is a sympathetic reaction to the feelings of those unwilling to go on (Burck, pp. 256-257: Aeneas' vacillation is an expression of his concern for the despairing Trojan men and women; Büchner, *RE,* col. 1378, 26-1379, 4, and *Wege,* p. 280: Aeneas loses confidence because the very people whom he serves call into question the value of his mission). There is nothing in the text to suggest that Aeneas' reaction is anything but a personal reaction. Burck, p. 256, n. 4 asserts without further warrant that Aeneas' *curae* in *A.* 5.701 and 720 are his cares for his people. As for Büchner's argument, one wonders why Aeneas should be so affected by the feelings of only a part of his people and the most negligible part at that, the old, the weary, the weak and the cowardly, all those who want nothing more to do with Aeneas' mission (*A.* 5.713-717).

[8] The irony of the situation is underscored by the content of Aeneas' prayer to Jupiter. *Pietas* is its ruling idea. Jupiter should save the fleet *si quid pietas antiqua labores/ respicit humanos* (*A.* 5.688-689), or destroy what remains *si mereor* (*A.* 5.692).

[9] See *A.* 1.208-209, the comment following Aeneas' speech of consolation to his people.

[10] *Cf.* the remarks of Oppermann, p. 148.

[11] See Leach, pp. 3-4.

[12] For a brief outline of the history of the love motif in the elevated poetic genres see Hügi, p. 81ff, n. 2.

[13] For a collection of passages dealing with Carthaginian perfidy see D'Agostino, pp. 82ff.

[14] See Klingner, *Virgil,* pp. 406-407 for a discussion of anti-Carthage prejudices in *Aeneid* 1, without any definite conclusions about reasons for their inclusion.

[15] Quinn, *LE,* p. 51.

[16] *Cf.* Klingner, *Virgil,* pp. 420-421.

[17] For Aeneas' request to visit his father as an act of love see Brooks, pp. 147-149. Brooks notes the parallel of *A.* 6.108 to *A.* 2.560. Austin on *A.* 6.116 notes *A.* 6.695-696, the opening of Aeneas' emotional greeting of his father. The verses imply that Aeneas dreamed frequently of a meeting with Anchises. *Cf. A.* 4.351-353, from Aeneas' speech to Dido.

[18] Aeneas' choice of Orpheus and Pollux as mythological precedents to persuade the Sibyl to grant the request is instructive. Both enter the underworld for love. Austin's remarks on *A.* 6.119ff are valuable.

[19] See Brooks, pp. 149-150.

[20] See Brooks, pp. 153-158; *cf.* Segal, pp. 625-627.

[21] *Cf.* Büchner, *RE,* col. 1384, 53-57.

[22] For these and other parallel myths, see Austin on *A.* 6.172. *Cf.* Segal, p. 638.

[23] See Brooks, p. 158; Segal, p. 639.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

[1] See Fraenkel, *JRS,* p. 5, "In Virgil's opinion the combination of different private egoisms plays an important role in preparing the general confusion which is the breeding-ground of war."

[2] On the sinister overtones, however, of Vergil's description of the arrival at the mouth of the Tiber see Reckford, p. 255 and Putnam, pp. 416-417.

[3] See above, p. 77. On Aeneas' hesitation at emerging from the protective cloud making him invisible to Dido see *Aen.* 1.515-518, 579-587 and above, p. 24.

[4] See Sherwin-White, *RP,* p. 8 for τὸ μὴ θησαυρίζειν as a characteristic of the barbarous Germans in Strabo. The phrase *componere opes* implies as well an inability to put resources together creatively to produce inventions. In this connection note in *A.* 8.321 that the natives are *genus indocile.* See also pp. 19-20 for *imperitia* and an absence of technology as a characteristic of barbarians in Caesar, *Gal.*

[5] *Cf.* Sherwin-White, *RP,* p. 8: Strabo attributes the migratory habits of the Germans to their lack of agriculture and storing up of wealth.

[6] Anderson, pp. 525-528 outlines the problem and offers various solutions. More recently see Binder, pp. 89-91; George, p. 27, n. 1; Eden on *A.* 8.322.

[7] See *Met.* 1.121-122 of the silver age:

> tum primum subiere [*i.e.,* men] domos: domus antra fuerunt
> et densi frutices et vinctae cortice virgae.

[8] For a discussion of changes in Vergil's conception of the golden age of Saturn see Anderson, pp. 519-520.

[9] See *A.* 4.212-213, ...*cui* [*i.e.,* to Dido] *litus arandum/...dedimus.* The disparaging tone of the barbarian Iarbas' words is unmistakable.

[10] *Cf.* Büchner, *RE,* col. 1398, 54-57.

[11] *Cf.* the remarks of Klingner, *Virgil,* pp. 512-513.

[12] Eden on *A.* 8.26-35 notes that *A.* 8.26-27 parallels *A.* 3.147ff. as well as *A.* 4.522-527. The parallel to *A* 3.147ff. is beyond question, but the repeated reminiscences of the narrative of Book 4 make it clear that the Dido episode is uppermost in Vergil's mind.

[13] See Pease on *A.* 4.532 (*magnoque, etc.*) and Eden on *A.* 8.19 for the metaphor as a commonplace.

[14] Diction and the identical syntax, word placement and (necessarily identical) metrical configuration demonstrate that *A.* 4.532 and 8.19 are imitations of Catullus. Although the line ending *fluctuat aestu* recurs in *A.* 12.486, the passage in which it appears has no other reminiscences of the Dido episode.

[15] See Hügi, p. 36 (but contrast the discussion on pp. 95-96) and in a similar vein Eden on *A.* 8.22ff. although Eden suggests that the similarity of setting of the *Aeneid* passage to the one in the *Argonautica* may have contributed in a subsidiary way to the inclusion of the simile.

[16] Hügi, p. 95 maintains without warrant that the passage on night in *A.* 4 is a direct imitation of A.R. 3.744-751. Although the passage in *A.* 4 is a reminiscence of Apollonius, there are (as Hügi himself notes) no verbal borrowings, and the contrast of night with the anxiety of a human is, as Eden on *A.* 8.26-35 notes, a commonplace of Greek poetry.

[17] Putnam, p. 424 and p. 428.

[18] That the kingdom in Italy is owed to Aeneas and Ascanius is a point that Vergil makes repeatedly. See, for example, *A.* 1.253; 2.783-784; 3.184-185; 4.234, 275-276, 354-355; 5.737; 6.66-67.

[19] For a citation of the reminiscences of Book 4 see R. D. Williams on *A.* 12.843f.

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